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The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is an independent institute 
for research, consultancy, education and training, based in the Netherlands. Its 
aim is to promote transparent, accountable and effective governance of the 
security sector, broadly defined. It seeks to advance democracy and the rule of 
law, help governments and civil society face their security challenges, and 
further the civilized and lawful resolution of conflict.  
 
The Man behind the Greenwood Papers 
 
Resting his fists on the lectern, he would fix his audience with a glare and 
pronounce: “REVEAL, EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY.” It was his golden rule of 
democratic governance. David Greenwood was born in England in 1937 and died in 
2009 in Scotland. He first worked for the British Ministry of Defence, then went on 
to teach political economy at Aberdeen University, where he later became the 
director of the Centre for Defence Studies. 
 
In 1997, David Greenwood joined the Centre for European Security Studies in the 
Netherlands as its Research Director. For 10 years, he was the principal researcher 
and teacher at CESS, and a friend and mentor to his colleagues. To borrow a phrase 
of his own, David Greenwood was a construction worker on the building site of 
democracy. This series of research reports, formerly called the Harmonie Papers, is 






This Greenwood Paper marks the end of a series of three programmes on civil-
military relations in Turkey and the prospect of Turkish membership of the 
European Union (EU). In 2004 the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) 
launched the first programme with the aim of contributing ‘to an increased 
understanding in Turkey of the appropriate role of the armed forces in a 
democracy and thereby to help the country to come closer to complying with the 
political EU (Copenhagen) criteria for membership’. The first two programmes, 
which ran between 2004 and 2009, focused on the role of the military in the 
polity and society of Turkey and, needless to say, involved breathtaking 
meetings between Turkish participants, and between them and participants 
from EU member states. In light of the history of the Republic and the 
‘guardians’ of its fundaments, the subject was a very sensitive one. Indeed, the 
Task Force Report, published in 2005, invoked opposing, sometimes bitter, 
reactions, even though the Report merely tried to clarify the measures 
necessary for further alignment of Turkish civil-military relations to EU practices. 
Nonetheless, over time this sensitive issue increasingly became a subject for 
free and open discussion, no matter how fiercely the views differed. 
The third three-year programme, called ‘Promoting Good Governance 
in the Security Sector of Turkey’, commenced in April 2010. In contrast to the 
previous focus on the military, this programme has emphasised the role of the 
civil authorities and aimed at the development of the civilian capacity for good 
governance. The existence of civil or political guidance as regards security and 
defence policy is often assumed as part of overall democratic control. In 
practice, however, the extent to which such guidance and civil leadership exists 
varies considerably. Some aspects of civilian oversight may be called ‘paper 
tigers’, lacking requirements such as transparency or informed documentation. 
One CESS study on civil direction clearly showed the differences in this respect 
in various member states of the EU. Our Turkish friends were right when they 
argued that there is no single EU model for civil-military relations, and that no 
single model can be imposed on Turkey. 
The past three years have shown a significant broadening of the theme. 
The subjects under scrutiny have included parliamentary oversight, financial 
accountability, the rule of law and civilian direction of the security sector. All four 
themes are addressed by Turkish and Dutch authors, while four policy papers, 
written by trainees on our courses, have been selected for publication as well. 
We are thankful to them, as we are to the two editors, Mert Kayhan from the 
ARI Movement in Turkey and PhD Candidate at Royal Holloway, University of 
London and Merijn Hartog from CESS. 
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In general, on behalf of the Board of CESS, I would like to thank all our 
partners and contributors to the programmes in Turkey during the past nine 
years. Many will remember the tense moments during the meetings and, 
perhaps in particular, during the informal gatherings, but my guess is that most 
of them also recognise the fruitful result of discussions that were previously 
impossible, or hardly possible. The future of Turkish-EU relations will not 
depend solely or predominantly on civil-military relations in Turkey. Yet, they are 
part of the required ‘alignment’, and we hope we have furthered that objective, 
an attempt that includes this Greenwood Paper as a final tangible contribution. 
 
Peter Volten 
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Between 2010 and 2013, the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) in 
the Netherlands conducted a capacity-building programme on ‘Promoting Good 
Governance in the Security Sector of Turkey’, in close cooperation with local 
partners TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara and the ARI 
Movement in Istanbul. The programme was financially supported by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At our conferences and training courses 
in Turkey, we welcomed politicians, civil servants, representatives from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists and many academics from 
various universities in Turkey and abroad. One of the features of the 
programme was a one-week study visit to the Netherlands, where a group of 
Turkish practitioners had an opportunity to share experiences and lessons 
learned with their Dutch counterparts. Since this programme is drawing to a 
close, the time has come to reflect on its outcomes. At the same time, we 
believe it is useful to place the programme’s progress in the context of the 
political developments in Turkey in recent years. 
The programme mentioned above evolved out of two earlier projects 
that CESS implemented in Turkey between 2004 and 2009. These previous 
ventures both aimed at understanding the salient position of the military in 
politics and society and suggested reforms to align Turkish civil-military 
relations with EU standards and practices. The third programme in Turkey 
aimed at enhancing civilian capacity for good governance in the security sector. 
The programme target group consisted of representatives from Parliament 
(deputies, but especially staffers and advisors) and the Court of Accounts, civil 
servants, academics and civil society representatives. The emphasis of our 
work in Turkey has thus followed political developments over the years, and has 
gradually moved from the military side of the civil-military equation to the civilian 
side. 
An important feature of the CESS approach is the emphasis on 
transparency and accountability for all institutions involved. For the government, 
our maxim is that the executive should reveal, explain and justify: reveal its 
policies and the underlying reasons, explain them to parliament and to the 
people at large, and finally justify them in parliament and in open public debate. 
                                                 
∗
 Mert Kayhan is Director of the ARI Movement in Turkey and a PhD candidate at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. Merijn Hartog is Programme Manager at CESS and 




In civil-military relations, we advocate a balance of trust whereby the military 
accept the primacy of politics, but politicians in government take professional 
military advice seriously. 
The aim of this book is to analyse the fundamentals of four major 
strands of good governance in the security sector: parliamentary oversight, 
financial accountability, the rule of law and civil direction. These themes 
determined the topics of the seminars, conferences and training courses that 
we organised during the last three years. Another aim of this book is to 
scrutinise recent developments in Turkey, using the four themes as a structure. 
By means of different case studies, all related to good governance in the 
security sector, four Turkish authors assess the many reforms that have taken 
place in Turkey in the recent past and the challenges that still lie ahead. We 
have also asked four authors from the Netherlands to consider the four themes 
from a Dutch perspective. Besides providing a Western European point of view 
on security sector governance, the Dutch authors introduce the themes from a 
theoretical perspective.   
Moreover, we have included four policy papers on issues related to 
good governance in the security sector in this book. These texts were written by 
participants on our training courses. One of the tasks we assigned to our 
trainees during the workshops was to compose a paper on a practical policy 
issue. The purpose of this exercise was to help participants improve their skills 
in producing and presenting short, concise policy papers. Of the many papers 
that were delivered during the programme, we have selected the four most 
interesting and thought-provoking texts. 
All of the papers in this book represent the authors’ own perspectives 
and arguments on the above-mentioned complex issues. In view of the authors’ 
diverse backgrounds and interests, some are longer than others, reflecting 
academic scrutiny and sensitivity; while others are shorter but sharper in nature, 
reflecting a more policy-oriented, activist approach. In a sense, the variety of the 
views expressed throughout the programme and the way they have been put 
forward are accurately represented in the book as well. This is not only 
desirable, but also unavoidable in a highly politicised context where reform and 
progress both take time and create discontent, if not at least discomfort. 
 
 
Turbulent Transformations in Turkish Civil-military Relations 
It would be an understatement to declare that Turkey has experienced 
significant political transformations in recent years. When considering the 
security sector, the most evident changes irrefutably took place in the 
relationship between the civilian and military leadership. Prominent 
developments that signify this changing relationship are the ongoing Ergenekon 
and Balyoz cases, in which, respectively, around 300 people are being charged 
with membership of a clandestine terrorist organisation and in which hundreds 
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of military officers are under indictment for plotting a military coup in 2003. Both 
these cases and consequent conspiracy theories and coup allegations have 
hurt the army’s standing. Its status as the most trusted institution in the country 
seems to have plummeted since 2002.1 
It should be noted here, however, that Turkish society is deeply divided 
about the Ergenekon-Balyoz trials. As one of the rapporteurs at a conference 
we organised last year pointed out, one of the main reasons for this directly 
relates to a prevalent lack of faith in the impartiality of the Turkish justice system. 
The issue in this respect is not so much that the judiciary is not very impartial, 
but that part of the Turkish population does not believe the country possesses 
an impartial legal system. And without sound foundations of popular trust, the 
fundamentals of the rule of law will crumble. Another reason for concern is the 
expanding nature of the Ergenekon case in particular. After the arrest of senior 
military officers at the start of the case in 2007, the arrests became more 
widespread in the following years. Nowadays, not only is the military under 
indictment, but also journalists, academics, civil society representatives and 
government officials. Popular support for the case seems to be declining at the 
same pace as the indictments are expanding. 
Another noticeable development that led to an acute reshuffle of civil-
military relations was the collective and voluntary resignation of the military top 
brass in July 2011, in protest against the many arrests of senior military officers 
in the aforementioned cases. This seemed to be a last-resort move by an 
increasingly powerless and desperate military, intended to show the 
government that they could still shake up the political system by resigning 
voluntarily. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s swift response in appointing a 
new army chief rendered this rash move by the military basically ineffective. 
Next to these investigations, trials and resignations, a legislative reform 
process was instigated ten years ago, which was a significant step in asserting 
civilian control over the military and which also had a bearing on good 
governance in the security sector in general. These legislative reforms were first 
of all aimed at the composition, structure, roles and functions of the National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), which until the early 2000s was 
perceived as being the platform where the military wielded its power over 
politics. Since 2003, the MGK has again been a consultative body instead of a 
policy-making institution, which is basically what it had been after 1982. 
Furthermore, since 2004, the Secretary General of the MGK has been a civilian, 
instead of a military officer. One of the authors of this book, however, points out 
that the reforms were only aimed at the demilitarisation of the MGK, and not at 
democratising national security policy-making. According to this author, the 
reforms were nothing more than a transfer of power from the military to the 
executive authorities. Further to that, the whole policy-making process is still 
                                                 
1
 Cagaptay 2011.  
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closed to Parliament, civil society and the public. There is very little debate in 
the media regarding these issues. 
Another significant legislative development, which is generally 
supported in Turkey and which will also influence civil-military relations, is the 
ongoing constitution-making process. This new constitution will replace the one 
from 1982, which both awarded officers with a far-reaching mandate to control 
the political arena and at the same time restrained the power of civilian leaders. 
In itself, the drafting of a new constitution is a very positive development, and it 
will surely increase Turkey's prestige and strengthen its role as an actor in the 
international arena once it is in place. 
On the other hand, the lack of transparency in this regard is a reason 
for concern. To generate sufficient public confidence and political legitimacy, it 
would have been better if the authorities had informed Turkish society 
throughout the drafting process. Following the initial meetings of the 
Parliamentary Commission that is drafting the constitution, transcripts of the 
proceedings were indeed released. However, no new transcripts have been 
published for more than a year now.2  A lack of transparency by means of 
regular updates could be fertile ground for speculation in a society that has 
always been prone to conspiracy theories. In the end, the credibility of the 
Commission and the constitution it produces would be best served by an open 
drafting process. 
Yet another legislative development that is dealt with in this book is 
parliamentary financial control of the defence sector in Turkey. Here it is useful 
to note that legislation is in place for Members of Parliament and the Court of 
Accounts to be able to assert their right to control defence and military spending. 
As recent deliberations on the defence budget in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA) again pointed out, however, they do not make sufficient use 
of that right. A pressing concern now is to increase the knowledge and expertise 
on defence and security matters within these institutions, because that is what 
is largely lacking. Especially among the administrative cadres, that is, staffers 
and advisors, there is a need for knowledge with regard to defence and security 
issues. 
Further to this, a culture of accountability needs to be encouraged. This 
means having a government that proactively reports on its policy and spending, 
rather than only being accountable after the money has been spent. This 
applies particularly to large investments in infrastructure, communications and 
military equipment. Pursuing transparency and accountability requires having a 
critical parliament and civil society that boldly and proactively assert their right 
to know. Surely this is the most challenging and time-consuming task, one that 
basically necessitates a change in mentality among government officials. 
                                                 
2
 Varol 2012. 
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Reducing the political influence of the army was an unambiguous move 
towards firm civilian control of the security sector, thereby aligning Turkey with 
practice in other NATO and EU countries. The Turkish Government seems to 
have achieved this goal, which deserves praise and encouragement. However, 
this is not the end of the story, for it does not automatically mean that control of 
the security sector in Turkey is becoming more democratic. This will require 
further changes. Our book aims to highlight the transformations that have been 
initiated in the framework of security sector governance, but at the same time 
assesses the challenges that lie ahead, without underestimating the fact that, as 
history has shown us, the success of any kind of political reform process with 
particular social outcomes is highly dependent upon the extent to which it is 




Part A - Parliamentary Oversight 
 
 
I. Parliamentary Oversight of Peace Support Operations 
 





A successful parliamentary democracy depends on the transparency and 
accountability of the government and effective scrutiny by parliament. In 
principle, there should be as little difference as possible between defence and 
security on the one hand and the range of other government departments on 
the other. All should follow the cherished maxims, enunciated by the Centre for 
European Security Studies and its scholar David Greenwood, that governments 
should reveal, explain and justify their policies and actions: reveal them to the 
voters, explain them in public debate and justify them in parliament. That might 
cause difficulties in the field of defence, which in the final analysis deals with 
matters of life and death and where secrecy plays a larger role than in other 
domains, but even here, maximum transparency on policy is essential to 
maintain public confidence. Secrecy applies mainly to weapons characteristics 
and contingency plans. Defence is a matter of the long haul and requires the 
lasting support of the nation. Moreover, most of the presumed secrets that are 
relevant to public debate can be found in open sources somewhere in the world. 
A professional parliamentary staff should have no difficulty in disclosing them in 
a responsible manner. 
Effective democratic oversight depends on the clearly defined authority 
of the president, prime minister, minister of defence, chief of the general staff 
and parliament. The law must be clear in times of peace and for emergency 
powers and transitions to military operations. Parliament should control the 
budget and play a defined role in deploying the armed forces. In NATO and EU 
countries, the minister of defence is a civilian, assisted by a ministry of defence 
which consists of both military and civilian officials and deals with the budget, 
intelligence, strategic planning, force structure and deployments, arms 
acquisition and military promotions. All such countries’ parliaments possess a 
standing committee on defence, but how the executive is controlled varies 
considerably in practice. A common norm should be that the committee meets 
regularly, has the right to request information and to discuss it with the minister 
of defence personally, asks oral and written questions, examines the budget 
                                                 
∗
 Dr Willem van Eekelen is former Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, former 
Secretary-General at the WEU and Board Member at CESS. 
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and the audits, and is entitled to conduct hearings. There are differences, 
however, in the degree to which parliaments deal with topical policy issues. 
Their role is widely acknowledged in budgetary matters (although detailed 
involvement in a line-by-line examination also varies) and legislation, but on 
policy questions practice varies between control ex ante and ex post. Some 
argue that parliament is better off scrutinising policy ex post, because of its 
deterrent effect: the government has to be more careful for fear of being 
censored, while parliamentary agreement in the preparatory phase would make 
it a partner of the government and diminish the scope of later criticism.1 
In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, the 
emphasis is on ex ante scrutiny, where parliament has two instruments at its 
disposal: a constitutional requirement or convention giving it a role in policy 
decisions relating to deployment abroad, and the power of the purse. In the 
United Kingdom this is minimal, hence the emphasis on ex post evaluation. In 
France, Italy and Spain, parliamentary involvement is even more minimal, both 
before a decision is formalised and in the evaluation process. In France, the 
power of the purse is exercised once every five years by the approval of the loi 
du programme for that period.2  
 An interesting question is whether having better information increases 
risk aversion among parliamentarians. Usually a large part of parliamentary 
debate concerns the degree of danger involved in the proposed operation. In a 
way, this might seem peculiar, because there would be no need for military 
intervention if there were no danger. The sentiment is understandable, however, 
particularly for parliamentarians who are no experts but represent their voters. 
Among European countries, only France, Spain and the United Kingdom have 
shown an outspoken willingness to take decisions involving clear risks of 
casualties and these countries apparently have a larger ´risk absorption´ 
capacity. These countries are also rare examples of the executive being able to 
take deployment decisions single-handedly, subject only to ex post 
accountability. 
 Security and defence are part of foreign policy and need to be 
grounded in a strategic concept that defines interests, threats and risks; 
determines the international position of the country in general and in the 
alliances it belongs to in particular; and outlines globally the size and 
composition of the defence establishment. Such a concept needs to be 
reviewed periodically, because the international environment is subject to 
fundamental change, especially since the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise 
of the Soviet Union. Generally, the threat of massive aggression has been 
replaced not only by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
                                                 
1
 Houben 2005, 259-264. 
2
 See DCAF 2003, which includes this author’s Occasional Paper no. 2 of October 2002 
on “The national and international parliamentary dimension”, and tables on practice in 
NATO countries. See also DCAF 2008. 
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and failed states, but also by non-military threats such as organised crime, 
trafficking in drugs and human beings, and illegal immigration. 
The upshot of these developments is an increasing merger of external 
and internal security, which has to be reflected in the ways governments 
organise themselves. Civil-military cooperation has become an essential 
dimension in an overarching concept of security, and also in the conduct of the 
military in expeditionary operations. In peace support operations (PSOs) we 
have to deal with the interconnected phases of prevention, conflict resolution if 
necessary by military means, stabilisation, reconstruction, and security sector 
reform, culminating in good governance. 
This requires close coordination between the ministries of defence and 
foreign affairs, both in policy making and in the conduct of operations. In PSOs 
the objective is winning the hearts and minds of the population, difficult as this 
might be. In Afghanistan we heard much about the ‘3D’ approach – defence, 
diplomacy and development – perhaps an appealing slogan, but not an 
adequate description of what our mission was supposed to achieve: not 
defence, but security, and not only diplomacy, but rather good governance. 
Therefore it would have been better to aim at an integrated approach combining 
a full arsenal of instruments. 
Over the past twenty years, the role of the military has changed. During 
the cold war, not a shot was fired between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and 
maintaining sufficient defence capabilities was a deterrent of war. Today, the 
military profession has become dangerous in situations of ‘war among the 
people’, with repeated absence from home, and the addition of many non-
military skills. In PSOs the role of the soldier abroad might be compared with 
that of the police at home: he ensures security but acts only when necessary, 
the difference being that in most PSOs there is a need for protection (and 
sometimes hard fighting) against insurgents. One of the consequences has 
been the realisation that without a minimum of security, a development effort 
has little chance of success. For that reason, the military forces in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan were grouped in 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), more successful in the north of the 
country than in the south. It also led to a greater appreciation of the role of the 
military, which suffered greater casualties than many governments had 
anticipated. 
In terms of security sector reform, the experience in Afghanistan has 
contributed to a better and more constructive understanding of civil-military 
relations. The military accept the primacy of politics in deciding what the country 
would be prepared to do and at what cost. Politicians take military advice 
seriously in judging what is possible and the required capabilities. Ideally, we 
see a ‘balance of trust’ between the military and the politicians, in which the 
defence and security effort can count on democratic support. 
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One could argue that after two decades of security sector reform in 
Eastern Europe, we should prefer the term ‘security sector governance’, 
because the emphasis has moved to adaptation to shifting circumstances, and 
that the principles of reform are widely accepted by now, at least in NATO and 
EU circles. Indeed, much progress has been made, but parliaments are 
confronted with new dilemmas. In the first place, participation in PSOs is not 
automatic, but discretionary and subject to often varying considerations. In 
collective defence there was little debate, but in a peace support mission, 
questions relating to its purpose, chance of success, risks of casualties, 
duration, cost and participation by others, play a great role. In the past, for a 
parliamentarian, there were few votes in being spokesman for defence, but 
today, the public takes a much keener interest.  
An unintended consequence of this new situation is the great variety of 
conditions applied to the availability of national contingents, making ‘constraint 
management’ a permanent headache for multinational force commanders. In 
addition we have seen considerable change in the skills and equipment needed 
for operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Calls for ‘network centric 
warfare’ were overtaken by ‘boots on the ground’ and helicopters. Then drones 
and Special Forces were needed for surgical strikes. In the Libyan crisis, the 
participating states had to rely on US ground surveillance, target acquisition and 
mid-air refuelling; capabilities which surpassed the ability of a single nation and 
militated in favour of multinational units. 
At a time of shrinking defence budgets, the need for international 
cooperation is greater than ever. Hardly any country is able to act militarily on 
its own. Today the emphasis is on smarter defence in NATO and on pooling 
and sharing in the EU. Both are aiming at doing better with limited funds. 
Obviously, there are possible synergies to be achieved by combining efforts, 
particularly in training, logistics and common research and acquisition. But 
pooling and sharing with whom? Preferably with countries that have the same 
equipment, share the same defence culture, and are geographically contiguous. 
Yet, both NATO and the EU need to maintain an overarching framework 
incorporating the contributions of all allies and partners.  
Pooling and sharing and task specialisation imply interdependence, 
which requires a high probability that, in a crisis, the resources involved will be 
made available to the partners. That raises the sensitive issue of national 
sovereignty, so dear to parliaments. They will be reluctant to give up their say in 
defence and security, which they still regard as one of their main remaining 
prerogatives in a globalising world. That sentiment went even deeper in the 
days of conscription, but remains strong when confronted with the prospect of 
sending one’s soldiers into harm’s way. Conversely, if countries cannot count 
on the availability of the shared resources, there is little sense in building them. 
A clear example was the withdrawal of German personnel from the Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) flights during the Libyan crisis. In that 
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case, other crews were available, but in other cases the common effort might be 
completely paralysed. 
Is there a solution to the ‘sovereignty’ dilemma? Probably not fully, but 
an effort should be made to arrive at a sort of pre-delegation arrangement 
between both governments and their parliaments, that is, a catalogue of the 
contingencies and scenarios where the units and assets will be made available 
rapidly and without waiting for parliamentary consent. We have seen many 
examples of the need for quick action to prevent a crisis from escalating and 
causing large-scale human suffering. The EU’s operation Artemis in the Congo 
was effective, with 1,700 troops able to intervene rapidly before the UN could 
muster a peacekeeping force three months later. Similarly, France and the 
United Kingdom acted quickly, but without much consultation with others, in the 
Libyan crisis, and prevented the rebellion in the Benghazi area from crumbling. 
The problem of sovereignty also plays a role in the debate on 
interference in the internal affairs of a country that is violating human rights. The 
debate on humanitarian intervention – or better: intervention for humanitarian 
purposes – was given a stimulus by the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 and the 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
supported by a report from Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, pushed the 
notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to turn the debate away from intervention 
and towards the responsibility of the state to protect its own population. Kofi 
Annan’s important report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All’ was the subject of a UN summit in September 2005, 
where it was not fully endorsed, but where absolute notions of sovereignty were 
dismantled nevertheless: 
[...] we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with the 
relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.3 
The notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ found its way into several UN Security 




The Dutch Framework for Authorising Military Deployment  
The Netherlands has been a frequent contributor to PSOs of all kinds. It was the 
fifth country to send a battalion (of volunteers) and a ship to the Korean War, 
and participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the 
                                                 
3
 UNGA Resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005, para.s 138-9. 
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United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 
in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Multinational Force in Iraq after the 
defeat of Saddam Hussein, Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan, Ocean 
Shield and Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, and made many smaller 
contributions to UN peacekeeping. Parliament was consulted and, until the end 
of the 20th century, supported the government without great difficulty. That 
became more difficult in 1995, when peacekeeping in Bosnia turned out to be 
impossible because the parties to the conflict did not want peace and 
international action had to resort to peace enforcement. 
The Netherlands Government formulated a list of conditions for 
participation in intervention for humanitarian purposes in a note to Parliament4 
after having organised three international seminars on the subject. They 
included: 
• serious and massive violation of human rights; 
• reliable and objective proof from different sources of these 
violations or the threat thereof; 
• the government of the state concerned cannot or will not take 
adequate measures, or is itself responsible for the violations; 
• an urgent need to intervene; 
• use of force is the ultimate means to redress the situation; 
• the primary purpose of the intervention is to stop the violations; 
• evidence that the intervention is supported by those it intends to 
protect; 
• the position of neighbouring countries has been taken into account; 
• there is a reasonable chance of success at an acceptable cost; 
• the intervention is unlikely to lead to even greater problems. 
In implementing the intervention, its purpose should be made public at the 
outset; the use of force should be limited to what is necessary and proportional 
to the objective; the ius in bello should be observed; the consequences to the 
political system of the country should be limited to the objective; and there 
should be full reporting to the UNSC. 
 The Netherlands matched these conditions with a ‘review framework’ 
based on Article 100 of the Constitution and containing a non-exhaustive 
checklist of aspects relating to parliamentary involvement in the national 
decision on the despatch of forces for a PSO. A letter to Parliament proposing 
such a deployment should provide an analysis covering the following points, 
when appropriate: 
• an assessment of the political context of the conflict; 
• the political attitudes of the parties to the conflict; 
• the issues at stake in the conflict and the motives of the parties; 
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• the character of the conflict (intra- or inter-state) and the risks of 
spillover; 
• (previous) negotiations, international efforts and mediation; 
• whether an agreement was in force, and if so, the extent to 
which it was respected; 
• a political risk analysis of the situation and future developments; 
• the role of the military operation in the political process; and 
• the humanitarian, political and economic situation, including 
subjects like refugees, reconstruction, rule of law, disarmament, 
and elections. 
A less extensive but basically similar approach was made by the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in 1997:5 
First, are we sure of our case? ... Second, have we exhausted all 
diplomatic options? ... Third, are there military operations we can 
sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long 
term? ... And finally, do we have national interests involved? 
The European security strategy developed by High Representative Solana in 
2003 put the emphasis on effective multilateralism with the Charter of the 
United Nations as the main framework. This meant that in principle, the use of 
force in PSOs should take place only with a mandate from the UNSC. No clear 
answer was given for what should be done if the UNSC were unable to deal 
with a crisis because of the veto of one or more of its permanent members. That 
was the situation in Kosovo when Russia opposed a UN resolution, but NATO 
felt obliged to act to stop ethnic cleansing and a massive exodus of the 
population. 
The Dutch Parliament devoted much time to debating these issues. 
Due to pressure from Parliament, the Government agreed to an independent 
inquiry into the Srebrenica disaster, in which Dutch peacekeepers had been 
pushed out by General Mladic and thousands of Bosnians murdered. Its report 
in 1999 – four years after the event – led to the resignation of the Kok Cabinet, 
albeit shortly before elections were due to be held. In the Iraq case, an inquiry 
under a former president of the Supreme Court was held into the Government’s 
attitude regarding its support for the aims of the US-led operation against 
Saddam Hussein, while refraining from participating militarily. In 2009 (six years 
after the crisis), the inquiry’s critical report led to the resignation of the fourth 
Balkenende Cabinet, largely because of the (somewhat exaggerated) 
conclusion that Parliament had not been fully informed, which is a deadly sin in 
Dutch politics. In any case, nobody could say that the Dutch do not take 
international affairs seriously. Albeit in an extremely ex post manner. 
Scepticism in the Netherlands about the policies of President Bush in 
Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a delicate relationship between a Government 
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wanting to show solidarity in NATO operations and a hesitant Parliament. A 
second extension of the Uruzgan taskforce became impossible. The loss of 24 
military personnel was an element in the debate, but the lack of progress in 
stabilising the situation was more important, plus the fact that commitments like 
Afghanistan had to be of limited duration. The effort became difficult to sustain 
and equipment was wearing out more rapidly than foreseen. The 3D method, 
although not used exclusively by the Dutch, received praise, as did their 
conduct in defeating a Taliban offensive in the battle of Chora in Uruzgan in 
June 2007, making them more battle-hardened than many other units.  
 
 
The Sequence of Deployment to Afghanistan 
Nobody in Europe had expected military involvement in a country as distant and 
unknown as Afghanistan. Not on 11 September 2001, when Al Qaeda struck 
the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in a surprising attack on United 
States economic power and military might. The international response was 
largely sympathetic. Nous sommes tous des Américains, wrote Le Monde, but 
Washington did little to capitalise on the wave of support. NATO invoked Article 
V on common defence against an external threat, and AWACS aircraft 
participated in surveying American airspace, but the United States gave a cool 
response to offers of assistance. When the Taliban refused to extradite Osama 
bin Laden with the excuse of oriental hospitality, the United States mounted a 
quick campaign, together with the militias of the Afghan Northern Alliance, to 
defeat the Taliban. They succeeded in three weeks, but failed to capture 
Osama bin Laden, who escaped from Tora Bora to Pakistan and was killed 
there only in 2011. The military campaign continued under the codename 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but more had to be done to pacify and 
modernise one of the most backward countries in Central Asia. Over the years, 
countries from all parts of the world participated actively, except – peculiarly 
enough – the countries bordering on Afghanistan. 
On 16 April 2004, the Dutch Government informed Parliament that the 
NATO Council had adopted a revised operational plan for the gradual 
deployment of the ISAF for Afghanistan, which over time would include the OEF. 
A year later, on 3 June 2005, the Government wrote that it had decided to 
contribute to the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the fight against international 
terrorism. It added that NATO intended to deploy ISAF to the six southern 
provinces of Afghanistan. Two weeks later, the Government wrote that it was 
examining the possibility of making a contribution in Southern Afghanistan, 
together with the United Kingdom and Canada and possibly others, subsequent 
to a request from the Secretary General of NATO. 
In conformity with Article 100 of the Constitution, on 22 December 2005, 
the Government announced that the Netherlands would participate with a task 
force in Uruzgan for a period of two years, starting in June 2006, together with 
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an Australian unit. The Netherlands would also participate in Regional 
Command South in Kandahar, and would command this headquarters between 
November 2006 and May 2007. On 30 November 2007, Parliament was 
informed of the decision to continue the participation in ISAF for another two 
years with new partners: France, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Singapore. 
In the meantime, the Dutch share of the taskforce had grown from some 1,000 
to 1,900 personnel. The security situation was worse than expected and 
logistics in a province without tarred roads were a constant headache. 
Parliamentary anxiety about the safety of personnel sleeping in tents had led to 
the construction of reinforced containers.  
Early in 2010, the coalition Government could not agree on a second 
extension and collapsed over the issue. On 21 April, a group of 
parliamentarians from six parties agreed to a motion asking the (caretaking) 
Government to examine the dispatch of a police training mission. The Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and Defence sketched the possibilities for joining one of the 
various ongoing programmes, but left the decision to the next Government. In 
an ‘Article 100 letter’, the new Government announced its decision to send an 
integrated police training mission of 500 personnel under the 3D formula to the 
German PRT in Kunduz Province, Germany being the ‘lead nation’ for the 
European Union Policy Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) in that area. The issue 
was controversial and led to a parliamentary hearing of some 30 specialists 
from different countries. A few days later, the leftwing opposition introduced a 
motion to cancel the mission, but it was defeated in a vote of 100 votes out of a 
total of 150. The mission was saved, but its supporters continued to quarrel 
over the duration of the basic training programme, security, human rights and 
the related issue of literacy. A special demand was that the policemen would 
not engage in fighting missions. In mid-August 2011, the mission started its 




The experience of the past two decades has shown that in mounting an 
operation, one should first define the desired outcome and the efforts needed to 
achieve it. To whom are we opposed and can we deal with the present leaders? 
Can we show that our outcome is preferable to that of our opponent?6 And 
above all, can we forge an integrated approach, combining all instruments at 
our disposal? This would require much better coordination and cooperation 
between all international organisations involved than is currently the case. 
Parliamentarians should focus less on incidents and more on assessing the 
impact of policies in the longer term. Are we making progress, and if not, why 
not? 
                                                 
6
 Smith 2005.  
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Finally, parliamentarians would do well to participate in international 
parliamentary assemblies, like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Assembly. This 
would widen their understanding of the issues and the positions of the other 
participants. Similarly, with the full incorporation of the Western European Union 
(WEU) into the EU, national parliamentarians involved in defence and security 
will henceforth meet twice a year, together with a delegation of the European 
Parliament in the capital of the EU presidency. 
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Most countries consider parliament to be the supreme authority responsible for 
democratic control of the military. In addition, in most democracies, the 
decision-making process consists of a series of procedures whereby the 
governing body takes the decision to send military troops abroad only with the 
approval of parliament. In this context, parliament is responsible for controlling 
civilian-military relations as a whole and overseeing the decision-making 
process to authorise military operations abroad, in particular on behalf of its 
citizens. 
Disputes between developed countries are increasingly being resolved 
through non-military means. When their armies instead step in to solve issues 
between less developed countries, many challenges in civil-military relations 
that had been deemed resolved begin to emerge. Such peace support 
operations reveal that mission formats differ substantially from those in 
conventional theatres. The military engaged in a less-developed country 
encounters an environment in which perceptions of democracy and democratic 
order are different, and where different cultural, social and psychological 
interactions are dominant. Moreover, the military is required to engage in 
missions that entail having civil expertise in these environments, even indirectly, 




The Spanish Minister of Defence appointed after the death of General Franco in 
1982, who made an important contribution to the democratisation of the 
Spanish military, said that studies carried out on civil-military relations suffered 
from a lack of theory. According to Burchill’s 2001 study, quoted by Serra, 
‘theories define not only our style of expression but also our ethical and 
practical horizons’.1 It is clear that theoretical works help us to understand the 
rationale underlying facts and evaluate the results obtained in academic studies, 
particularly in the field of political science. Furthermore, theories do not only 
explain and/or predict, but they also indicate types of possibilities for solutions 
and for further development. Thus, it is thought to be beneficial to construct a 
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theoretical framework to assist us both with understanding this topic of study 
and to think about the different possible solutions.  
Serra has observed that ‘the academic circles in the United States 
started to discuss seriously the area of civil-military relations thanks to a clash 
between Clinton and the military in the 1990s’.2 In relation to this observation, 
Serra stated ‘I doubt Huntington would rewrite today what he had written as a 
foreword of his work The Soldier and the State.’ With regard to military missions 
abroad, it is evident that the theoretical debates carried out in the United States 
in the 1990s had an eventual impact on practice in this area. Thus, to make the 
responsibility and powers of parliaments in relation to these tasks more 
comprehensible, it will be beneficial to review the theoretical debates that took 
place between the governing body and the US military leadership in the 1990s. 
These debates were constituted with a view to differentiating the 
engagement levels, as well as the institutional features of the military changing 
over time. One of the most important issues revealed in these debates is that 
there can be solidarity between the military and parts of the legislature to resist 
other deputies and the government, which may be opposed to their plans, due 
to the nature of the military industrial complex. In this, the military can be 
identified as a collective pressure group. 
Dauber thinks that ‘the doctrine suggesting gradual force usage as in 
Vietnam is now being converted into the short-term use of force that can be 
concluded with less casualty in the 1990s, namely into a doctrine where 
technical standards are the dominant factor’.3 According to Dauber, ‘during the 
planning and decision-making of a military operation, this approach rendering 
the technical standards dominant allow the military to preside over the debates 
by exerting a monopoly of expertise on these issues.’4 
This type of operation raises questions relating to how the lack of civil 
expertise among the military might be tackled in order to control and supervise 
the elements5 considered integral parts of the decision-making process of the 
civil authority relating to national security. Hence, Serra states that ‘my 
increasing awareness about the political realities in different countries has 
allowed me to see the ignorance of the civil body that is responsible for 
reformation in those countries on military issues’.6 Feaver points out that military 
personnel may take their place in some part of the decision-making process by 
proxy and by making proposals to assess and eliminate the threat; however, the 
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final decision must remain with the civilian authority.7 Nevertheless, Feaver’s 
‘way-out’ proposal is not capable of adequately explaining how parliaments and 
governments that lack expertise on many technical issues can provide oversight 
on a military that constantly develops new methods counteracting such 
processes. 
Another area put forth at the engagement level is the military 
operational method whereby the military conducts missions similar to police 
operations. Janowitz identified this practice in the 1960s. According to Janowitz, 
‘when a consistent international relationship form is sought rather than victory 
and when the military is forced to employ a minimum use of power and 
consistent defensive stances, then the military institution is converted into a 
police organization’.8 The experiences with Afghanistan and Iraq have shown 
that United States troops are obliged to perform tasks in accordance with 
Janowitz's ‘police organization’ method. 
Avant's findings agree with those of Serra, suggesting that support from 
parts of the legislature gave the military a reason to reject the governing body’s 
decision in the 1990s.9 Based upon this finding, Avant considers that a civil 
consensus ‘between the governing body and the legislature’ will be the most 
effective tool in solving the problem. 
 
 
Common Practices Regarding the Oversight Function of Parliaments 
Although parliamentary functions for controlling the armed forces in a 
democratic manner and to provide oversight of relevant foreign missions can 
vary from country to country, generally, the approval, recommendation and 
warning functions are the same. 
It is necessary for parliaments to establish a method for fulfilling the 
functions relating to oversight and supervision. This entails setting up special 
commissions and committees. Through these commissions and committees, it 
is anticipated that parliaments will have the power to monitor the whole national 
security policy and defence planning process. These committees and 
commissions work in areas such as foreign affairs, planning and budget, 
industry, commerce, science and technology, defence industry 
support/governance, and so forth. 
In the control system chain, the governing body and the judiciary also 
play important roles in addition to and/or apart from that of parliament. In many 
democratic systems, the head of state or president is also the chief commander 
of the armed forces. These roles and functions are perceived and constituted by 
different methods (symbolic, solid, less/more active forms). The positioning of 
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national security councils within the governing body in some countries, as well 
as the related mandates and responsibilities, vary widely.  
The principal duties of parliaments related to sending troops abroad are 
to approve the troop deployment prior to or after the deployment; in other words, 
to approve the decision of the political authority regarding the use of force. 
During this process, parliament is expected to take into account the operational 
details of a decision, such as the framework of the mission, unit composition, 
amounts of personnel armaments and equipment, the terms of reference, rules 
of engagement, and so forth. 
Using different implementations methods that vary from country to 
country, parliaments can do the following: 
• Approve the budget for the mission. 
• Demand additional information channels to assuage concerns 
regarding the decision of the political authority to send troops 
abroad. 
• Demand that governing body inform parliament by utilising the 
intelligence services, other national institutions and/or 
international organisations, institutions and partners. 
• Use, for information purposes, methods such as questioning, 
censure, urgent sessions, statements, official investigations and 
visiting troops abroad. 
• In the case of opposition to a decision by the governing body, a 
vote of no confidence may take place. 
The decision process related to the deployment of troops abroad can proceed 
as relatively closed sessions and in a technical format where military and 
civilian expertises are utilised jointly. Nonetheless, in terms of the democratic 
requirement to be accountable to citizens, the system must be sufficient to be 
able to monitor and provide oversight for these processes in almost every 
aspect. 
A number of considerations may be mentioned in terms of the delicacy 
and importance of the political decision-making process regarding troop 
deployment abroad. First and foremost: the deployment of troops to another 
state's area of sovereignty, for whatever reason, does not only substantially 
affect the relations with that country alone, but usually also those with other 
countries in the region. Second, military missions to be conducted abroad 
require the use of significant resources. These missions do not only constitute a 
heavy financial burden in terms of resources such as armaments, vehicles, 
equipment, munitions, allowances, maintenance, supply and depreciation costs, 
but they also require the deployment of a significant number of human 
resources to a region where major risks are involved. In other words, sending 
troops abroad is something that should go beyond the process of strategic level 
decision-making and execution conducted only within the institutional structure 
of the state. And third, the decision to send troops abroad has a significant 
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effect on individual citizens. These decisions are closely associated with social 
perceptions, established ethical values and cultural settings.  
In parallel with these considerations, devising the decision-making 
processes related to sending troops abroad in a manner to be monitored on 
behalf of citizens by organs such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
non-political organisations (NPOs), media bodies and universities monitoring 
these processes, gains more importance. When taking a decision to send 
troops abroad, especially with regard to international relations and financial 
aspects, the elementary factors differ from country to country. For example, in 
some countries, constitutional, legal, ethical, traditional and cultural aspects 
may be more prevalent.  
Furthermore, the military may show institutionalised reflexes to 
influence the planning and execution stages of mission types that involve 
serious risks for the troops. The new and different political design emerging with 
the change in the operational area for troops also affects the in-house aspect of 
civil-military relations as a whole. In this respect, whether or not the 
engagements of the military stay within the traditional cultural framework, 
forming the perception of the citizens of the states to which the military is 
assigned and within the assent criteria composed within this framework, 
emerges as a new area of discussion. 
More specifically, the differentiation of the identity of the superior 
command in this framework can also be judged either in terms of international 
relations or in terms of country-specific values. Besides, the requirements, 
nature, costs and implementation methods of peace support missions and the 
international problems arising as a result of this implementation may create an 
environment where the institutional trust felt both for the state and for the 
military may be questioned. 
In relation to decisions on deploying troops abroad, parliaments need to 
consider the conditions in which the troops will be deployed and the extent to 
which these will be acceptable to the public. Parliaments are also expected to 
use their power to expressly discuss the details of the decision, such as the 
following:  
• Is the mission compliant with the constitution and the 
international and national legal framework? 
• To what extent is the permission of the host country influential? 
What is the allocated budget and how will the budget be spent? 
• Are the operational details of the deployment clear and 
unequivocal and which of parliament’s approval criteria were 
decisive? 
• How will the review of the military operations be made? 
It is a common expectation that a parliament will discuss the decision and the 
policies of the governing body related to the deployment of troops openly and in 
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detail, question the executive and the members of the military under oath (if 
necessary) and investigate suspicious cases. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to have answers to the following questions 
in order to understand the differences in the oversight and supervision functions 
related to the missions to be conducted abroad, in terms of responsibility and 
authorisation levels: 
• Are there possibilities for communication between members of 
parliament and the relevant bodies conducting the operation? 
• Are there means allocated to parliamentary committees for 
visiting troops abroad, and for sharing the observations and 
information obtained during such visits with the 
parliamentarians and the public? 
• Is parliament granted direct oversight power of the peace 
support mission before and after sending the troops abroad, 
without endangering the safety of the operation? 
• Since the process in parliament will take a long time, are there 
conditions where the oversight power of parliament is 
suspended and/or exceptions are applied? 
In relation to the possible duties and responsibilities regarding military 
deployment abroad, there are particular areas where parliaments may 
contradict the powers of the relevant governing body responsible for 
implementing the operation. Issues such as confidentiality, operational security, 
international procedures and methods, as well as national norms and cultural 
settings that differ from country to country, affect these discussions. To this 
extent, the question of whether the multinational chain of command of deployed 
armed forces allows oversight is emerging as the main issue for discussion. 
Another debated issue is whether the mandate of parliament is applicable to the 
intelligence support of the operation to be conducted. 
 
 
Legal Framework and Current Practices of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly Relating to Military Deployment Abroad 
In the past, several Turkish governments have applied to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) for military deployment abroad; this has happened 
more than 30 times since 1950. All the applications were accepted, except 
one.10 However, the decision by the Democrat Party for military deployment in 
Korea in 1950 was taken without the consent of the TGNA. After this, the 
decision process related to military deployment abroad was arranged as a 
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 29 
separate article in the Constitution of 1961. Since then, the provision specifying 
that the mandate for permission would remain with the TGNA has been 
converted into a constitutional provision. This arrangement was maintained in 
the Constitution of 1982, but a second paragraph was added to the article, 
bestowing the President with a mandate to use the armed forces in cases of 
imminent emergency. 
The provision related to the military deployment of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) is stated in Article 92 paragraph F of the 
section related to legislation of the chapter concerning the basic organs of the 
Republic of the Constitution of 1982.11 The format of this arrangement in the 
Constitution reflected to TGNA's Rules of Procedure as Article 130 entitled 
‘Sending or Acceptance of Use of Armed Forces’ specified in the section 
entitled ‘Declaration of War and Decisions Concerning the Armed Forces’. 
Furthermore, according to Article 117 of the Constitution, the Council of 
Ministers is responsible to Parliament for the protection of National Security and 
for preparing the Armed Forces for national defence. 12  Moreover, the 
assignment of this power to the TGNA is clearly stated in Article 16 of the ‘Law 
for Mobilisation and State of War’, dated 1983 and numbered 2941. It is also 
pointed out that the expression ‘for a certain period’ in Article 130 of the TGNA's 
Rules of Procedure implies that the power of decision for determining the period 
is given to the TGNA. The decision power related to other issues, especially to 
the use of force (where, how much, how, and so forth), is left to the discretion of 
the Council of Ministers.13 
The results of the examination carried out by the Constitutional Court, in 
response to an appeal by the Social Democratic People’s Party, in relation to 
TGNA decisions no. 107 and 108, 14  show that when the TGNA gives the 
Council of Ministers permission to use military force, this is not construed as an 
absolute takeover of power, and the TGNA’s right to monitor the developments 
resulting from this decision continues to be valid. It is explicitly understood that 
the TGNA can change or revoke this permission whenever necessary. However, 
according to Özbudun, ‘since the decision for sending armed forces abroad are 
political due to its nature and based upon preference and discretion, this should 
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also be discussed, as such decisions are excluded from judicial review by the 
Constitutional Court’.15  
The debates on the powers of the Government and the Parliament 
seemed to be drawing to a close with the Constitutional arrangement in 1961. 
However, the expression ‘the conditions accepted under international law as 
legitimate required to be taken into consideration by TGNA while giving 
permission to the Council of Ministers for sending and deployment of troops’ still 
requires debate. Particularly during the discussions surrounding the 
memorandum of 1 March 2003, issues of ‘how the legitimate conditions were to 
be determined’ and ‘what these conditions were’ led to a number of questions. 
The issue of ‘who would decide the conditions’ not mentioned explicitly in Article 
92 of the Constitution lay right at the heart of the debate. Furthermore, remarks 
were also made indicating that ‘the conditions for conformity to international law’ 
did not apply with regard to Article 92, and that the TGNA's decision would be 
adequate. Another, related issue that has caused a debate is that no separation 
is made between the ‘decision to declare war’ and ‘decision to undertake 
military deployment abroad and deploy foreign troops in the country’. These and 
similar debates will continue to occupy the agenda when a UN Security Council 
Decision cannot be taken and/or is delayed. Thus, the expectation is that these 
issues will be mentioned in the new Constitution.16  
In fact, the Constitution and the TGNA’s Rules of Procedure do not 
focus in exclusive detail on sending troops abroad. However, this does not 
mean that the use of the TSK for operations abroad is not open to parliamentary 
oversight. Parliament can request information from the Government about the 
military and technical details of the decision and can basically use the 
parliamentary committees to decide on the details related to the military 
operation to be carried out abroad. For example, in the decision of Parliament 
dated 2006, regarding sending troops to Lebanon, it is stated that ‘the 
arrangements related to the military and technical aspects of our contribution 
shall be made by the relevant institutions in the framework of the duty and 
powers to be given by the Government’. The same decision reads, ‘the limit, 
scope and number of the military troops shall be specified by the Government’. 
However as indicated previously, we have seen that the Government provided 
sufficient information to get the approval by means of either committee 
meetings or parliamentary sessions. Additionally, the minutes of the assembly 
and the debates monitored through public platforms show that the approval 
processes related to sending troops abroad are discussed in detail. The 
approval phases of the decisions related to sending troops to Korea, extending 
the mission Hammer Force, the Cyprus operation of 1974, cross-border 
operations to Northern Iraq, the bill dated 1 March 2003 and the approval 
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stages of the decisions concerning Libya and Syria are explicit examples of 
such types of discussion.  
The issue of auditing the TSK by the Court of Accounts was discussed 
extensively until recently, and was finalised with the last constitutional change 
and the Court of Accounts Law no. 6085. All the constitutional/legal exceptions 
and exemptions related to auditing the TSK by the Court of Accounts were thus 
eliminated. Therefore, auditing of the TSK’s financial matters can be carried out 
via the Court of Accounts. 
Since timing is very important in defence issues, in some country 
models, parliament gets involved in the process later on. In practice, in Turkey, 
we have seen that approval processes are run prior to the said mission, though 
there is no arrangement similar to Article 100 of the Constitution of 
Netherlands.17  
Turkish parliamentary committees are free to visit the assigned troops 
abroad and to inform the public of their observations during these visits, unless 
the security of the military operation concerned and of the parliamentary 
committee are at risk. Moreover, Parliament has the mandate to use its direct 
oversight power vis-à-vis the troops through institutions such as the Court of 
Accounts. 
The application of parliamentary oversight abroad is at the discretion of 
the authorities conducting the operation. Thus parliamentary oversight is 
applicable to situations that do not endanger operational security and must have 
the permission of the commanding authorities. There is no visible obstruction to 
communication between Members of Parliament and the governmental organs 




In the eyes of the public, Parliament is the most important tool for legitimising a 
governmental decision to deploy troops. Thus, it is important to open 
parliamentary processes up to the public during the debates on the issue. 
However, national security is regarded as very important in Turkey. In this view, 
state security and national defence planning are the most important issues 
within the Turkish society. When these sacred attributes are combined with a 
lack of expertise on defence planning, the whole defence field and the technical 
nature of the foreign missions to be conducted remain classified for non-military 
personnel.  
Despite all these arrangements, it is difficult to claim that Parliament is 
adequately exercising its responsibilities relating to missions abroad. It is 
commonly believed that Parliament is not active enough in performing its 
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oversight duty to supervise the activities of the Government on the question of 
defence. Furthermore, there is still a common prejudice that neither Parliament, 
nor the governing bodies, nor the Judiciary, is authorised to supervise the 
soldiers.  
Akyeşilmen examined Parliament’s power to exert its democratic 
powers to oversee the military and wrote an article published in an almanac 
entitled The Security Sector and Democratic Oversight 2006-2008, which was 
published by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).18 
In her work, Akyeşilmen quoted statements by Government and opposition 
party members regarding the defence budget in the parliamentary minutes. 
According to Akyeşilmen, Vecdi Gönül, the former Minister of Defence, stated in 
a speech made on 11 December 2007 that ‘we are happy to see everybody 
putting special emphasis on the defence budget and we all know that because 
of Turkey’s geopolitical location the TSK should be armed sufficiently enough so 
it has the ability to deter all risks and challenges’. Mustafa Özyürek, former 
member of one of the opposition parties, ‘thanked the ruling party for their 
special emphasis on the defence budget’ and stressed the ‘importance of the 
Turkish Armed Forces’.19 
Akyeşilmen contends that Members of Parliament and Government 
officials, including the Minister of Defence, cannot perform their duties and 
functions in full in the oversight process ‘due to a lack of transparency and non-
existence of expert civilians on the subjects concerning defence planning’. So, 
according to Akyeşilmen, ‘this renders the monitoring of this process by citizens 
nearly impossible when even the Members of the Parliament have no clue what 




In Narlı’s view, ‘behaviour and institutional variables influence each other 
considerably’. According to Narlı, the institutional changes and arrangements in 
Turkish civil-military relations that are emerging due to compliance requirements 
with the EU are changing the point of view of both citizens and the military. Narlı 
claims that the keyword in this change is ‘transparency’. Again, according to 
Narlı, through the guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the EU, as 
well as socialisation processes, the civil-military area has only become partially 
transparent, and the level of transparency achieved at this stage is not 
adequate.21 
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Pondering the reasons for this, Narlı concludes that the perceptive 
relations between citizens and soldiers are not affected by such changes.22 In 
Narlı's words, ‘what keeps Turkish civil-military relations under EU standards is 
a lack of knowledge of the civilian authority regarding defence and the 
traditional understanding labelling the soldiers as the sole authority on these 
issues’.23 
Various examples, including Turkish ones, indicate that the power of 
transparent constitutional, legal, structural and institutional arrangements is 
indisputable in making the civil-military relationship more democratic. However, 
on the other hand, the power and influence of creating a collective political 
culture pattern that can absorb democracy is at least equally, and maybe even 
more, important.  
Moreover, civil consensus between the governing body and the 
legislative body, which was considered by Avant to be the most effective tool to 
solve the problem, has seemingly been attained in Turkey. However, 
considering the debates over democracy, it is observed that some opposition 
members and some citizens, the numbers of which should not be 
underestimated, have serious doubts about both the democratic legitimacy and 
the extent of the facility granted to Parliament. 
Linz has stated that ‘democratic legitimacy is dependent on the belief 
that no other regime can achieve better for collective purposes, at any point of 
time in a specific country’.24 Either opposition members or citizens themselves 
can legitimise government policies to the extent that they are in compliance with 
their perceptions of democracy. According to Linz, ‘the soldiers are also ready 
to adopt the changes brought by such authority including the basic principles 
considered unchangeable when they see the political authority as a legitimate 
institution in the democratic sense.’  
The research entitled ‘Democracy and Perception in Turkey’ conducted 
by the public survey company MetroPOLL in 2011, about democracy and 
perception in Turkey, indicates that concerns regarding democracy are shared 
by the opposition as well as by the majority of citizens.25 In this respect, an 
additional set of changes is required for citizens to accept that the political 
regime is democratic and that Parliament's discretion with regard to the 
Government and the military is effective. It will be very important to achieve 
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these changes with a civilised approach that goes beyond the civil control 
framework.
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Part B - Financial Accountability 
 
III. The Parliamentary Budget Process in the Netherlands: 
Focus on Defence 
 




Parliamentary Democracy and its Consequences 
The Netherlands became a kingdom in 1815.1 This followed 19 years of French 
rule and over two centuries of being a decentralised republic, the Republic of 
the United Netherlands. The Republic consisted of seven more or less self-
ruling provinces kept together by a stadtholder. Holland was the most important 
province. 
In 1815, the Netherlands decided to become a kingdom ruled by a King 
(the son of the last stadtholder), a Parliament consisting of two Chambers, and 
a Constitution. But, as was usual at the beginning of the 19th Century in 
Continental Europe, the King made the decisions. The Chambers were more 
advisors than decision-makers, and sometimes not even that. 
This situation lasted for more than 30 years. In 1848 there were 
uprisings all over Europe. The Dutch King, fearing for his position, agreed on a 
fundamental change to the Constitution. A central point was the introduction of 
political ministerial responsibility, implying that ministers would be responsible 
for the policies and budgets of their departments. That also implied that 
Parliament could carry a motion of disapproval over ministerial policy. The 
complication was that, with the King’s approval, the Minister could ignore the 
motion. The Minister was appointed by the King, and the rule was that as long 
as he had the King’s trust, he (in those days, a woman could not be appointed 
as Minister) could stay. 
Then, in 1868, Parliament rejected the budget of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Cabinet resigned, but the King did not permit this, and he dismissed 
the Second Chamber (the House of Representatives). Elections were held and 
an almost identical Chamber returned, something that was seen as a defeat for 
the King. The new Chamber rejected the budget again and the Cabinet stepped 
down. The King considered again holding new elections, but even his 
supporters in Parliament disagreed with this course. So the resignation was 
final, and the parliamentary system in the Netherlands was born. That was the 
start of the democratic system we have today: the Minister, not the King, is 
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responsible. The Minister can only function with the support of the majority in 
Parliament. If the Cabinet clashes with Parliament, Parliament can be dismissed 
only once. The people can decide in a general election whether they support 
the Cabinet or the parliamentary majority, and in the latter case, they can 
choose a new majority. This is how the parliamentary system works in the 
Netherlands. 
To function properly, the Cabinet needs to be supported by the majority 
of the Parliament. If the Cabinet loses that majority, the only thing it can do is to 
send Parliament home and organise new elections. This is particularly important 
in a parliamentary democracy such as the Netherlands. For the last 150 years, 
we have had coalitions in which the biggest party has never had more than 30 
per cent of the votes. The coalitions consist of two, three, or sometimes four 
parties, and it is very important that such a coalition has the support of the 
people. 
What we can learn from our past is that a parliament does not gain 
power ‘out of the blue’. My thesis is that a parliament wins its authority. In 
history, there comes a time when a parliament makes a stand and refuses to 
follow a totalitarian government, a military regime or the king who rules the 
country. It makes a stand by rejecting a budget or by refusing to pass a law, or 
similar. There is a moment of historical proportions when parliament shows who 
represents the people of that country and who is really in charge. 
 
 
The Defence Budget Cycle 
Everywhere in the world, perhaps with exception of the Far East, this is a time 
of budget cuts; also, or maybe especially, in defence budgets. This makes 
taking a look at the defence budget cycle even more relevant. 
In the Netherlands, the process starts in its own particular way. 
Elections are held every four years (that is, if a coalition holds; otherwise, there 
can be an election after the coalition government has stepped down). After the 
results are finalised, the process to form a government starts. With no party 
winning over 30 per cent of the votes, it takes at least two parties to form a 
coalition. For all kinds of reasons (mistrust, the need to inform the people what 
will happen), the parties forming a Cabinet write a programme for the coming 
years. In this programme, every party tries to include as many of its own 
political ideas as possible. After long negotiations, a common programme is 
agreed upon, and, even more important, a financial framework with the budget 
spending and budget cuts that will prevail during the coming four years. The 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), an independent 
institute that straddles public policy and academic economics, supports the 
negotiations. This bureau makes calculations and projects what the programme 
will mean for the budget, people’s incomes, and the growth of the national 
 37 
income. It calculates the national accounts and the spending limits for the 
coming years. 
The common programme gives direction to the members of the Cabinet, 
including the Minister of Defence. The parties that form the coalition are 
consulted, and later agree on the Ministry of Defence’s policies for the coming 
years. The budget process then commences with the budget framework. Of 
course, during those four years, changes can occur: for instance, extra cuts 
during a recession or extra spending when the ministry is given additional tasks. 
We should note out here that until some years ago, the three branches of the 
Army in the Ministry of Defence – the Land force, the Air force and the Navy – 
had their own deputy Minister, second in command to the Minister. Allocation of 
the budget was more difficult than nowadays, as there was much competition 
among the three branches, and shifting a budget from the Navy to the Air force 
caused a lot of unrest and envy. Seven cabinets ago, the coalition decided to 
appoint just one deputy Minister for the three branches of the Army. 
The starting point is thus the financial framework and the coalition 
agreement. Within this framework, the Netherlands’ current international 
obligations and missions take priority. These are obligations with running costs 
and are the first to be taken into account when deciding on the financial 
framework. From then on, it is relatively easy. The coalition programme 
determines policy and there is a framework for the budget for the coming four 
years. The coalition programme identifies priorities and cuts. This means that 
policy-making is relatively straightforward in the first two years. However, the 
longer the Government rules, the less important the priorities become. There 
are always new international developments and there are always new weapons 
on the market, which are cheaper, more useful and of better quality. And it is 
possible that new budget cuts become necessary. 
For the first two years, the Minister of Defence presents the budget with 
its priorities to the Council of Ministers. There is usually little comment, because, 
after all, this is what was agreed upon in the coalition programme. The coalition 
has a majority in Parliament and budgets generally tend to be passed and 
approved with only minor changes at most. After some years, however, as 
mentioned earlier, there may be extra demands or budget cuts may become 
necessary, and then the real political process starts again. Usually this is 
prompted by forced budget cuts that make new choices necessary or new ideas 
about how to spend money for Defence.  
In this context, the Advisory Council of International Affairs (AIV) plays 
an important role. This council advises the Government and the Parliament 
about international affairs. Its advice is usually taken very seriously and it is very 
influential. If the AIV recommends that extra budget should be allocated to a 
certain area, this advice is usually followed, and within the financial framework 
the Government will start looking for extra funds. If the economy is healthy, 
there might be some extra money available and the general budget rule can be 
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ignored. This main budget rule indicates that every Minister has to compensate 
for extra spending within his or her own budget. The allocation of extra money is 
therefore an exception that can, for example, occur if a very important 
international mission has to be accomplished. Most of the time, however, the 
financial framework requires budget cuts elsewhere in the defence budget. 
When there are exceptions, all the parties of the ruling coalition should agree to 
them. Given that all Government ministers have their own priorities, if there is 
extra money available, it is a fierce battle to get some. 
Alongside the advice given by the AIV, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also has priorities with respect to the international situation, obligations and 
missions. In addition, the military staff exercises its advisory role on spending 
money on personnel and hardware, and the staff naturally advise the best 
material money can buy. 
In this situation, the Minister of Defence goes to Parliament with his 
budget and with the proposals that have been agreed on in the coalition 
programme (which in practice means for the first two years or so). After that, or 
maybe sooner, depending on international developments, he will bring forward 
new proposals due to international developments; for example, tackling piracy 
off the coast of Somalia may require new spending and new cuts. The Minister 
of Defence needs to come to an agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in bilateral deliberations, and then the Minister of Finance should determine that 
the new costs are within the limits that were agreed upon. The Minister of 
Defence takes his proposals to the Cabinet, where he is supported by the Prime 
Minister (otherwise, these proposals would not be on the Cabinet’s agenda). 
With this support and thanks to the deliberations, the proposals will pass the 
Cabinet easily and find their way to the Council of State.  
In the Netherlands, the Council of State advises on every law. It looks 
at the internal consistency of the law and its technical aspects. The question of 
whether a law is in line with the Constitution and other laws, international 
treaties and obligations is also an important part of its advice. As the situation 
outlined in the paragraphs above concerns a budget law, the Council of State 
will only propose some general considerations. With these considerations, the 
budget is sent to Parliament, and then a public debate starts.  
First, the Defence Committee of the Second Chamber of Parliament 
discusses the budget. In the weeks beforehand, various experts and authorities 
express their opinions on television and in the newspapers, trying to influence 
the debate. In the Defence Committee, spokesmen from the different parties 
raise questions. The first round is for written questions, often followed by a 
second round. After the Minister of Defence has answered those questions, 
there is a debate in Parliament. Various other aspects of the budget are 
addressed, such as the role played by women in the Army, and where certain 
items are bought and whether Dutch industry is involved. It is interesting to note 
that in the Dutch Parliament, like in most parliaments, not only do military 
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aspects or aspects concerning the international security situation come up for 
discussion, but also policies on industry, gender and various other national 
issues. 
After the budget has been adopted by the Second Chamber, it finds its 
way to the First Chamber (the Senate). General issues tend to be debated there: 
the Dutch position in NATO, or the Dutch missions in the Balkans, in 
Afghanistan or off the coast of Somalia. The Senate can only pass or reject the 
budget, and rejection is very rare. After these discussions and after passing the 
budget in the Senate, the Minister of Defence signs the budget, stating his 
responsibility for it, and then the Queen, as Head of State, also places her 
signature on it. 
 
 
The Limited Role of the Military  
Does the military play any role in this process? Strictly speaking, it does not, but 
there are different ways in which the military tries to influence the budget. In 
practice, then, the military does have some leverage. During the last 60 years, 
the most outspoken way of influencing the process took place in 1974, when 
severe budget cuts were announced to the government programme of that time. 
That year, fighter jets flew at a very low altitude over the parliamentary buildings. 
The generals responsible for this action were sacked the same week, and this 
was the last time the military tried to exercise its influence so directly. 
Of course, the military tries to exert ‘softer’ forms of pressure. First, by 
trying to persuade allies and the arms industry to emphasise the necessity of 
having a sufficient defence budget. All the arguments one could imagine are 
used: patriotism, international obligations, defence actions, defence of 
international trade, economic reasons, and so forth. Most of the arguments refer 
to the Dutch tradition of trade and interest in global peace for ethical and 
economic reasons. Second, there are always officers who try to influence the 
public debate, at conferences and seminars, on television, and in newspapers. 
They are entitled to do so, having the same rights as every other citizen. Then, 
of course, during the budgetary process, they try to influence parliamentarians 
and all others who are involved in the discussion. In practice, their options are 
limited and their success rate is not very high. Looking at the defence budget 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the scale of the budget cuts in this 
period indicates that the military only has limited leverage. 
 
 
The Court of Audit 
Ever since the 16th Century, the Netherlands Court of Audit has as acted as an 
independent High Council of State. It is a central government body, created to 
ensure that the democratic system works properly. The Court investigates 
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whether central Government revenue and expenditure are received and spent 
correctly and whether central Government policy is implemented as intended. 
The Court is independent, which means that it can decide what to audit. 
It sees the Cabinet and the Parliament as its customers. Both can request that 
projects, budgets and so forth are audited. The Court sees it as its job to 
provide Parliament with useful and relevant information, so that it can indicate 
whether a minister’s policy is effective. The Court does not express political 
opinions; rather, it expresses an opinion on Government policy that has already 
been adopted. Thus it will never state that a particular law is wrong, but it can 




The JSF case 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is a good example of how the budget 
process works in practice. The JSF programme started in the 1990s with the 
objective of developing and building an affordable stealth plane for the US and 
its allies. The plane had to replace the F16 or comparable planes such as the 
F111, the Harrier (B variant), and the F18. Some of these aeroplanes were built 
in the 1960s or 1970s. 
On the one hand, there should be large-scale production; figures of 
2,000-2,500 aeroplanes were cited on the grounds of keeping the programme 
affordable. On the other hand, it was necessary to take into account the specific 
and sometimes different demands of the United States Air Force, the United 
States Navy and Marine Corps, and the British Royal Navy. Later on, other 
potential buyers brought their own specific demands. The JSF positioned itself 
as a fifth-generation aeroplane intended for a high spectrum of violence. To 
keep the plane affordable and to save money, three different types were 
integrated in one plane.  
The costs for development were estimated at 24 billion dollars in 2001. 
The costs were covered by the United States and partner countries: at level 1, 
the country paid 10 per cent; at level 2, 5 per cent; and at level 3, at least 1 per 
cent. It was also possible to be a Security Cooperation Participant, with just an 
observer role. Several years ago, in 2006, it was stated that the costs of 
development had already doubled and there was no certainty that they would 
not increase again. Now it is certain that the costs will continue to rise, 
particularly due to software problems. Nobody knows how much the extra costs 
will amount to. 
The JSF reflects the way defence budgets are discussed. First we have 
to consider the international obligations. The Netherlands cooperates closely 
with NATO allies, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Belgium, and sometimes Scandinavian countries on marine affairs. Given that 
the Netherlands wants to cooperate with the United States, it makes sense to 
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use the same plane as the Americans. Communication is easier, so considered 
from the angle of international cooperation and NATO membership, an 
American aeroplane is a logical choice. The AIV also came to this conclusion. It 
furthermore established that compared with its competitors, the JSF is 
sophisticated and designed for the future. The Air Force is lobbying vigorously 
for the project on television, in newspapers, and so forth. It sees the JSF as the 
best aeroplane for the future and for the tasks that lie ahead. 
 When considering national politics, a discussion has arisen about 
fundamental questions: what kind of army do we really want? What kind of war 
do we foresee, if any? What kind of conflicts might we become involved in in the 
next 20 to 40 years? Looking back, since the end of the Cold War, the 
Netherlands has played a role in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing in local 
conflicts: in the Balkans, Africa, and Afghanistan. As a result, people are 
questioning the necessity of an aeroplane like the JSF. 
With the conflicts that the Netherlands is involved in now, one can 
doubt whether such an aeroplane would be useful. In other words, and to put it 
plainly: where is the enemy that would justify such a plane? On the other hand, 
the JSF will fly until at least 2040. Who can foresee what conflicts the 
Netherlands might become involved in in the coming decades? There are 
certainly no supermarkets where you could buy one if you needed one. 
Then there is the question of employment. The Dutch aircraft industry is 
involved in the development of the JSF, and 1.3 billion dollars has already been 
invested in trying to get the plane in the air. Many hundreds of people are 
working on parts of the JSF. So Dutch industry would benefit a great deal if the 
JSF were to be a success. It is an innovative aeroplane, and not only is the 
employment of many hundreds of people at stake, but also innovations in the 
aircraft industry that the Netherlands hopes to transfer to other (civilian) 
aeroplanes. 
All of these elements – international politics, our view of the world and 
the role we want to play in it and the position of our aircraft industry – are at 
stake. But the real discussion, the most probing part, is the discussion about the 
budget. Can we afford to buy an aeroplane that is still not fully developed 
(including the software)? Can we afford this plane, the cost of which will not be 
known until the development stage is completed, which will not be before 2014 
or even 2016?  
Opposition parties claim that the costs will run up to 15 billion euros 
over a 30-year period. The competing manufacturers, meanwhile, want to sell 
their aeroplanes for a fixed price of nearly 5 billion dollars plus 5 billion dollars 
for a maintenance contract for a certain number of years. So the Government is 
currently postponing the decision and trying not to alienate the Americans.  
The debate has been lingering on for more than a decade. This is partly 
because the Americans postponed the delivery of the plan and do not want to 
set a fixed price. It is also because of a fundamental question: who will want to 
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buy something if they do not know what it will cost? And finally, the JSF case is 
lingering on because various governmental coalitions over the past decade did 
not want to buy due to pressure from the population. At a time of economic 
recession, people are not fond of spending money on military equipment. So the 
Dutch Government decided to buy two test aeroplanes to remain involved and 
help the Americans with testing, and under pressure, it lowered the number of 
aeroplanes on order from 87 to 56. When discussions on the JSF started, the 
Ministry of Defence had intended to buy 125...  
During all these discussions over the last 15 years, the Court of 
Account played its role. From the start, parliamentarians wanted to know 
whether the JSF would be a financially good buy. So the Court of Account went 
into the financial details of the JSF and helped parliamentarians to estimate 
what the final price would be. Recently, the Court of Account again tried to 
estimate the price and whether this would be fair, using the newest data 
available, including all technical specifications and the latest software 
developed. But these are still estimates. Due to the discussion about 
employment and innovation, another institute is trying to establish what the 
consequences of not buying the plane might be in terms of loss of employment 
and innovation. At the moment of writing, the discussion is ongoing. So no one 
knows whether the Netherlands will buy these aeroplanes or not. Most probably, 
having fixed the total cost we want to spend, we will buy fewer than the 56 
currently promised by the Ministry of Defence. A lot of people would not be 
surprised if the amount were around 50, unless a new coalition decides not to 
buy any new aeroplanes at all. Then the Netherlands would have an Army 




Buying or not buying the JSF reflects the political process that determines 
military spending in the Netherlands. Given the lack of public enthusiasm, it is a 
tricky and winding road to continue with purchasing new planes. The 
Government went through the same process with the Starfighter in the 1970s. 
The Minister of Defence, in those days a member of the Social Democratic 
Party, encountered so much opposition from his own party that he stated 
publicly: ‘parties don’t buy planes, governments do’, and he simply overruled 
the party.  
Now we see the same process at work. There is a lot of opposition 
coming from most political parties and the population at large, and there are 
serious doubts about the cost, the technical details and whether the purchase is 
necessary at all. But in the end, it will be the international connections that the 
Netherlands retains with the Americans, and the international obligations we 
have, that will tip the scale. The F16 has to be replaced, even if it takes five or 
more years, and since we have already dismissed part of our Land Forces, it 
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does not make sense to abolish the Air Force as well. In the end, international 
obligations, the value of employment and innovation and the importance of 
being an ally will settle the matter. 
 44 
 45 
IV. Parliamentary Oversight of Defence-related Expenditures: 







In late December 2004, shortly after the EU agreed to start membership 
negotiations with Turkey, an unprecedented trial opened a new era in Turkish 
civil-military relations. For the first time in its history, the Turkish military agreed 
to the prosecution of one of its highest-ranking commanders, Retired Admiral 
İlhami Erdil, on corruption charges.2 Admiral Erdil was sentenced to more than 
two years in prison and stripped of his rank. Concerns surfaced about how the 
trial would affect the military’s image; the media coverage of this incident was 
vast, and to the amazement of academics and journalists, the Chief of the 
General Staff Hilmi Özkök fully supported Erdil’s prosecution by the military 
court. 
Since 2004, several accusations of corruption have been directed 
against military officers and, at times, against the military itself.3 At the trials of 
the 1980 coup leaders, including the retired generals Kenan Evren and Tahsin 
Şahinkaya – whom Time magazine once described as one of the wealthiest 
generals in the world, following accusations that he had received bribes from 
the American Lockheed firm to buy weapons – not only was the massive 
personal wealth of these generals uncovered, but they were also harshly 
criticised for using their rank for personal gain.4 Consequently, a relatively lively 
public debate emerged on the economic sources of the Turkish military’s 
political power. Nevertheless, only a limited number of academic studies have 
tackled the issue of parliamentary oversight of defence-related expenditures.5 
While Turkish civil-military relations have changed considerably in the past 
decade,6 the economic sources of the Turkish military’s political power are still 
largely intact, and the legal and practical aspects of parliamentary control are in 
need of strengthening.  
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Civilian control of the Turkish military is beset by major transparency 
and accountability problems. The difficulty of obtaining defence-related budget 
data, such as the military’s weapons procurement expenditures or research and 
development spending, or its share of discretionary funds, reveals the lack of 
transparency and accountability of the Turkish military.7 Without transparency 
and accountability in the economic domain, it is unlikely that democratic 
consolidation will be achieved in Turkey. 
Consequently, this chapter first critically examines the complexity of the 
Turkish defence budget, namely in relation to the expenditures and assets of 
the defence sector in general and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in particular. 
Second, I examine the existing legal framework and assess practical attempts 
to curb the Turkish military’s economic autonomy, in the form of mechanisms 
such as the parliamentary Plan and Budget Committee and the National 
Defence Committee, as well as the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay). Finally, I 
conclude by considering the implications of the current situation and discussing 
the measures that are needed to further normalise civil-military relations in 
Turkey through limiting the military’s hold on the national defence budget.  
 
 
Understanding the Complexity of the Turkish Defence Budget  
Funding of the defence sector in Turkey is quite complex due to the way the 
military structured the sector after the interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980, so 
as to have firm control over the defence budget.8 As a result, although most 
defence expenditures are financed by the national budget, an autonomous 
defence fund (the Defence Industry Support Fund, Savunma Sanayi 
Destekleme Fonu, SSDF) and foundation (The Turkish Armed Forces 
Foundation, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı, TSKGV) contribute to 
the assets of the Turkish military. The political economy of Turkish civil-military 
relations is further complicated by the activities of a hybrid organisation, the 
Armed Forces Pension Fund (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK). Established 
by the military in 1961, mainly to support officers with low salaries, this pension 
fund has become one Turkey’s foremost holding companies.9  OYAK has a 
unique and privileged legal and economic status, while the SSDF and TSKGV 
funds remain immune from any civilian audits. 
Some of the challenges in Turkish civil-military relations thus stem from 
the unique and distinctive characteristics of the assets of the military and its 
affiliated organisations, and the difficulty of keeping these structures under 
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civilian control and, more importantly, accountable and transparent. The 
following sections will examine the issues facing defence budget-making in 
Turkey, focusing on the nature of the problems that curtail civilians’ ability to 
control the economic power of the military. 
 
 
Defence expenditures and transparency 
National security in Turkey is provided by three constituent bodies: the Ministry 
of National Defence, the General Commandership of Gendarmerie and the 
Coast Guard. In terms of the cost of personnel and these institutions’ goods and 
service acquisition, the Ministry of National Defence receives the lion’s share of 
the defence budget, followed by the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard, 
respectively.  
The defence budget increased from $10 billion (1.36 per cent of GDP) 
in 2010 to 10.3 billion (1.35 per cent of GDP) in 2011.10 Between 1998 and 
2008, the share of defence expenditures in the budget tended to decline, but it 
still remained high compared to other budget items.11 This is quite important, 
since the budget items relating to the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard are not 
accessible 12  and the numbers may be higher than anticipated. In fact, the 
defence budget has increased steadily in the last few years, and further 
increase is planned.13  
According to reports by the Ministry of National Defence, 99 per cent of 
its spending in Turkey is related to three main items: personnel expenditures, 
social security payments, and acquisition of goods and services14  However, 
assessment of the amounts reported for each item is problematic, due to the 
limited nature of the data.15 For example, the lack of transparency surrounding 
how many draftees the armed forces need becomes an issue every time the 
Government wants to bring in extra funds by offering paid military service 
(bedelli askerlik). Despite being the second largest military in NATO (after the 
United States) and having 510,600 active and 378,700 reserve troops in 2012,16 
the TSK has often opposed the initiation of paid military service on the grounds 
that it does not have sufficient troops to fulfil its duties. So far, the inadequate 
amount of data available to the public on this issue has limited any attempt to 
question the TSK’s objections.  
Moreover, data on the TSKGV’s expenditures are not accessible, while 
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SSDF data are available but not comprehensive. While these two entities bring 
funds in, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (Savunma Sanayi 
Müsteşarlığı, SSM) spends considerable amounts from these structures; indeed, 
the major goal of establishing the TSKGV and the SSDF was to mitigate 
Turkey’s dependence on importing defence-related goods and enable it to build 
up its own defence industry. 17  Thus, parliamentary control of not only the 
national budget but also these extra-budgetary funds is needed to attain an 
acceptable degree of transparency and accountability in defence-related issues.  
Finally, it is almost impossible to determine how much is spent annually 
in the ongoing fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan, PKK). Ostensibly, this conflict has cost Turkey more than $300 billion 
in the last 25 years.18 Moreover, the majority of the TSK’s counter-terrorism 
measures against the PKK utilise discretionary funds (örtülü ödenek), which are 
impossible to trace due their secretive nature.  
In sum, defence sector expenditures are budgeted from national, extra-
budgetary and discretionary funds. While it is easier to make sense of what 
comes out of national funds and the SSDF, it is less so for the extra-budgetary 
funds and almost impossible for the TSKGV and pensions of retired officers.19 
Accordingly, there is a great need for more transparency and accountability in 
all defence expenditures in order to achieve a more democratic system. 
 
    
Defence assets and transparency 
The defence budget in Turkey is financed by four main constituents that can be 
classified as budgetary and extra-budgetary sources. Eighty-four per cent of 
military expenditures are funded by the national budget.20 The SSDF allocates 
funds for 15 per cent of the total military expenditure, while the TSKGV covers 1 
per cent of overall military expenditure. The procurement of arms is financed in 
particular by foreign debt and credit.21 Moreover, the capital and the interest 
expenses relating to this procurement are refunded by the Ministry of Finance 
budget. However, information on the magnitude and cost of foreign debt and 
credit is limited.22 
In the early 1980s, a modernisation programme was launched to 
strengthen the national defence industry. 23  The programme expenses were 
covered by the SSDF under the control of the Defence Industry Development 
and Support Administration. The latter was established in 1985 by Law no. 3238, 
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and renamed as the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries in 1991, under the 
Ministry of Defence. The SSDF has maintained a distinctive structure in terms 
of its budget and audit in that although it falls under the Ministry of National 
Defence, its income and expense accounts have a unique character. There is 
no direct funding relationship between the national budget and the SSDF. 
Moreover, the SSDF’s expenditures are funded by various sources, such as the 
national lottery and indirect transfers. Although SSDF data are available, the 
Court of Accounts has never had any auditing authority over the SSDF’s 
accounts. Instead, a commission composed of representatives from the Prime 
Ministry, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Customs and the 
Ministry of Finance audits the SSDF’s accounts;24 however, this process has 
been far from transparent. 
The TSKGV was founded in 1987 by Law no. 3388, ‘to work towards 
increasing the fighting strength of the Turkish Armed Forces by developing the 
national armaments industry of Turkey, establishing new branches of the 
armaments industry, and purchasing weapons, vehicles and equipment’.25 The 
TSKGV is an amalgam of the Turkish Land Forces Foundation, the Turkish 
Naval Forces Foundation and the Turkish Air Forces Foundation. These 
organisations’ real estate, stocks and shares, cash, assets and liabilities were 
devolved to the TSKGV upon its foundation. While only a limited number of 
studies have been carried out on the Foundation,26 the TSKGV’s finances have 
long been a topic of concern, on the grounds that Article 3 of the law provides 
that donations and grants given to the foundation are exempt from all kinds of 
taxes and other legal dues. Furthermore, the assets of the TSKGV are not 
accessible via the foundation’s website, prompting columnists to often question 
how military foundations are financed and audited.27 
The TSKGV currently holds shares in many defence corporations in 
Turkey. Consequently, albeit indirectly, the Turkish military has considerable 
influence on the defence industry. Although grants given to the foundation are 
exempt from all kinds of taxes and other legal dues, subsidiaries of the TSKGV 
are subject to audit by the Ministry of Finance. Such auditing is again limited to 
the military’s actual cooperation with the auditors, if and when it takes place. 
Finally, most studies on Turkish civil-military relations tend to neglect 
the financial contribution of the Scientific and Technological Research Council 
of Turkey (Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu, TÜBİTAK) to the 
defence budget. TÜBİTAK is accountable to the Prime Ministry and provides a 
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considerable amount of funding for the Ministry of National Defence’s research 
and development projects. However, the transparency of the decision-making 
process regarding these projects is questionable. First, our knowledge of the 
amount of funding allocated for research in universities is limited.28 Second, as 
a result of a decision made by the Science and Technology High Council in 
2005, through an additional regulation approved by the Ministry of National 
Defence, research and development projects that are funded by TÜBİTAK are 
exempt from audit by the Court of Accounts.29 
 
 
Parliamentary Auditing Mechanisms in the Defence Sector 
The auditing of the defence budget is one of the most problematic aspects of 
civil-military relations in Turkey. Clearly, defence-related assets and 
expenditures are not under systematic and stringent democratic control. 
Parliamentary committees (the National Defence Committee and the Plan and 
Budget Committee) and Sayıştay, the two mechanisms available to civilians, 
have not been efficiently utilised so far, due to the military’s monopoly over data 
on the defence sector and legal and practical shortcomings. In the following 
section, I assess the extent to which these two forms of parliamentary control 
have been adequately employed by civilians. Since this chapter focuses 
exclusively on parliamentary control, other civilian control mechanisms, such as 
via the executive or the judiciary, lie outside the scope of this study. I include 
Sayıştay under parliamentary control since specific laws that will be discussed 
below make the Court responsible for auditing the defence sector for Parliament. 
 
The National Defence Committee and the Plan and Budget Committee 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) has several specialised 
committees that oversee issues such as health, justice, agriculture, education 
and defence, on the grounds that not all issues can be deliberated in General 
Assembly meetings. The Plan and Budget Committee is the major 
parliamentary body responsible for examining military expenditures and 
enforcing restrictions on the defence budget.30 The committee members can 
question any budgetary item and suggest changes after seeking advice from 
military or civilian experts in the defence sector.  
Of the 17 current committees, the National Defence Committee is one 
of the most important, since the draft defence budget law and other defence-
related issues are examined during its regular sessions. Similar to the process 
in the Plan and Budget Committee, any of the 24 Committee members may 
question the relevance of any budgetary item and request detailed information 
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on how funds are spent. In other words, the Defence Committee is the organ 
that is responsible for ensuring the accountability of defence institutions to 
Parliament and the public. Consequently, Parliament can request changes to 
defence budget items (along with items unrelated to defence) via the Plan and 
Budget Committee. According to Hamit Beriş, Article 117 of the Constitution 
rules that the TSK is accountable to the TGNA.31 Thus, Parliament is not only 
responsible for controlling the budget-making process, but is also entitled to 
inspect the efficiency of its spending. This constitutional power vested in 
Parliament is exercised indirectly through the National Defence and the Plan 
and Budget Committees. 
In practice, the defence budget is prepared by the Government and 
sent to the National Defence Committee for assessment, before being sent to 
the General Assembly and passed as law. With no constitutional power vested 
in it, the Committee hardly ever analyses the budget in detail; in fact, it is not 
unusual for most of the agenda to be monopolised by unrelated issues, and for 
the budget to remain unquestioned and unchanged by the end of the meeting.32 
For example, the December 2011 Defence Committee was undermined by 
personal quarrels between the opposition and government deputies on the 
patriot missile system to be established in Turkey, which overshadowed any 
examination of budget items. 33  Moreover, in the first Plan and Budget 
Committee’s first meeting of 2012, opposition deputies protested against the 
police force’s use of pepper spray by spraying government deputies with 
deodorant.34  
Mismanagement and lack of expertise are major problems undermining 
parliamentary oversight of military expenditures through specialised committees. 
The Plan and Budget Committee endures an extreme workload under the 
pressure of not only defence-related laws, but also other budgetary issues. On 
the other hand, while the National Defence Committee’s workload is more 
reasonable, this latter committee lacks the other’s power. Furthermore, even if 
both of these Committees were to work full-time on oversight of the defence 
budget, it is questionable whether the Committee members would have the 
necessary expertise on defence matters to assess the efficiency or 
transparency of the budget. Neither do they make an effort to acquire such 
expertise from outside Parliament, a tendency that may be exacerbated by the 
lack of transparency surrounding the defence budget. The former Minister of 
National Defence Vecdi Gönül has at times criticised the lack of proactive 
efforts by deputies to audit the defence budget.35 Consequently, Committee 
meetings are rather symbolic and do not result in effective parliamentary control 
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of defence-related expenditures. 
 
Sayıştay 
The major constitutional judiciary organ that is designed to audit the defence 
budget is the Sayıştay, which operates under Article 160 of the Constitution. 
The Law on the Court of Accounts, brought into force in 1967, defines the duties 
and responsibilities of Sayıştay.36 The institute is ‘responsible for auditing on 
behalf of the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) the revenues, expenditures 
and property of government offices operated under the general and annexed 
budgets’.37  
Sayıştay has a distinct setup, since it not only examines the 
performance and legality of defence-related expenditures, hence actively 
assisting the TGNA with control of the defence expenditures, but it also brings 
problematic practices to court. In other words, it holds judicial power. As a result, 
Sayıştay is a key institution for controlling military expenditures, but it has not 
been adequately utilised to date.  
One reason for the ineffectiveness of the Court stems from the laws 
that have not clearly defined the Court’s jurisdiction. Another reason is that it 
has been hard to transfer the power the Court retains on paper to practice, due 
to military resistance and politicians’ tendency to submit to the military’s will. In 
fact, the auditing power of Sayıştay, vested in the 1961 Constitution, was 
restricted after the 1971 memorandum, when the Turkish military’s assets and 
expenditures were excluded from Sayıştay’s audits on the grounds of 
confidentiality and the secretive nature of national security practices. The 1982 
Constitution, drafted after the 1980 coup, did not fare any better in terms of 
parliamentary control of military assets and expenditures. The situation got 
worse in 1985 when military contracts were exempted from civilian authorisation 
and audits, as the SSDF was also removed from the scope of the Sayıştay’s 
jurisdiction under Law no. 3238 on the SSM.38 Instead, an internal commission 
including representatives from the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of National 
Defence, the Ministry of Customs and the Ministry of Finance was set up to 
audit the activities of the SSM.39 
After decades of unaccountability of defence expenditures, the laws 
passed for EU harmonisation after Turkey’s official candidacy in 1999 included 
significant improvements in civil-military relations. One improvement was the 
addition of an article to Law no. 832 on Sayıştay in 2003, which provided for the 
audit of military assets through a regulation, and the amendment of Article 160 
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of the Constitution in 2004 to enable the auditing of military assets. 
Nevertheless, these attempts were not realised in practice, as the necessary 
regulation was never put in force and the military resisted Sayıştay’s attempts to 
carry out audits in military locations.  
The problem of auditing military spending made the headlines in the 
early days of 2010 in the context of the Ergenekon trials. The public prosecutor 
of the Ergenekon investigation tried a number of high-ranking commanders and 
officers for plotting coup attempts. During the investigation, the personal 
spending of the retired brigadier general Levent Ersöz, one of the culprits on 
trial, was scrutinised. Levent Ersöz is accused of drawing the equivalent of 3 
million euros from the discretionary fund (örtülü ödenek) of the General 
Commandership of the Gendarmerie in order to buy surveillance equipment.40 
In response to these developments, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) decided to enhance the legal mechanisms for 
controlling military spending. AKP deputy Nurettin Canikli announced that his 
party would amend the law on the Court of Accounts and argued that the AKP 
was determined to enhance the transparency of the defence budget and 
expenditures.41 After the mounting criticisms directed at the Government and 
the military from the public and the EU Progress Reports, 42 Law no. 6085 on 
Sayıştay was passed in 3 December 2010. Together with Law no. 5018 on 
Public Management and Control, this law gave Sayıştay significant powers for 
externally auditing (ex post) defence assets and expenditures. Law no. 6085 
also ‘paves the way for audits of extra-budgetary resources earmarked for the 
defence sector, including the Defence Industry Support Fund’.43  
Sayıştay auditors have openly argued that this new law (no. 6085) can 
be interpreted to include the audits of the SSDF, the TSKGV and the OYAK 
under the Sayıştay jurisdiction.44 More importantly, Law no. 6085 allows the 
Court to audit public institutions, including the armed forces, not only for 
performance, but also for regularity, meaning the Sayıştay can audit the fiscal 
reports and tables of the military as well as checking whether military assets 
conform to procurement contracts and records. 45 More importantly, the secrecy 
clause is now defunct and the reports of the Sayıştay audits can be announced 
to the public. In fact, the media has been overly enthusiastic about the 
Sayıştay’s auditing of military dining facilities (orduevi) and canteens, since 
those were never under any kind of control in the past. According to Zaman, 
Sayıştay ‘has begun audits of military-run firms’. Another daily reported on 8 
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August 2011 that ‘a committee from Sayıştay recently contacted the TSK to 
inform them about an inspection and launched an auditing process.’46 
While these developments were highly praised by the EU and 
journalists in Turkey, an amendment to the Law on Sayıştay through a new 
regulation was passed in June 2012, causing Sayıştay to publish a protest on 
its official website.47 With the law, Sayıştay once again lost its ability to properly 
audit military assets and expenditures, and with the introduction of a secrecy 
clause, the Turkish public was once again deprived of the right to obtain 
information on military assets and expenditures.48 This move was harshly and 
duly criticised by major civil-military relations experts and in the European 
Commission’s 2012 Progress Report on Turkey.49 
 
   
Conclusion 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the magnitude of the military budget is not 
a deal-breaker in the democratisation of civil-military relations in Turkey. The 
main problem stems from the absence of systematic parliamentary control of 
the defence budget. Although Sayıştay is responsible for auditing public 
institutions, as provided by the Constitution, for decades, additional laws and 
regulations have kept military spending beyond Sayıştay’s reach. There is still 
little sporadic or systematic civilian control over the Defence Industry Support 
Fund, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, the OYAK and discretionary funds. 
In 2012, shortly after a new law (no. 6085) was introduced in 2010 to improve 
parliamentary control of the defence budget, an amendment limited the 
jurisdiction of Sayıştay and reintroduced the secrecy clause that limits the 
public’s right to know how taxes are spent in the defence sector and by the 
military. Effective auditing will require the recent limitations on the law to be 
lifted. However, with the majority of Parliament consisting of AKP deputies, this 
seems unlikely to happen in the near future. The Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) has criticised the AKP Government for its lack 
of will to control the defence sector; however, the same CHP deputies have 
contributed little in the National Defence Committee or the Plan and Budget 
Committee to question the decisions of the Ministry of National Defence. It is of 
utmost importance that the opposition encourages these specialised 
committees to take an interest in defence issues. 
After all, every elected representative of the Turkish Parliament has a 
legal right to be informed about the activities of the Ministry of National Defence 
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and the General Staff. Thus, the minister can be subjected to questioning by 
members of the Parliament regarding personnel and arms procurement. 
However, there is an information asymmetry between the defence elite and 
politicians, which means that the latter do not have sufficient expertise on 
defence issues. Consequently, this lack of information and expertise prevents 
the politicians from exercising efficient oversight over military expenditures.50 
Overall, a lack of transparency, accountability and information asymmetry 
between the civilian and military elite has generated a black hole that impedes 
civilian control over the economic practices of the TSK. While this asymmetry is 
a problem, it would be easier to solve; the General Secretariat of the National 
Security Council has a number of civilian bureaucrats who have expertise in the 
defence sector and who are under-utilised by the National Security Council. 
Academics who have studied the defence sector for decades are also being 
under-utilised due to the secrecy clause and the military’s general distrust of 
civilians. 
Contrary to the military’s aspirations, a truly civilian constitution is 
crucial for maintaining civilian control of the defence budget. The issue thus 
needs to be tackled by reviewing all related laws; even better, by ensuring that 
parliamentary control of the defence budget is based on democratic norms in 
the new Constitution that is currently being drafted by a parliamentary 
committee. As the 2012 Progress Report also highlights, the new constitution 
should ensure mechanisms for the deputies to review the reports published by 
Sayıştay and take the necessary action.51 Only then will the military realise that 
its actions have consequences and that civilians are not as incompetent as 
once presumed.  
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the political economy of the 
Turkish Armed Forces is quite complex and that although several improvements 
have been made, more civilian effort is needed to enhance not only 
parliamentary, but also overall democratic control on economic matters with 
regard to Turkish civil-military relations. 
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Part C - The Rule of Law 
 







In most democracies, the concepts of a plural party political system, 
transparency and accountability, separation of powers by the principles of trias 
politica and, last but not least, the rule of law, are usually well understood and 
accepted. Yet, there are differences between the various democratic systems in 
the world, not only because of different nations’ histories, cultures, legal 
systems, levels of political maturity, and so forth, but also because the 
perceptions and expectations of their citizens are different. During the many 
training courses CESS has delivered in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia, our trainees have almost always expressed (even 
slightly) different views on the performance of democracy. In our role-play 
exercises it has repeatedly proved that from the trainees’ perspective, general 
theory and real practice are two separate issues. This is quite understandable, 
as there is no blueprint for democracy; only a generally accepted framework 




Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Generally speaking, one can say that democracy is a type of governance where 
the people have the ultimate power, but where they have authorised (usually by 
elections) a Parliament, Executive and Judiciary (duly separated in accordance 
with the principle of trias politica) to exercise this power; where transparency 
and accountability are common standards; and where the rule of law applies to 
everyone. What exactly is the rule of law, however, and are we all speaking 
about the same thing? The Council of Europe’s (CoE’s) Commission for 
Democracy through Law (the so-called Venice Commission) regrets the 
absence of an internationally accepted common understanding, but in 2011 it 
came to an interesting conclusion about the various international considerations 
regarding what the rule of law should stand for:1 
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• Legality, including a transparent, accountable and democratic 
process for enacting law 
• Legal certainty 
• Prohibition of arbitrariness 
• Access to justice before independent and impartial courts, 
including judicial review of administrative acts 
• Respect for human rights 
• Non-discrimination and equality before the law. 
During the CESS training courses I summarise this, in a way that is perhaps 
non-scholarly but very practical and easy for the trainees to remember, as 
follows: the rule of law makes the State abide by the law, ensures equality 
before the law, supplies law and order, provides efficient and impartial justice 
and upholds human rights. This does not cover all the specific legal elements, 
but certainly covers the most important ones for them to remember. 
The combination of a plural party political system, the democratic 
principles of transparency and accountability, and the correct implementation of 
the trias politica and of the rule of law does not only protect and guarantee 
citizens’ rights, but it also prevents the State abusing its tremendous powers. 
For the State alone provides services, allocates resources, makes and applies 
laws and ultimately has a monopoly of force. In this complete system of checks 
and balances, the State is also bound by the law, and State officials are not only 
accountable to their superiors and their political masters, but also for the 
lawfulness of their personal actions in front of the Courts. 
 
 
The Security Sector 
The monopoly of force brings us to the security sector, which has classically 
consisted of those organisations within society that are responsible for 
protecting the State and its citizens (police forces, armed forces, and so forth) 
and the bodies responsible for the management and oversight of the various 
security forces (ministries and parliament). In contemporary accounts, however, 
we tend to speak about the ‘security family’ that has many more players, such 
as defence forces, police forces, gendarmerie or paramilitary forces, informal 
security forces, intelligence services, customs enforcement, civil oversight 
bodies, financial management bodies, the judicial and correctional system and, 
last but certainly not least, civil and political society organisations. All these 
players form part and parcel of the democratic system at large, including the 




At this point, the role that the State has to play with respect to human rights 
should be emphasised. The State is not only bound by a national Constitution 
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and subordinate legislation, but also by international treaties guaranteeing 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (or civil liberties), such as: 
• from the United Nations (UN): the so-called Bill of Human 
Rights; 
• from the European Union (EU): the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights; 
• from the CoE: the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 
European Social Charter (ESC). 
All these international treaties allow States to impose lawful restrictions on inter 
alia governmental civil servants and members of the police and armed forces. 
With regard to the first text (the UN Declaration on Human Rights), this is 
unsurprising when we recall that the bill was written in the direct aftermath of 
World War II and in the heat of the Berlin crisis of 1948. Subsequent treaties 
were obliged to follow the original UN text as no one wanted to re-open 
laborious discussions on a finally universally accepted text. Many governments, 
however, take a many-levelled approach here: they (usually constitutionally) 
guarantee the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all their citizens whilst 
in subordinate legislation, some of these rights and freedoms are not restricted 
but actually completely excluded for certain citizens. Allow me to illustrate this 
with three examples: 
Example 1: Almost half of the CoE Member States with armed forces 
still exclude their military personnel from the right of association with the aim of 
protecting their social interests. This right however, may only be restricted when 
‘necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security.’2 How 
excluding military personnel from the right of association can be in the interest 
of national security eludes me completely. 
Example 2: When ratifying the ECHR, many States have made 
reservations to Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial) for military personnel, thereby allowing military courts to exist. One 
wonders whether the military judiciary (where superiors accuse, defend and 
judge subordinates) in these countries always can and will respect the 
principles of ECHR Articles 5 and 6. One also wonders whether in these 
countries, keeping such a tenacious grip on military courts allows the military to 
keep its actions from the public gaze.  
Example 3: In many European countries, police officers and military 
personnel have no passive voting rights and membership of political parties is 
often forbidden. It is argued that this is necessary to prevent the politicisation of 
the police and armed forces and that it guarantees these institutions’ neutrality. 
In general, no other players in the field of the trias politica have had such severe 
restrictions placed on them, and apparently there is no danger of them 
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becoming politicised or losing their neutrality in such a way that would endanger 
the trias politica. 
These examples clearly show that people in the security sector are still 
being treated differently from other parts of society. Someone from antiquity 
might agree with this, but as early as 1637, the French philosopher and 
mathematician René Descartes (1596-1650) had written his famous words ‘Je 
pense, donc je suis [I think, therefore I am].’3 In my view, this incorporates all 
mankind without any exception for sex, race, position, or whatever. After the 
Second World War, centuries-old perceptions on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms were finally given a more universally accepted dimension inter alia in 
the CoE’s ECHR. Societies were organised in a more democratic way and 
citizens were (and still are) encouraged to participate. In the meantime, we have 
reached the year 2013, and I detest the on-going differentiation, if not 
discrimination, between society and the security sector. Security sector 
personnel are grown human beings; they are entitled to have their own opinions 
and to be treated accordingly. Yet, almost like second-class citizens, too many 
people from the security sector are unfortunately still being partly excluded from 
the society in which they not only work and live, but also have to protect and 




The Situation in the Netherlands: Historical Development4 
In the second half of the 19th century, working conditions in the Dutch armed 
forces were extremely poor. Salaries were pitiful and pensions and medical care 
were scarce, if they existed at all. Rheumatism and tuberculosis were common. 
The lower ranks and their families were condemned to a life of poverty. For that 
reason, some associations were established with the aim of providing charity for 
colleagues in despair. Nothing much, however, was done to prevent poverty or 
to improve working and living conditions.  
As a result of the industrial revolution, the first real trade union 
movement in the civil sector was set up in 1894: the Algemene Nederlandse 
Diamantbewerkers Bond (General Dutch Diamond Workers’ Union), founded by 
Henri Polak and Jan van Zutphen. A group of determined non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) from the army followed suit, and in 1898 the first trade union for 
army NCOs was established: Ons Belang (‘our interest’), probably the oldest 
                                                 
3
 Descartes 1987, Chapter 4.  
4
 In this case study I mainly focus on the developments for military personnel. For this, I 
frequently consulted the book “Noch noodig, noch gewenscht” (English: Neither 
necessary, nor wanted), written by my esteemed colleague Jan Heckers (deceased 
2011) and edited (ISBN 90-5166-553-0) by the Algemene Federatie Militair Personeel 
(General Federation for Military Personnel or AFMP, the legal successor to Ons Belang) 
in 1998, on the occasion of celebrating 100 years of trade unionism for military 
personnel. 
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trade union for military personnel in the world. It is quite remarkable that in 
those days, Dutch legislation did not forbid military personnel to form such an 
association. Not that everyone agreed with it; in 1904 the then Dutch Minister of 
War stated that ‘the association is neither necessary, nor wanted’. But other 
associations followed, for instance for the military police, for naval personnel, for 
officers, and so forth. These associations were more like representative 
associations than trade unions, and it could be argued that they chose to take a 
softer approach. Whatever the differences between the various associations, 
the determination to improve working and living conditions could not be 
countered. 
The first police representative association (the predecessor of the 
modern Dutch Police Union, the Nederlandse Politie Bond) was founded in 
1897, and others followed in 1914 and 1915. At this point it is also noteworthy 
that civil servants hesitantly followed the example that the police and military 
associations had set, and finally established their own trade unions or 
representative associations in 1919. One could indeed say the security sector in 
those days was way ahead of its time. 
In 1919, a consultation platform for civil servants was set up, and this 
was finally formalised in the Civil Servants Act in 1929. Military personnel had a 
consultation platform from 1922, but had to wait for the Military Servants Act for 
this to be finally formalised in 1931. There was a Committee A for officers 
associations and a Committee B for the lower ranks. The form of consultation, 
however, was restricted to advice. If the advice was negative, the Government 
could easily ignore it and continue with its course of action; a far from 
satisfactory situation. In early 1933, the Government decided to curtail salaries 
for military personnel by 14 per cent (after two previous cuts of 5 per cent each). 
This caused a lot of disturbance and discontent, and a mutiny broke out on the 
Ironclad Hr. Ms. De Zeven Provinciën (The Seven Provinces) in the Dutch 
Indies on 4 February 1933. Whilst the vast majority of the Dutch crew was 
ashore celebrating at a party, some native shipmates hijacked the ship, left the 
roads of Oleh-Leh (Aceh, Northwest Sumatra) and steamed up to Surabaya to 
protest against the salary cuts. On the early morning of 10 February 1933, a 
Dutch naval aircraft bombed the ship (mistakenly midships) with a 50 pounder. 
The consequences were serious (23 casualties, 20 wounded) and the mutiny 
was over.5 
In the Dutch Parliament, Minister Laurentius Nicolaas Deckers (then of 
Defence) defended the Navy’s operation, but the public was upset about what it 
saw as this unnecessarily rough performance, particularly when an investigation 
proved that the bomb had been aimed in front of the bow but had mistakenly hit 
the ship midships. There was great empathy with the victims and their relatives 
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 See website of the MoD of the Netherlands at: 
http://www.defensie.nl/nimh/geschiedenis/tijdbalk/1914-1945/aanvang_van_de_muiterij_ 
op_hrms_de_zeven_provincin_(4_februari_1933) [last accessed 1 December 2012]. 
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and fierce indignation about the Government’s performance. But the 
Government, under heavy pressure from the Navy leadership, argued that the 
social democratic movement in the Netherlands was behind the public outcry, 
and blamed military associations in the Netherlands for this mutiny on the other 
side of the world. As a consequence, Navy personnel were barred from social-
democratic organisations and from reading the social-democratic newspaper 
Het Vrije Volk (‘the free people’; this last veto was lifted in the late 1950s). The 
Government also issued a Regulation on the Principles of Activities by 
Representative Associations for Military Personnel below the Officers’ Ranks. 
Note that officers’ associations were excluded from this Regulation that inter 
alia comprised the following: 
• meetings were only allowed to be held in the presence of an 
officer who had to report to the Garrison Commander the next 
day; 
• only active serving military personnel were allowed to become 
members; 
• the unions/associations were forbidden from having paid board 
members/administrators; 
• political discussions were forbidden; 
• singing the union/association song was forbidden; 
• connections with commercial institutions were forbidden; 
• the unions/associations had to renew their admission to the 
consultation system. 
These harsh measures severely curtailed the activities of the 
unions/associations of the lower ranks severely (almost to the point of 
destroying them), raising the question of why the Government’s response 
focused on personnel who had had nothing to do with a mutiny some 9,000 
miles away. 
The answer is quite simple: the military authorities had always 
perceived the existence of unions or associations for the lower military ranks as 
a nuisance and bad for discipline, and believed that they were becoming too 
influential and economically too independent. The latter applied particularly to 
Ons Belang, which in those days had its own housing foundation, various 
insurance companies, a bank, a printing works, a welfare fund, and so forth, 
and had become an important institution in its own right. During a public criminal 
session of the High Military Court on 14 July 1933, it was argued that ‘It is 
absolutely forbidden for soldiers to have political discussions. The soldier as 
such should not have political convictions’. Also in July 1933, Militair Rechterlijk 
Tijdschrift (‘military judicial magazine’) advocated to exclude military personnel 
from the right to vote and to forbid military unions/associations. The majority of 
the military leadership argued that blind obedience was the soul of military life 
and that it was counterproductive to have groups of military personnel that 
aimed at improving their working and living conditions. With the mutiny, they 
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saw their chance to break the unions and/or associations, to divide and rule 
them, and they were successful: in 1937 there were 11 associations, most for 
small, targeted groups, and the consultation system only met twice in 1938. The 
detested Regulation of 1933 was for the most part withdrawn in 1949, and 
completely in 1967. 
After the dark times of the Second World War, a change became 
noticeable. The Consultation scheme was resumed in February 1948 and 
Minister Alexander Fiévez (then of War) stated that the Government considered 
the Consultation scheme to be of great value and ‘highly appreciated the input 
and advice from all the participants in the Consultations’. In September 1948 
Ons Belang celebrated its 50th anniversary, producing a special edition of its 
weekly magazine in which the then ex-Minister Fièvez wrote: ‘[…] my 
conviction, which has become mature through experience, is that an association 
such as Ons Belang is absolutely indispensable’. Compared with the period 
immediately after 1933, this was quite a change, although the unions for military 
personnel now continued to call themselves associations. These associations 
now sought closer co-operation, which finally led to mergers in the early 1980s. 
The changes of the late 1960s, a period when students all over the 
world held protests and demonstrated for more say on various issues, also 
affected the world of the military. Following suit, the associations – especially 
those for conscripts – aimed for better working conditions, compensation for 
weekend duties, compensation for overtime, and so forth. In 1974 the entire 
consultation scheme was altered: from then on, there was one Committee for 
Civil Servants (including teachers, police personnel and so forth) and one 
Committee for Soldiers only: Centraal Georganiseerd Overleg Militairen 
(CGOM, the central organised consultation for soldiers). The Committees A for 
officers and B for the lower ranks were dissolved. A so-called duplicate decision 
ruled that decisions applicable to all public servants (including the military) 
would be taken in principle in the Committee for Civil Servants and the details 
worked out in CGOM, and that decisions relating only to military personnel 
would be dealt with by CGOM alone. In the second half of the 1970s, a system 
of local consultation was introduced, whereby unit commanders could discuss 
the wellbeing of their personnel. The Dutch Law on Participation Councils had 
existed since 1950 and the first European Community Directive on Participation 
Councils had been issued in 1968, but military personnel had always been 
excluded. A very modest start was made with the introduction of a small amount 
of compensation for overtime and weekend duties. 
Also immediately after World War II, the office of the Inspector General6 
(in an advisory function to the Minister of War) was created; first for the Army; in 
1946, also for the Navy; and from 1953, also for the Air Force. The first 
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 See website of the MoD of the Netherlands at: http://www.defensie.nl/igk [last accessed 
on 1 December 2012]. 
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Inspector General was His Royal Highness (HRH) Prince Bernhard (husband of 
the later Queen Juliana), who inter alia advocated modern leadership and better 
career opportunities for the NCOs. In 1970, the three functions were integrated 
into one Inspector General for all parts of the Armed Forces. In 1976, HRH 
Prince Bernhard was relieved of his post, and since then it has been fulfilled by 
a three-star active serving general or admiral. Since 1991, the Inspector 
General has also been the Inspector General of Veterans, and present tasks 
are to: 
• advise the Minister of Defence on all issues related to Defence: 
• visit one-third of the armed forces each year and write four-
monthly reports on the findings; 
• write an annual report including results and recommendations; 
• intermediate in conflict situations between military personnel 
and their superiors where the trade unions find themselves in a 
deadlock. In other words, the post functions as a kind of 
Ombudsman for armed forces personnel; 
• keep in touch with veterans’ organisations and recommend 
changes/improvements in veterans policy if needs be. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of using the Ombudsman function of the 
Inspector General, military personnel are also allowed to approach the National 
Ombudsman (created in 1982), but only when they have already complained to 
a governmental institution without a result.  
It might thus be argued that the relations between the State and its 
public servants slowly became normal industrial relations. Yet, in 1983, the 
Government decided to curtail all of its employees’ salaries by 3.5 per cent. 
Fierce protest rallies, demonstrations and even strikes made the Government 
retreat slightly: the cut was reduced to 3 per cent. In October 1984 an Advice 
and Arbitration Committee (AAC) was set up, known as the Albeda Committee 
after its first chairman, retired Minister for Social Affairs Wil Albeda. Its main 
objective was achieving a fairer consultation scheme for public servants. This 
was prompted by the employee side in particular, as their influence on the 
outcome of the working conditions consultations was much smaller than in the 
private sector. This had to do with the position of the Government, which was 
not only an employer, but also represented the general interest and was often 
bound by Parliament’s power of the purse. This undermined the Government’s 
role as an employer and meant that the parties at the Consultation table were 
not equal. In the first years of its existence the AAC issued various 
recommendations, many of them appealing to the Government to better 
exercise its responsibilities as an employer. 
In the mid-1980s, a thorough comparison was made between the terms 
of employment for civil servants at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and military 
personnel: the so-called Pakketvergelijking (‘package comparison’). This 
resulted from the ongoing discussion about differences in working conditions 
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between civil and military personnel. Based on that survey, it was inter alia 
decided that military personnel should in future pay for their medical care, but in 
return they would get a better compensation scheme (comparable to that of the 
mid-1970s) for overtime, irregular hours, weekend duties, exercises, and so 
forth. In addition, a method was developed to analyse functions (with 
knowledge, responsibilities and leadership as the special weighing factors) and 
then putting a rank to a function. Many military leaders were opposed to this 
approach, as they thought it would undermine the hierarchy, but when the 
results were introduced in 1990, it turned out much better than expected. In the 
second half of the 1980s, the structure of local participation councils within 
Defence was improved and brought more into line with the then repeatedly-
changing Law on Participation Councils and the current European Community 
Directive on Participation Councils.  
At the end of the 1980s, the then Minister for Home Affairs, Mrs Ien 
Dales, who was also responsible for the Consultations with public servants, 
decided that the Government also had to act as an employer and that situations 
in which the Government could unilaterally decide to curtail salaries, such as 
had occurred in 1983, had to be prevented. This lead to the granting of 
negotiating rights on primary working conditions (that is, salaries, pensions and 
aspects of social security) to public servants’ organisations, including military 
organisations. This represented a huge step forward, and when in 1990 the 
armed forces were to be reduced by 30 per cent, the military associations 
managed to obtain the right to negotiate a Social Charter. 
In 1993, there was another change in the Consultation scheme: the 
Committee for Civil Servants and the Committee for Military Servants were 
dissolved and eight new sector Committees were formed, including one for all 
civil and military servants working in the Defence sector, while the negotiation 
rights remained intact. At the same time, the Government also lifted the 
reservations it had made for military personnel when ratifying the ESC in 1980. 
The now (from an industrial point of view) obtained legal right to strike, however, 
was replaced by mediation for military personnel only in the Advice and 
Arbitration Committee. This formal right to strike is not to be confused with the 
penal provisions of the Military Criminal Code with respect to disobedience, 
unlawful absence, conspiracy, mutiny, and so forth. In other words: while a 
strike may be lawful on the one hand, it may be severely punished on the other. 
Moreover, Dutch society will never accept its armed forces going on strike, and 




The Situation in the Netherlands: Conclusion 
Considering the period between 1898 and the 21st century, it cannot be denied 
that the military trade unions fought a long and hard battle to achieve their 
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current position. However, the rule of law has always been applicable: the 
legitimacy of the armed forces is regulated in the Constitution and the rights and 
duties of military personnel are described in short in the Military Servants Act. 
These rights and duties are worked out in more detail in the General Military 
Servants Regulation (Algemeen Militair Ambtenaren Reglement, AMAR, to be 
agreed on in the Consultation scheme) and the details are also worked out in 
more specific regulations, often for each part of the armed forces. 
The development of the rule of law over the years also had an impact 
on the political rights of military personnel. The first military man in Parliament 
was Warrant Officer Wilhelmus Wijk, at the time also President of Ons Belang, 
from 1918 to 1922. He established the Alliance for Democratisation of the 
Armed Forces (Verbond tot Democratisering van de Weermacht, VDW), and got 
7,000 votes at the 1918 elections. Because of the then applicable system of 
dividing rest-votes, this resulted, surprisingly, in one seat in Parliament. The 
VDW was a small, neutral political party that aimed exclusively at the 
improvement of working conditions for military personnel and was dissolved 
when Wijk was not re-elected in 1922.7 
Until 1971, a high-ranking member of the military could easily become 
Minister of Defence. At that time however, the incompatibility principle was 
introduced, and when Governmental personnel were elected to Parliament or 
Government, they were given extraordinary leave. After their political careers 
they could easily return to their previous jobs. In the 1990s it was decided that 
this was unfair to others seeking election, and since then one has had to quit 
one’s governmental job before accepting a political or executive post in either 
Parliament or Government.  
As for the legality of exercising political rights, Article 12a of the Military 
Servants Act reads in a free translation: ‘The military servant is to refrain from 
publicising his thoughts and/or exercising the right of association if the 
functioning of his position or the public office in general would not be assured 
within reason. The first paragraph is not applicable to membership of a political 
party inscribed in the electoral register or a trade union’. This gives Dutch 
military personnel every right to participate in trade unions and political life, and 
many of them indeed do so. However, there is a gentlemen’s agreement that 
they do not do so in uniform, especially in political life. After all, it is not the 
military person that wishes to be involved, but the citizen, hence the absence of 
the uniform.  
This development of civil-military relations over the years undoubtedly 
also had an influence on the way in which industrial relations for military 
personnel developed. Notwithstanding the views of eminent scientists such as 
Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, one can define at least three eras: ± 
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 See website of Leiden University, Parliamentary Documentation Centre at: 
http://www.parlementairdocumentatiecentrum.nl/id/vg09lld6j3zp [last accessed on 1 
December 2012]. 
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1860-1945, mass warfare with management of violence; ± 1945-1990, the Cold 
War with deterrence and non-use of force; and finally, from the early 1990s, 
peace support operations marked by extensive humanitarian intervention. If we 
compare these time-frames with the development of industrial relations in the 
Dutch security sector, there certainly seem to be similarities. 
In 1998 the AFMP celebrated 100 years of trade unionism for military 
personnel. As the then chairman of that union, I presented the first copy of the 
book Noch noodig, noch gewenscht (‘Neither necessary, nor wanted,’ ironically 
quoting the 1904 Minister of War’s views on Ons Belang, the predecessor of the 
AFMP) to then Prime Minister, Wim Kok, during a special celebration with more 
than 500 guests. He replied that ‘nowadays trade unions for military personnel 
are very necessary and absolutely wanted’. In the early 21st century a high-
ranking Dutch officer even declared that ‘if trade unions for the military did not 
exist today they should be invented tomorrow’. All these expressions are tokens 
of a normalisation in relations. 
During operations or exercises, many of our rights are temporarily 
restricted or even excluded. In normal circumstances, however, a member of 
the military is considered a ‘citizen in uniform’ with the same basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as their civilian neighbour. Of course there are the 
occasional tensions with the MoD and/or the leadership of the armed forces. 
But generally speaking, and leaving no room for complacency, the situation in 
the Netherlands for military personnel and in the security sector at large is 
satisfactory, even though there is always potential for improvement. 
At this point let me make it absolutely clear that the primacy of politics is 
not an issue and that the chain of command is highly respected. However, 
terms of employment, working conditions and the general lines of career 
possibilities are subjects for either negotiation or consultation. Subjects such as 
operations, discipline, the hierarchy, the budget, and so forth, are out of bounds 
for the unions of military personnel, are even after more than 114 years – as 
they should be. In other words, there is absolutely no danger of the unions 
assuming power; on the contrary. But military personnel of course are entitled to 




Unfortunately, this satisfactory situation is not replicated in many other 
countries. For more than 30 years the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) has frequently investigated and written reports about police 
personnel, prison personnel, military personnel (including conscripts), and so 
forth. While, for instance, in the early 1970s only ten European countries 
allowed their military personnel the right of association, one can now say that 
things have improved to 100 per cent. However, this is still not more than half of 
the Council of Europe Member States with armed forces, and most of the 
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‘newcomers’ are from Eastern Europe. The latest PACE report from April 2006 
on military personnel and its Recommendation8 took the Committee of Ministers 
(CM) almost four years to agree on a common reaction to the member States9 
that was largely in line with the Assembly’s views on the issue. One of CM’s 
recommendations in February 2010 was to: ‘examine within the Committee of 
Ministers the implementation of this recommendation two years after its 
adoption’. After that, there was a long silence, until the CM’s Steering 
Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) finally instructed10 its Secretariat in July 
2012: 
1. to elaborate a questionnaire on the implementation of Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
human rights of members of the armed forces and to transmit it to 
Member States. Other relevant stakeholders may also be invited to 
provide comments; 
2. to submit to the Committee of Ministers the results of the examination of 
the implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)4 by 30 June 
2013 at the latest. 
Since PACE’s Recommendation from 2006 one would almost start to believe 
that CM’s policy, and that of the Member States who they after all represent, is 
that procrastination is the thief of time. 
Almost all people working in the security sector, except those with 
police or military status, can freely enjoy nearly all their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The known exclusions for both military and police 
personnel are passive voting rights and membership of political parties. 
However, military personnel are too often deprived of additional fundamental, 
civil or workers’ rights, such as the fundamental right of association. Taking into 
account the tremendous shift in civil-military relations, I would argue that is high 
time for governments to accept that human rights and fundamental freedoms do 
not stop at the barrack gates, and to take the 2010 Ministerial Recommendation 
as an opportunity to review their – often outdated – regulations on the members 
of the armed forces and to bring them up to date.11 One should also bear in 
mind that the better police officers and military personnel can exercise and 
enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms at home, the better defenders of 
these rights and freedoms of other people they will be when on mission abroad.
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 Council of Europe, PACE Document 10861 and PACE Recommendation 1742, 11 April 
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 Council of Europe, CM Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)4, 24 February 2010. 
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11
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VI. Ruling Behind the Law: Judicial and Administrative 







‘We made the appropriate choice at that time. We would stage a revolution if it 
were today. The revolution is a historic event. Historic events cannot be judged. 
The judiciary, which takes its judicial authority from the 1982 Constitution, does 
not have the authority to charge and try us. (…) Staging a revolution [coup] is 
not a crime according to our laws. We did not attempt a revolution, we staged 
one. Everybody should know that staging a revolution and attempting to stage 
one are not the same. (…) There were people from the left and from the right at 
the courts. We told them not to execute only leftists. We hanged one from the 
right, one from the left. In this way, we wanted to prove we were not taking 
sides.’1 
 
As a country that aspires to become a member of the EU, Turkey offers a 
paradoxically anachronistic picture in terms of the strong degree of politico-
cultural and socio-economic involvement enjoyed by its armed forces. It has 
been repeatedly argued in various circles that Turkey needs to implement a 
series of military-related reforms in order to align its civil-military relations in 
accordance with western democratic standards. Thus, Turkey introduced 
several reform packages in the first half of the 2000s, aimed at strengthening 
democratic civilian control of the military and limiting its power in politics within 
the framework of the EU accession process. However, since these reforms 
generally concentrated on institutional arrangements, such as re-designing the 
role and composition of the National Security Council (MGK) as a consultative 
body with a civilian majority and a civilian secretary-general, the military 
establishment continued to exercise influence through a series of informal 
channels. 
On 27 April 2007, Turkey’s generals staged the so-called ‘e-coup’. The 
online memorandum posted on the General Staff’s official website noted that ‘if 
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necessary, the Turkish Armed Forces will not hesitate to make their position 
and stance abundantly clear as the absolute defenders of secularism.’ 
Most western commentators were stunned to see a country on the path 
to EU membership come to the brink of a military coup. On the other hand, for 
those who have studied Turkey’s economic, social, and political history 
insightfully enough, the fifth military intervention in the Republic of Turkey was a 
response to a series of developments that took off with the decision of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to nominate Foreign Minister Abdullah 
Gül to the highly prestigious post of President. This was nothing but a 
continuation of events that reflect the authoritarian-modernist mentality of the 
establishment elites, mixed with the patriarchal traditionalism that dominates the 
minds of the general population in Turkey. 
In this respect, ‘liberating Turkish Cypriots from Greece’s domination 
(1974)’, ‘preventing the country from falling into the hands of the Islamists’, and 
‘stopping internal conflicts twice by the conventional way of a coup (1960, 1980), 
once by a memorandum (1971), then once by what has been referred to as the 
postmodern coup (1997), and finally by an e-memorandum (2007)’ consolidated 
the paternalistic figure of the state, and of the military as the main 
representative of the establishment. 
This protagonist role of protecting the secular and modern personality 
of the Republic, as well as maintaining the unity of the country, chiefly stems 
from the fact that Kemalism, the founding ideology of the modern Turkish state, 
which aimed at the creation of a politically non-Islamic, secular, westward-
looking Turkey, has positioned the military to be the vector of these positivist 
and progressive ideals. In contemplation of this position, the military has 
introduced several social, economic and political processes and structures, 
insofar as compulsory military service as a secondary socialisation process has 
been sanctified by the Turkish population at large as a pre-requisite for the 
achievement of true ‘manhood’.  
Additionally, it should be recalled that, as specified above, the current 
imbalanced status of civil-military relations is a result of historical and 
cumulative developments. Following each military intervention (in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997), the military has designed, consolidated, and enhanced 
mechanisms to benefit from having unprecedented economic, financial and 
political autonomy within the Turkish polity. This exceptional status has given 
rise to an autonomous and hyper-centralised military structure. It can be 
suggested that the current autonomous status provides the Turkish military with 
four interrelated functionalities: (1) it sets out the conditions to protect it from 
outside (civilian) interference, while (2) equipping it with abilities that guarantee 
its significance as an actor in political, economic, and social spheres; (3) 
generates unmatched benefits to military officers, which also (4) produces and 
reinforces collective identity and cohesion among them. 
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In order to decipher the impact of this autonomous and hyper-
centralised military structure, not only on the asymmetrical nature of civil-military 
relations in Turkey, but also on various other relations, this article will embark 
upon a deconstruction of the historical and political context that has brought the 
military to be the primary actor in the Turkish polity. In particular, the main focus 
of this section will be the administrative and judicial autonomy of the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TSK), since the political and economic spheres have been 
studied eloquently in the other chapters of this book.  
 
 
Theoretical Background: The Concept of Military Autonomy 
In his often-quoted article entitled ‘Military Autonomy and Emerging 
Democracies in South America’, David Pion-Berlin refers to autonomy as ‘an 
institution’s decision-making authority’, and to military autonomy as ‘the relative 
independence with which the armed forces behave’.2 He then makes a useful 
distinction regarding the sites upon which the military seeks to exert authority, 
by distinguishing institutional autonomy, ‘the military’s professional 
independence and exclusivity’,3 from political autonomy, which he defines as 
‘the military’s aversion towards or even defiance of civilian control’.4 
In his seminal formulation of military professionalism and its relation to 
the political activity of the military establishment, Huntington argued that due to 
the requirements of modern warfare, it would not be possible for the military to 
remain competent in many other fields than those that directly relate to its 
primary function of external defence. As a result of this specialisation, ‘the 
vocation of officership absorbs all their energies and furnishes them with all 
their occupational satisfactions. Officership, in short, is an exclusive role, 
incompatible with any other significant social or political roles’.5 In other words, 
the required functional specialisation for external defence means that ‘it became 
impossible to be an expert in the management of violence for external defense 
and at the same time to be skilled in either politics or statecraft or the use of 
force for the maintenance of internal order. The functions of the officer became 
distinct from those of the politician and policeman’.6 In this regard, as ‘[t]he one 
prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military 
power’, this would be achieved through ‘professionalizing the military’,7  and 
‘confining it to a restricted sphere and rendering it politically sterile and neutral 
on all issues outside that sphere’.8 
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While this may have been true in the context in which it was produced, 
the United States, and in most of Western Europe, many other cases, including 
Turkey, offer no confirmation of Huntington’s assertion that there is a routine 
identity between corporate autonomy and political subordination. On the 
contrary, in these cases, 9  corporate autonomy and submission to civilian 
authority are inversely related to one another. To the extent that the armed 
forces of these countries accumulate powers and decision-making authorities, 
they become less willing to give up their interests and resist the transfer of 
control to civilian initiatives. 
On the other hand, while these ‘military institutions that consider 
involvement in – or control over – domestic politics and the business of 
government to be a central part of their legitimate function’, defined as ‘political 
armies’10 by sharing ‘a common core of characteristics and orientations’,11 there 
are also significant differences that ‘can be found not only in the internal make-
up of the military institutions but also in the variations in actual military political 
intervention or direct rule’.12 After all, ‘[m]ilitary rule does not depend only on the 
intrinsic nature of a political army but also on its relationship with civilian actors, 
the broader institutional context of military rule within the state, the public 
domain, civil society and various kinds of social contradictions and struggles’.13 
In this respect, to comprehend the military’s longitudinal political and social role 
in Turkey and to identify how its enhanced administrative and judicial 
autonomies have caused dualities that are problematic to the functioning of an 
advanced democracy, the basic parameters of this situation need to be 
analysed. In the end, these autonomies are not only the embodiment of the 
feeling of superiority of the officers towards the rest of the society, but also 
provide fertile ground for its maintenance. Thus, the following sections will 
examine the TSK’s socio-economic and political roles within the Turkish polity 
from a historical perspective. 
  
From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic: The role of the TSK 
It is generally argued that the military has been the most significant factor 
behind the evolution of the political, social and economic structure of the 
Ottoman state apparatus. Lybyer emphasises that ‘[t]he Ottoman government 
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had been an army before it was anything else. [...] In fact, army and government 
were one. War was the external purpose, government the internal purpose, of 
one institution, composed of one body of men’.14 This follows not only from the 
fact that the sultan was expected to manifest military prowess and physical 
courage, among other royal attributes, but the whole Ottoman ruling class was 
called the ‘military’ (askerî). According to Mumcu, we need to ask why the word 
‘military’ encompassed all public services in the Ottoman; it can be claimed that 
it appeared as a reflection of the establishment of the state on military purposes 
and concerns.15 
In due time, the Ottoman state evolved into an empire owing to its 
military strength and success. Salaried infantry corps under the direct control of 
the sultan – the Janissaries – came to physically represent Ottoman power and 
gradually developed parochial interests as they became aware of their 
corporate strength. In a dramatic turn of events, when the Empire ceased to 
expand and the relative superiority of the Ottomans vis-à-vis European powers 
faded as a consequence of conjunctural developments, this traditional elite 
corps started to symbolise the corrupt and collapsing Ottoman structure. In an 
attempt to restore imperial authority and keep up with the ‘challengers’, a reform 
movement was initiated at the end of the 18th century, leading to the 
establishment of a new, European-style army alongside the Janissaries and 
then, in 1826, the complete destruction of this traditional Ottoman corps. 
It would not be misleading to suggest that the New Order proclaimed by 
Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), which consisted of a programme of westernisation 
in order to create a new army, triggered a chain of irreversible events that led to 
the political modernisation of the country. It was the exposure of the members 
of this military bureaucracy to western political ideas and ideals that guided the 
introduction of the country’s first constitution and establishment of the 
Parliament in 1876. The enshrinement of constitutional and representative 
principles came in 1908 with what is known as the Young Turk Revolution, a 
threatened rebellion which provided fertile ground for Mustafa Kemal to appear 
a decade later as the leader of the independence movement, supported by the 
remaining officers from the Ottoman forces defeated during World War I, and 
transform the Empire into a nation-state. To put it in Rustow’s words, ‘for nearly 
two hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey’s foremost modernizer’,16 and 
the military was right at the heart of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to 
the Republic of Turkey. 
As the key protagonist in this transitional period and the founder of the 
Republic, the TSK took on the role of guardian of the Turkish nation, which 
created a self-perception on the part of the military as the protector of the state 
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on behalf of the people. In essence, the military regarded itself as the essential 
core, the fundamental nucleus of the newly born nation and state. 
The military played a key role during the Ottoman period. Following the 
collapse of the Empire, the TSK assumed the role of guardian of the Turkish 
nation, which has given it a privileged status since the foundation of the 
Republic. During the transition period from the Empire to the Republic (when 
the TSK led the War of Independence) and the early years of the newly founded 




The Centralisation of the Military Administration during the Republican 
Era 
The state of ‘centralisation’ describes a military structure and chain of command 
where power and authority is concentrated, rather than diffused. In other words, 
by attaching and holding responsible every element and level of the military 
command mechanism to a single person or position, the military organisation 
has achieved a hyper-centralised outlook. This is manifested in the status and 
role of the Chief of General Staff. While such a structure may be extremely 
functional and necessary at times of total war, since it implies effective control 
and decision-making, it is, however, against the practice of graded responsibility 
or graded hierarchy, which is the generally accepted civilian democratic norm in 
security/defence policies in NATO member countries. For instance, in the US, 
the Secretary of Defense has authority, direction and control over all issues 
concerning the Department of Defense, and is in the administrative and 
operational chain of command for all of the armed forces; that is, the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.17 While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff serves as the military advisor to the Secretary, s/he is not in the chain of 
command. Similarly, in the case of France, within the Ministry of Defence there 
is a joint forces organisation that coordinates defence operations. 18  The 
example of the Netherlands is equally representative of the practice of graded 
responsibility, where the Chief of Defence is responsible for the implementation 
of operations at home and abroad, the Central Staff in the Ministry is in charge 
of making policy, and internal material policy, from procurement and major 
maintenance to disposal, is established by the Defence Material Organisation.19 
Unlike the above-noted practice in other NATO countries, in the case of 
Turkey, the Office of the Chief of General Staff is: 
not a coordination unit that symbolically gathers all command powers 
[...] but a ‘center of power’ representing an extremely vertical 
organization that, like a magnet, gathers around it all units, from the 
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military justice system to the force commands. All other political powers 
of the army, including powers related to the military organization, the 
chain of command, national defense, and military policy, are therefore 
gathered under one authority and, more importantly, its ambiguous 
jurisdiction is established by a single authority. This situation protects 
and increases the political power of the army by creating a military 
system that does not allow any interference in it but that is ready to 
intervene in other spheres.20 
The state of hyper-centralisation has been achieved gradually, as a series of 
events – similar to how the state of autonomy has been achieved, as elaborated 
below – have built upon each other. In the progression to achieving a hyper-
centralised structure, three specific arrangements deserve particular attention, 
since they can be identified as the driving engines of this process. The first of 
them corresponds to the issuing of a regulation by the Erkan-ı Harbiye-i 
Umumiye Vekaleti (the equivalent of the Ministry of General Staff) on 5 August 
1923, to re-organise the administrative structure of the armed forces. Replacing 
Western, Eastern, and Southern front commanders with army inspectors, the 
regulation also limited the authority and duties of the inspectors to the drafting 
of detection and suggestion reports on the state of the specific army in 
consideration to be submitted to the main headquarters. According to this 
arrangement, although army inspectors were positioned at the top of the military 
hierarchy, just below the Minister (until March 1924), they did not have any 
commanding authority or a military base. Even the schedule and content of the 
inspections were left to the discretion of the Chief to whom they were directly 
attached. As a result of this, a very rigid and individual command relationship 
was established between the Chief and the corps and division commanders, 
leaving out the principles of military responsibility-sharing and graded hierarchy. 
In terms of decreasing the number of intermediary echelons and concentrating 
the command chain in the hands of a few, the establishment of the 
inspectorship system, which lasted until 1938, should be considered the first 
institutional step towards a hyper-centralised structure. 
With the second arrangement, the Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekaleti 
was abolished as a ministry and re-established as the Erkan-ı Harbiye-i 
Umumiye Riyaseti (the Chairmanship of General Staff). Law no. 42921  was 
dated 3 March 1924, and Articles 8 to 12 of this 14-article law were on the 
establishment of the Chairmanship as an independent body and clarification of 
its status, authority, and responsibilities. The relevant articles proceeded as 
follows: 
• The Ministry of General Staff is abolished. (Article 8) 
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• The Chairmanship of the General Staff is the highest military 
office and is responsible for administrating and commanding 
the armed forces on behalf of the President. The Chairmanship 
is independent. (Article 9) 
• The Chairman of the General Staff is proposed by the Prime 
Minister and appointed by the President. (Article 10) 
• The Chairman of the General Staff communicates to all 
ministries regarding the issues of which he is in charge. (Article 
11) 
• The Ministry of National Defence is accountable to Parliament 
for the military budget. (Article 12) 
It is important to note that the Law does not mention any administrative 
responsibility mechanism for the TSK. The Military Chairman/Chief is appointed 
by the President and, as it was mentioned above, uses the President’s authority 
on his behalf; and in this respect, it could be argued that the Chief is implicitly 
responsible to the President. According to the 1924 Constitution, the President 
is not responsible to any other state body, except in the case of treason against 
the state, in which he is answerable to Parliament.22 Thus, the new Law states 
that the Chief of the Armed Forces is implicitly accountable to the President, but 
since the Turkish President is responsible to no one, via Law no. 429, the 
military consequently achieved the status of an institution that is not responsible 
to any other institution within the Turkish state structure. 
In addition, the vague description of issues under the authority of the 
Chairmanship in the Law, and the equipment of the Chairman/Chief, who is the 
supreme commander of the chain of command with the right to communicate 
with any ministry without any intermediary agency on these issues, not only 
caused a military omnipresence in the Turkish polity, but also reinforced the 
perception of the military’s supra-political position. 
Building upon the aforementioned two arrangements, the third 
arrangement in the line of consolidating the decision-making authority of the 
military within the state structure was the establishment of the Âli Şûra-i 
Askeriye (Supreme Military Council) on 26 February 1925 by Law no. 636.23 
The law not only equipped the Council with the authority to issue resolutions on 
the ‘political, administrative, financial, civilian, and military aspects of defence 
related matters’, but also, by loosely defining its functions, once again left a 
wide range of issues under the strict control of the military administration.24 The 
ample scope of its functions can be gathered around the following points: 
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• The preparation and implementation of the strategic plans and 
military doctrine of the armed forces; 
• The administration of the armed forces, the command and 
training of the military units, and the appointment and promotion 
of military personnel; 
• National defence and armament strategy; 
• The preparation of the national defence budget; 
• The adjudication of the legal provisions regarding those 
matters.25        
Chaired by the President, only a few members of this 16-seat council were 
civilians with ministerial positions; nevertheless, this has never had an impact 
on the military character and decision-making of the Council. It could even be 
argued that the Council had a ‘normalising’ effect in terms of the imbalance in 
civil-military relations, since the determination of the agenda and the 
management of the Council was left to the military side. 
When considered altogether, it can be observed that the process of 
centralisation of the inner military structure also corresponds to a process 
whereby the relationship between authority and responsibility has become 
reversed. As detailed in the articles of Law no. 429 that established the Erkan-ı 
Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaseti, while planning and decision-making authority with 
regards to military matters were left in the hands of the military itself, it was the 
civilian authorities who carried responsibility for these. From the military 
perspective, it is understandable why central control is essential, especially in 
times of war, since the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are expected to take 
action in a coordinated way. However, as considered by Robert S. McNamara, 
the influential US Secretary of Defense of the Cold War period, there are three 
kinds of centralisation: centralisation of responsibility, centralisation of function, 
and centralisation of authority.26 In the case of the Turkish military structure and 
civil-military relations, while the military administration has achieved the latter 
two, the first one, regarding responsibility, was delegated to civilians. In other 
words, the civilian administration holds all responsibility for the military authority, 
as a display of voluntary obedience. As will be demonstrated below, it is this 
imbalance between authority and responsibility that led the military cadres to 
obtain further benefits in terms of its hyper-centralised and autonomous place 
within the state structure, by various interventions in the polity. 
During the following years in the Turkish Republic, the military 
intervened four times in politics using traditional methods. In two instances, 
namely the 1960 and 1980 coups, military governments were formed before 
new constitutions were introduced as markers of the transition to civilian 
government; in two others, the 1971 memorandum and the 1997 post-modern 
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coup, the military settled for constitutional amendments and changes of 
government. These constitutional developments deserve particular attention, as 
they contain important information in terms of the legal and administrative 
autonomies of the TSK. Nevertheless, after each carefully crafted intervention, 
the TSK successfully opened up space for itself to increase its dominance over 
civilian politics, while enhancing its autonomous status through legal and 
administrative arrangements. Additionally, the opening up of new spheres in 
which the TSK has become a major player has not only increased the number 
of areas in which officers have an interest, such as their increased interest in 
the country’s economic circumstances now that an exclusive pension fund has 
been introduced, but has also produced new instruments and resources that 
shed further light on their perceptions and attitudes. In view of this, the following 
sections will evaluate the judicial and administrative autonomy of the TSK. 
 
   
Judicial and Administrative Autonomy 
The military judiciary was introduced in the Turkish legal system with the 1961 
Constitution, which was promulgated after the first ever military coup in Turkey 
in 1960. The first section of Article 138 notes that ‘[m]ilitary trials are conducted 
by military and disciplinary courts’, and then indicates that ‘[t]hese courts are 
entitled to try the military offenses of military personnel and those offenses 
committed against military personnel or in military areas, or offences connected 
with military service and duties.’ Such a broad mission statement clearly 
constitutes a breach of the principle of the right to one’s legal/natural judge.27 
Additionally and more strikingly, in the second section of the same article, the 
military judiciary equips itself with the authority to try civilians; and this is the 
reason why criticism is mostly concentrated on this article, as it is seen as the 
hotbed of the military judiciary. Suffice it to repeat here that this is also contrary 
to the above-mentioned principle of a legal/natural judge. 
On the other hand, in Article 141, the designation of the Military Court of 
Cassation (Askeri Yargıtay) as ‘a court of the last instance to review decisions 
and verdicts rendered by military courts’ points to a duality created in the 
judiciary system. As detailed in Article 139, the Court of Cassation also serves 
the same function with regards to the ‘decisions and verdicts rendered by courts 
of law’. In this respect, the creation of both military courts and a higher military 
court of cassation is not only against the principle of unitary jurisdiction and 
illustrates the first steps in the creation of an autonomous space within the 
judiciary system, but also makes it legitimate, although only on theoretical 
grounds, for any other professional group to request a specialised court. 
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The 1961 Constitution is also important in terms of the administrative 
structure it produced. First of all, it created the MGK in Article 111, consisting of 
‘the Ministers as provided by law, the Chief of the General Staff, and 
representatives of the armed forces’, and identified its function as ‘to 
communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to 
national security and coordination.’ Although at this stage, its authority was 
limited to recommendations, the existence of such a platform opened up the 
possibility of the military’s influence over political decisions; and, as will be 
explained below, further developments in the coming years transformed its 
structure and authority in such a way that it became the physical representation 
of the unprecedented weight of the military presence in the political system. And 
secondly, by holding the Chief of General Staff ‘responsible to the Prime 
Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers’ in Article 110, as opposed to 
the practice in democratic regimes, where the responsibility is to the Minister of 
Defence – which had also been the case in Turkey since 1949 – the status of 
the Chief of General Staff was upgraded. In the end, these changes brought 
about a military structure equipped with a constitutionally-backed channel to 
exert influence over politics, while establishing a lower level of civilian control 
over it; and this is completely consistent with the hierarchical layout upon which 
civil-military relations are established. 
The constitutional amendments introduced after the 1971 memorandum 
not only expanded the military judicial autonomy at the expense of the civilian 
judicial authority, but also provided the military with an additional structural 
mechanism that would protect it from civilian intervention and control. As 
previously mentioned, the second section of Article 138 in the 1961 Constitution 
authorised military courts to try ‘non-military persons only for military offences 
prescribed by special laws.’ Law no. 1488, which amended several articles28 of 
the 1961 Constitution, enlarged the scope of the authority of the military 
judiciary by empowering military courts to try non-military persons ‘in cases 
concerning military offences as prescribed by a special law, and those offences 
committed against the military during the performance of their duties as 
specified by law, or in military areas designated by law’ (emphasis mine). 
Parallel amendments were also made in Law no. 353 on the Establishment of 
Military Codes and Tribunal Procedure29 to harmonise the Law with regards to 
the constitutional amendments. The amended Article 11 referred to an 
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extensive list of offences set out in the Military Penal Code,30 which, if breached, 
would lead to the prosecution of non-military persons in military courts. This 
clearly reflects the militarisation of civilian judicial space and is representative of 
the hierarchical superiority of the military authority vis-à-vis ordinary civilians. 
Furthermore, with the amendment of Article 140, a Military 
Administrative Court (AYİM) was established to exercise ‘juridical control of 
administrative acts and deeds concerning military personnel.’ This refers to the 
creation of a military administrative judicial system alongside the general/public 
administrative judicial system. In other words, it has now become the duty of 
military men to supervise administrative decisions taken by fellow servicemen. 
As emphasised by Ümit Kardaş, a retired military judge, the institutionalisation 
of a high administrative court cannot be grounded in any legal logic or 
principle. 31  However, the outcome is remarkable in terms of illustrating the 
increasing administrative autonomy of the TSK. 
The 1971 amendments also served to signal the growing extent of 
military influence over the political system. By upgrading the function of the 
MGK from communicating to the Council of Ministers to recommending, and by 
clarifying that those representatives of the armed forces mentioned as members 
of the Council would, from this point on, be the Force Commanders, Law no. 
1488 is indicative of the desire of the military to reinforce its status in politics. 
The military administrative autonomy and the military influence on politics would 
become more apparent and less acceptable in terms of democratic principles in 
the 1982 Constitution. 
Similar to the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution was also the 
product of a post-military takeover period. A committee of legal experts selected 
by the military junta was held responsible for drafting a new constitution, and 
there is no doubt that the concerns expressed by military officials were taken 
into consideration. To put it differently, it was the second time the military had 
drastically touched upon the lives of all the citizens of Turkey by re-designing 
the system along the lines of its self-defined norms, principles, perceptions, and 
attitudes. Moreover, unlike in 1961, where the authority to elect the president 
was left to Parliament after the transition to civilian government, in 1982, the 
approval of the transition to civilian government, the constitution, and the 
election of General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff and the 
commander of the military takeover as President, were tied together in the 
referendum, whose ratification was almost guaranteed. Ratified by a 91.37 % 
majority, the 1982 Constitution entered into force on 9 November 1982. 
In the 1982 Constitution, the development on the status and the 
functions of the AYİM require particular attention. While the amended 1961 
Constitution referred to the AYİM in Article 140, where the functions and duties 
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of the Council of State were detailed as ‘an administrative court of the first 
instance in matters not referred by law to other administrative courts, and an 
administrative court of the last instance in general’, in 1982, the AYİM was 
referred to in a separate Article 157, with its own heading. This article 
empowered the AYİM to supervise decisions taken by civilian authorities, noting 
that AYİM is ‘the court of first and last instance for the judicial supervision of 
disputes arising from administrative acts and actions involving military 
personnel or relating to military service, even if such acts and actions have 
been carried out by civilian authorities’ (emphasis mine). As the paragraph 
further proceeds by noting that ‘in disputes arising from the obligation to perform 
military service, there shall be no condition that the person concerned be a 
member of the military body’, Article 157 evidently serves the dual purpose of 
strengthening the forbidden military internal domain, while expanding its judicial 
authority over civilians, by becoming the final arbitrator of disputes related to 
compulsory military service. 
Another crucial development in the 1982 Constitution is in relation to 
the prominence of the MGK. Chiefly, it enhanced the MGK’s powers, stipulating, 
for example, that the Cabinet must give priority to MGK recommendations. At 
the same time, the number and weight of senior commanders in the MGK 
increased at the expense of its civilian members, thus bringing an end to the 
civilian majority on the Council. Likewise, further securitisation of the state and 
politics was achieved via Law no. 2945 on the ‘National Security Council and 
the General Secretariat of the National Security Council’, through which the 
concept of national security acquired official status, providing grounds for 
transforming all issues dealt with by the MGK into state policies via MGK 
decisions. As the variety and substance of the issues taken into consideration in 
the MGK32 show, the military has assumed a parallel role to the democratically 
elected government in terms of executive decision-making. 
All in all, particularly with the establishment of the AYİM, we have 
witnessed the cumulative militarisation of the civilian judicial space and 
hierarchical superiority of the military authority over civilians, which manifested 
in a military administrative judicial arrangement, parallel to the general/public 




The role that the military played in the national struggle and the creation of the 
new state gave the military an honoured place in Kemalist society. As this 
article has shown, military interventions served to strengthen the military 
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internal domain, while expanding its judicial authority; or, in other words, its 
decisive power over civilians. The TSK emerged as the final arbitrator of almost 
any disputes related to the military, while creating the necessary institutions, 
such as the MGK, which guaranteed a supreme position in relation to judicial 
and administrative affairs. 
Although this role has declined gradually, following the reforms that 
were introduced during the EU accession process, it still exists. In particular, the 
latest EU Turkey Progress Report, published in 2012, emphasises that ‘the 
duality between the civilian and military court systems continued’.33  Despite 
claims to the contrary, Turkey's military continues to have a shadowy hold on 
political life. Democracy can be consolidated if military autonomy is further 
decreased.
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Part D - Civil Direction 
 







One of the oldest problems of human governance is that of the subordination of 
the military to political authority; in other words, how a society should control 
those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or physical force. Sun Tzu 
and Carl von Clausewitz argued long ago that military organisations are 
primarily the servants of the state.1 
Civilian control of the military is the dominant concept nowadays, and 
there are many definitions of civilian control. A very concise definition by 
Samuel Huntington is: ‘the proper subordination of a competent, professional 
military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority’.2 In its fullest 
sense, civilian control means that all decisions regarding a country’s defence – 
the organisation, deployment, and use of armed forces, the setting of military 
priorities and requirements and the allocation of the necessary resources – are 
taken by a civilian leadership. The armed forces must serve the societies they 
protect and military policies and capabilities must be consistent with political 
objectives and economic resources. Civilian control is a substantial element of 
an effective system of democratic control. 
This chapter focuses first on traditional approaches to civilian control. 
This is followed by a case study on the way in which civilian control of the 
military has been organised in the Netherlands. Lastly, the focus turns to recent 
developments in general and a new, broader approach towards civilian control 
of the military will also be presented, which will provide ample food for thought.  
 
 
Traditional Approaches to Civilian Control  
Civil control is characterised by the primacy of politics, but also by the provision 
of military professionalism. It is of the utmost importance to strike a balance 
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Samuel Huntington 
For Samuel Huntington, this balance is the core problem of civil-military 
relations, through which the degree of professionalism is defined. His 
monumental The Soldier and the State has had great and lasting influence.3 In 
this work, Huntington argues for a politically neutral, professional military that is 
isolated from politics. He argues that national security is best served under 
conditions of ‘objective civilian control’. According to Huntington, objective civil 
control maximises military professionalism, making the military a tool of the 
state and guaranteeing its distinctive existence as a professional body. As a 
consequence, the political leadership should seek to maximise military 
professionalism. At the same time, the military leadership should not acquire 
political influence. Instead, they should respect the ‘realm of political autonomy’.  
Huntington’s idea is that objective civilian control is preferable to 
subjective control, since the best guarantor for military subordination to political 
supremacy is a truly professional military. In Huntington’s opinion, subjective 
civilian control maximises civilian power by both civilianising and politicising the 
military, by making it politically dependent and by denying the military a distinct 
professionalism that is clearly different from that of other organisations in 
society. 
Subjective civilian control was dominant in communist states during the 
Cold War. Its main mechanisms were control by recruitment and selection, 
control by indoctrination, and control by organisation.4 After the end of the Cold 
War, objective civilian control was introduced in these countries by means of the 
de-politicisation and de-partyisation of the armed forces, democratisation, and 
professionalisation.5   
 
Morris Janowitz 
Another scholar, Morris Janowitz, has contended that Huntington’s ‘traditional’ 
military professionalism is being replaced by ‘pragmatic professionalism’. 
Although the military does not participate directly in politics, he argues, it is 
strongly linked to the political system and the state. Janowitz advocates a 
military as a ‘constabulary force’, which is integrated into civilian society, shares 
society’s common values and maintains a broad political perspective. ‘The 
military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously 
prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable 
international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a 
protective military posture’.6 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See footnote 2. 
4
 Doorn 1969, 5. 
5
 Danopoulos and Zirker 1999, 2-7; Danopoulos 1988. 
6
 Janowitz 1960, 417-441. 
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Michael Desch 
In his structural approach, Michael Desch argues that the particular combination 
of internal and external threats to a state determines the quality of civil control. 
Civilian control should be best in times of high external threat and low internal 
threat. The worst-case scenario occurs with a low external threat and high 
internal threat.  
As the extensive literature on war and state formation studied by Desch 
makes clear, a serious external threat increases the strength and cohesiveness 
of the civilian institutions of state and society.7 In a high-threat environment, 
civilians take a greater interest in military affairs and are therefore more 
attentive to their responsibility for civilian oversight. External threats thus unify 
the state and civil society, which in turn produces a desirable pattern of civil-
military relations in which the military are subordinate to civilian authority.  
Desch argues that the greatest danger to civilian control of the military 
ought to come after periods of high external threat have diminished, leaving the 
state with a large military force but no external mission. The reduced threat 
should lead to less unity within and among civilian and military organisations, 
increasing the potential for tension and conflict. In short, there are a number of 
reasons to expect that a widely recognised external threat will produce good 
civil-military relations, while its disappearance will undermine them.  
Historical evidence supports this logic. The countries with the best 
records on civil control – such as the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War – have been states with militaries whose primary missions are to 
undertake external operations. But the countries with the worst patterns of civil-
military relations have been states in the developing world that face few serious 
external threats, but many internal ones. Archetypal examples include the 
military dictatorships of the Southern Cone of Latin America. 
 
 
Civilian Control of the Military in the Netherlands  
The Dutch parliamentary system is a system of democratic government in which 
Cabinet ministers derive their legitimacy from and are accountable to 
Parliament. This chapter will focus in particular on the role of Parliament in 
Dutch defence policy and public support for the armed forces. 
 
Three main missions 
The Dutch Constitution describes three principal missions for the armed forces: 
• defending national and allied territory, including the Caribbean parts 
of the Kingdom; 
• promoting the international rule of law and stability; 
                                                 
7
 Desch 1995, 166-185. 
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• supporting and assisting civilian authorities in maintaining law and 
order and providing disaster relief and humanitarian aid, on a 
national as well as an international scale.  
Since the late 1970s, the Netherlands has aimed to make a significant 
contribution to international peacekeeping operations in the context of 
promoting the international rule of law and stability.8 The idea of the promotion 
of the international rule of law is enshrined in the Dutch Constitution: Article 90 
stipulates that ‘The Government shall promote the development of the 
international rule of law’. 
 
Dutch Defence Policy 
Dutch Defence Policy is an integral part of national security policy. The 
Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs deal with all international aspects on a 
‘joint’ basis. All letters to Parliament on security and defence issues are in 
principle co-signed by the two ministers. The Ministry of Defence is traditionally 
regarded as a ‘technical’ department and the Minister of Defence as the 
custodian of the defence budget and arbiter of procurement plans. From a 
policy point of view, the Minister of Defence has traditionally been considered a 
junior partner of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Over the last two decades, this 
junior position has developed and the defence portfolio (once described as a 
‘headache’ portfolio) has increased in political weight. Participation in 
international peace support operations, the development of a European 
Common Security and Defence Policy and increasing uncertainty in 
international politics may have made the position of the Minister of Defence 
more important.  
 
Parliament 
Overall responsibility for ensuring the armed forces act solely within the 
constitutional framework lies with Parliament. The Minister of Defence is 
politically accountable to Parliament and has to inform Parliament on any 
relevant development related to the armed forces. The defence committee 
provides an opportunity for detailed oversight. In public hearings, prior to 
forming an opinion, it invites various independent experts to inform Parliament 
on issues such as a new Defence White Paper, the political and military field 
conditions for participation in a peace support operation, and so forth. The 
Dutch intelligence services, one of which is military in nature, are also subject to 
legal restraints and parliamentary control. 
The primacy of politics should be clear, but it should be accompanied 
by a division of labour and what might be called a ‘balance of trust’. The military 
should accept political leadership and refrain from making political statements, 
but government and parliament should accept responsibility for the decisions 
                                                 
8
 Bakker and Homan 2009, 247-260. 
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they take that deviate from military advice. 9  They should also refrain from 
micromanaging the implementation of mandates once they have been given to 
the military, and focus on ex-post accountability. However, practice sometimes 
differs from this last norm, as will be shown later on.  
 
Personnel 
Regarding personnel, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the 
‘Soviet threat’ removed the primary rationale for the large standing Dutch armed 
forces and the conscription model. From the early 1990s onwards, the Dutch 
armed forces undertook a series of military reforms: the overall size of the 
armed forces was significantly reduced, the armed forces were re-oriented 
away from defence of national territory towards expeditionary operations (for 
both peacekeeping and combat roles, as the old distinction between 
peacekeeping and war fighting broke down in the new era of peace 
enforcement), and military conscription was abandoned in 1997. 
The abandonment of conscription raised concerns about breaking the 
link between the armed forces and society, as embodied in the citizen-soldier 
concept. The most notable feature of the debate surrounding the abandonment 
of conscription in the Netherlands, however, was the broad civil consensus on 
the issue: both political leaders and the public supported the shift, which was 
implemented with virtually no opposition. In a similar way, there has been very 
little concern that the creation of a fully professional military might threaten 
civilian democratic control of the armed forces or create a military with too much 
autonomy or institutional power. 
 
Military law 
Military disciplinary rules are almost entirely based on civil law and do not 
infringe upon the civil rights of military personnel. These civil rights can only be 
limited during military operations in times of war or in peace support operations. 
The Inspector General for the armed forces serves as Ombudsman for all 
personnel. 
Individual service members have the same rights as other citizens, 
which may only be limited by law and out of operational concerns. Personnel 
are allowed to organise themselves into unions and have recourse to legal 
means if they consider themselves to have been unfairly treated. Political 
neutrality is ensured through civilian control of the military. 
                                                 
9
 When the author of this chapter went to the Naval Institute as a midshipman in 1962, 
during his induction he had to learn by heart the following statement by the famous 
Dutch Admiral De Ruyter: ‘The civil authorities don’t have to ask me, but just to order me; 
and if I were ordered to go to sea with one ship, I would go’. If one failed to reproduce 
this quotation correctly, one had to do 25 push-ups. In this way, the author became 





Parliamentary involvement in the national decision-making process for 
deploying the military abroad has substantially increased in the Netherlands 
over the last decades, as the following examples show. During the discussion 
on the deployment of army units to Bosnia Herzegovina in the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992, it was Parliament that emphasised the 
peace-keeping nature of the operation and insisted that the unit’s armaments 
should be non-provocative. Hence, all heavy weapons (machine guns, mortars, 
and so forth) were removed from the Armoured Personnel Carriers. The 
composition of the force was kept light; hence no tanks were deployed either, in 
contrast to the approach taken by the Danes, who deployed tanks in the same 
mission. The serious consequence was that when the violence escalated and it 
became necessary to use force in excess of self-defence, the unit was severely 
handicapped when trying to defend itself, protect civilians and reach the given 
objectives to achieve its mission.  
Having learned from this experience, the pendulum swung to the other 
side: force protection became the most important issue and Parliament took an 
extraordinary interest in the risk analyses provided before each mission. A good 
example of this is Parliament’s concern prior to the deployment of a marine 
battalion in the framework of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia 
(UNMEE) in 2001. An intensive debate took place in Parliament for weeks. The 
debate revolved around security guarantees in case of an unforeseen 
escalation of hostilities. Parliament wanted the deployment of Apache 
helicopters as additional protection for the marine battalion. The Chief of 
Defence Staff could see ‘no military reasons’ for deploying the Apaches or for 
taking additional precautionary measures. Likewise, the military adviser to the 
Secretary-General of the UN did not see the necessity of having the ‘flying 
tanks’ in the mission and did not allow the Apaches to be positioned in the UN 
area of operations. As a consequence, the Apaches had to be stationed in 
Djibouti. Parliament insisted and the Minister of Defence went along with 
Parliament’s opinion. The Apaches were deployed to Djibouti at a cost of 
around 14 million euros, as soon became clear.  
A current example is that of the civil police mission in Kunduz, 
Afghanistan. The Dutch Cabinet needed the support of the small Green Left 
party for a majority in Parliament. This party demanded that the duration of the 
training should be extended from six to eight weeks, that it should include topics 
such as human rights, corruption, and women’s rights, that the police should not 
be involved in offensive operations, and so forth. Also in this case, the Minister 
of Defence went along with these demands. 
An important question that arises is where executive responsibility 
begins and parliamentary involvement ends. It is a classic debate – war is too 
important to be left to generals – but a Parliament that concerns itself with such 
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a high degree of detail may be counterproductive, for all its hard-won level of 
involvement. It would seem that its most precious asset is its balanced 
involvement in the entire political chain of decision-making, before, during and 
after an operation. It is a matter of maintaining a balance. Too much 
involvement in decision-making may negatively affect Parliament’s willingness 
to evaluate and review the actions and decisions post hoc, and may lead to a 
form of self-inflicted co-optation. 
 
Defence procurement 
The acquisition of defence equipment is another topic in which Parliament plays 
an important role. As a small country, the Netherlands spends considerable 
time on purchasing abroad and the accompanying opportunities for off-set in 
terms of co-production or other forms of compensation that could benefit its 
domestic industry.  
The procurement reporting procedure taken from parliamentary practice 
in the Netherlands, where each stage is put on the agenda of the Defence 
Committee, is as follows. The first communication determines the operational 
requirement in general terms. The second is the translation of operational 
requirements into technical specifications, followed by an exploration of the 
market, the listing of possible suppliers, and a timetable for production and 
delivery to the armed forces. Third, a study of the information provided by 
interested providers; fourth, preparation of the acquisition on the basis of 
negotiated offers, possibly complemented by field trials; and fifth, signing a 
contact, sometimes preceded by a letter of intent. The Minister has to wait for a 
period of at least three weeks before signing a proposed contract that exceeds 
100 million euros, to allow for a discussion and possible debate and vote to take 
place in the plenary session of Parliament. For projects costing between 25 and 
100 million euros, the operational requirement is subject to approval by the 
Defence Committee, but further execution is mandated to the armaments 
directorate.  
The most expensive defence programme in Dutch history will be the 
purchase of the successor to the F-16 fighter aircraft. Although the final decision 
will be made in 2015, the Government is already involved in the Development 
and Demonstration Programme of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the F-35A. The 
Netherlands originally intended to buy 85 JSFs. The initial purchase will cost 5.5 
billion dollars, while 30 years of service will cost 9.1 billion dollars; the lifetime 
cost of a unit will thus be about 215 million dollars. The Minister of Defence has 
already made clear that due to the rising costs only 56 JSFs will be bought. 
However, there have been a lot of complaints relating to the delay, 
technical problems and the rising costs of the project. The former Minister of 
Defence Hans Hillen complained that he had great difficulty with the cost 
increase of 20 per cent on top of what the Netherlands had budgeted. Despite 
this, he bought two test aircrafts. However, as the Ministry of Defence has to 
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implement big reductions in its budget, it is very unlikely that the original number 
of 85 JSFs will be bought. The whole decision-making process is a good 
example of the Polder Model, the slow decision-making process in the 
Netherlands whereby all parties have to be heard. 
 
Public access 
Public support for the armed forces in the Netherlands is undoubtedly of great 
importance. The Dutch Government actively informs the public on matters 
related to the armed forces, using all possible means for this purpose, including 
websites (http://www.defensie.nl/), audio-visual materials, briefings and 
publications. Besides this active approach, there is ample opportunity for the 
press and the public to put forward questions related to the armed forces. They 
can also request an inspection of any non-classified defence document. In 
addition, media can embed with virtually all units deployed on any mission and 
are limited in their reporting only with respect to operational and personal 
security matters, to protect the troops, the mission and the journalists 
themselves. To stimulate this embedded journalism, the Netherlands Ministry of 
Defence regularly organises press trips to areas of operations where Dutch 
troops are deployed. The public access to information related to the armed 
forces is based on the Netherlands Act on Public Access to Government 
Information of 31 October 1991.  
 
Society and the armed forces 
It is worth reemphasising the changed security context in which public support 
for the maintenance and employment of the armed forces must be sustained. 
The Dutch armed forces are increasingly engaged in operations away from 
national territory, in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Horn of 
Africa, in a broad range of contingencies ranging from enforcement to post-
conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Public support is as important as ever. 
Parliamentary debates and reports help to make defence more transparent and 
increase public awareness and understanding. They play an important role in 
building the public consensus that is essential for defence. 
Three categories of public support can be distinguished, namely: (1) 
public support for the armed forces in general, that is, about the necessity and 
desirability of having armed forces; (2) public support for the various tasks of 
the armed forces, such as national defence and contributions to international 
peace and security; and (3) public support for participation in specific 
operations.  
More than 70 per cent of the population considers the armed forces 
necessary and desirable. The public believes that the main tasks of the Dutch 
armed forces are defence of territory, crisis management and maintaining 
peace, humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism. The available research 
does not warrant the conclusion that there is significantly more or less support 
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for certain military tasks than for others. However, it should be noted that 
military expenditure is not particularly popular in the Netherlands, and it is 
relatively easy to cut government spending on the armed forces. Public opinion 
is more likely to accept cuts in spending on the armed forces than on, say, 
healthcare, education or domestic security. 
It is an issue of concern that support for specific operations is volatile 
and can sometimes fall. In early 2006, prior to the decision on participation in 
the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Uruzgan the 
opponents of the operation outnumbered the supporters. This was also the case 
when the decision to extend participation for another two years was taken. In 
addition, the current Kunduz mission is not supported by a majority of the 
public. There is a risk that if a majority of public opinion were to frequently 
oppose a specific operation, it would have a negative impact on public support 
for the Dutch armed forces in general.  
 
 
Recent Developments  
After the end of the Cold War, the security environment changed fundamentally. 
This had an impact on civil-military relations, as well on the military profession. 
The world of the soldier has become rather complex. Harald Müller has 
identified some transformations that are characteristic of the evolution of this 
environmental complexity.10 He argues that the transformation from autocracy 
to democracy in some countries after the end of the Cold War could undermine 
a pillar of military existence, namely reliance on a tradition as a source of 
psychological strength and pride. Another transformation he mentions is that 
with the disappearance of the bipolar structure, the comfortable simplicity of 
enemy, mission, frontlines, targets, strategies and doctrines has also 
disappeared.  
Müller is also critical of NATO. In his view, instead of giving soldiers a 
welcome orientation after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance created 
divisions, doubts, confusion and uneasiness. The member states hold different 
views on the new tasks for NATO. There is a risk that NATO will become a 
military toolkit for ad hoc coalitions, as the recent operations in Libya have 
shown.  
A further transformation is the momentous shift in the military’s social 
basis, including the multiculturalisation of the armed forces in immigration 
societies; the right of homosexuals to reveal their sexual orientation; and the 
admittance of women into service functions. As part of the ongoing democratic 
revolution, women have demanded and been granted increased opportunities in 
the military. 
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 Müller 2012, 271-291. 
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The information age has effected considerable changes in conventional 
warfare. One fundamental innovation has been dubbed the ‘Revolution in 
Military Affairs’, the effect of which is that targets can be acquired with much 
higher reliability and attacked over long distances with increasing precision (for 
example, by using drones).11 The transformation from conscript to all-volunteer 
armed forces can create greater distance between society and the military. This 
trend has already been underway for some time.  
Missions also have been transformed. New missions entail ‘wars of 
choice’ to restore the international order in the name of international law, to end 
serious violations of human rights, to prevent or put an end to genocidal actions 
such as ‘ethnic cleansing’, or to effect regime change from autocracy to 
democracy. Most of these missions, even those allegedly for ‘peacekeeping’ 
purposes, involve high-risk environments for the soldiers who undertake them. 
These missions mostly inhabit a grey zone between war and peace; there is a 
lack of clarity about who the enemy is. Another still-increasing global trend is 
the contracting-out of the supply of military and security services. As the 
financial crisis leads to cuts in military budgets, military operations are 
becoming more dependent on private military and security companies.  
The role of the mass media has become one of the most contentious 
areas of civil-military relations in a democracy. Advanced countries have 
become information societies, in which media play a major role in setting the 
military policy agenda and in helping to frame public evaluations of military 
operations. That the military does not control the presentation of the military to 
the public – a task accomplished largely through the media – is a major 
dimension of contemporary civil-military relations. 
It is obvious that all these transformations pose important challenges for 
the military profession. While the traditional role of warrior is still the basic pillar 
of the military profession, nowadays other roles also have to be fulfilled. The 
role of diplomat is important in peace support operations, where military 
objectives are often achieved by talking instead of shooting, and by gaining the 
hearts and minds of the population. Manager is another role, meaning that in 
peacetime, the military has to manage scarce resources in the most efficient 
way. Lastly, the military also fulfils the role of citizen, being fully integrated in 
society (the citizen in uniform). 
 
 
The Three Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations 
At the end of this chapter, it is interesting to introduce the new, broader, more 
advanced approach to civil-military relations that has been advocated by Florina 
Christiana Matei.12 She argues that the challenge in the contemporary world is 
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not only to assert and maintain civilian control over the military, but also to 
develop effective militaries, police forces, and intelligence agencies that are 
able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.  
Matei distinguishes six major roles: wars, internal wars, terrorism, 
crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. She rightly argues that 
we need a clear picture of the effectiveness and costs of security forces in order 
to understand the contemporary importance of the relationship between elected 
leaders and the security forces for democracy. That is, to understand what 
armed forces, police forces and intelligence agencies actually do in the twenty-
first century, how well they do, and at what cost in terms of personnel and 
financial resources, requires that we undertake a comprehensive analysis of 
civil-military relations that encompasses the three dimensions of control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency. 
Civilian control has traditionally been basic and fundamental, but it is 
irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can be used effectively 
to fulfil the military’s roles and missions. Furthermore, both control and 
effectiveness must be affordable, or they will undermine other national priorities. 
Matei concludes that increasingly, populations are aware that their military must 
not only be controlled, but that it must also be able to implement the assigned 
task at a reasonable cost. While the theories of Huntington and Janowitz are 
still the starting point for any discussion, Matei’s ideas represent an expansion 
of the traditional concept of civilian control and challenge experts in civilian-
military relations to make civilian control more substantial and practical in the 
new security environment.  
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VIII. The Role and Interaction of Civilians and Soldiers in the 
Making and Execution of Defence Policy. The Turkish Case: 






Although in recent years, there has been a departure from long-established 
practice, the formulation of ‘Turkish defence policy’ has traditionally – and 
legally – been the direct responsibility of the Turkish General Staff (TGS). This 
means that as far as defence policy is concerned, the military, which is 
completely separate from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), functions and acts like 
a second MoD.  
The military has also – indirectly, but effectively – been responsible for 
the development of ‘national security policy’. This type of relationship is 
probably unique in the world and has its roots in the history and dominant 
political culture of the modern Turkish Republic. In other countries, national 
security policy tends to be the responsibility of the elected executive in some 
form or another. The uniqueness of the Turkish style is not due to the 
constitutional framework in which national security policy is formulated. In fact, 
the Turkish system has many aspects in common with others, including the 
name of the principle institution, the National Security Council (MGK). However, 
the Army’s role as almost the sole authority, the final arbiter in this area, is sui 
generis. The main aim of this article is not to explain this unusual situation, but 
to describe how it shapes the ways in which Turkish defence policy is 
formulated, implemented and readjusted as circumstances necessitate.  
In recent years, the Turkish political system as a whole and the 
dominant role played by the Army in it has undergone a fundamental 
transformation. This did not happen overnight, but gradually gathered 
momentum. In particular, civil-military relations have shifted to a rather different 
legal and – equally important – psychological foundation than that on which they 
were based in the not too distant past. The social, political and international 
context has also profoundly changed.  
On the other hand, in Turkey, two critical flaws have appeared in the 
whole process of democratisation, based on an apparent misperception that 
democratisation simply means ‘demilitarisation’. First, the vital dimensions of 
democracy, such as accountability, transparency, pluralism, participation and 
the separation of powers – and above all, the rule of law – have been ignored 
throughout. Also overlooked has been the concept of good governance; in other 
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words, the ‘technical’ nature of the security and defence policy-making process. 
Eliminating the military’s ‘influence’ in one form or another, and even ignoring 
the military’s input, does not necessarily produce efficient and effective security 
policy-making.  
This article first describes the system which was operative until these 
changes gradually started to take hold, and then summarises the political 
‘reform’ process which transformed civil-military relations between 2001-2007, 
outlining how defence policy-making ‘worked’ after this transformation. This is 
followed, based on certain observations, by a critique of the still ongoing 
process of ‘reform’ in civil-military relations in Turkey and the resulting impact 
on the security and defence policy-making process. It concludes with a 
discussion of the shortfalls and potential traps ahead, and offers some ideas – 
as recommendations – for improving the management and direction of this 
historical and vitally important transformation for the country. Throughout, the 
formulation of defence policy is considered to take place within the overall 
framework of national security policy and the policy-making system.  
 
 
Defence Policy-making in Turkey before the 2000s 
Until the mid-2000s, the making of defence policy in Turkey was mainly 
connected to and governed by national security policy and the way the latter 
was formulated. This, in turn, made the involvement of the TGS – as the 
primary actor – in both processes inevitable, thanks to its constitutional status, 
functions and roles.1 Besides, the presence of the MGK as the main and the 
                                                 
1
 The Constitution (as amended as of 7 May 2010, by Law no. 4709, Art. 32). Art. 117 - 
[…] The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time 
of war, exercises the duties of Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the 
Republic. The Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the 
Republic following the proposal of the Council of Ministers; his duties and powers shall 
be regulated by law. The Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime 
Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers. The functional relations and scope of 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defence with regard to the Chief of the General 
Staff and the Commanders of the Armed Forces shall be regulated by law.  
Art. 118 - The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the 
Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National 
Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and 
Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of 
the President of the Republic. […] The National Security Council shall submit to the 
Council of Ministers the advisory decisions that are taken and its views on ensuring the 
necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and 
implementation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall 
evaluate decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it 
deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, 
the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society. The 
agenda of the National Security Council shall be drawn up by the President of the 
Republic taking into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the 
General Staff. […] The organisation and duties of the General Secretariat of the National 
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ultimate constitutional authority within the Turkish political decision-making 
system – and the military’s over-representation in it – further reinforced the 
military’s ability to have a powerful ‘say’ in security and defence related 
decisions. Moreover, the critical positions reserved for active or retired2 military 
personnel within the General Secretariat of the MGK made the military the only 
‘political’ power with real control over national security and Turkish defence 
policy – effectively in any political decision.  
Technically, the policy formulation cycle was initiated by the Secretariat, 
usually based on the current National Security Policy Document (Milli Güvenlik 
Siyaseti Belgesi) and the recent General Intelligence Estimate collectively 
produced by the TGS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the National 
Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT). The relevant parts of the 
NATO MC-161 series of intelligence documents were also taken into 
consideration. In addition to the ‘military’ (that is, the TGS and the land, naval, 
and air force commands, including the General Command of the Gendarmerie), 
each ministry and the MİT were requested to forward their views and the 
rationales for these. Both the document and the views related to it were handled 
as ‘secret’ and were strictly controlled.  
Based on the views received, the Secretariat would develop the first 
draft and resend it to the same group of addressees for a second review and 
comments. Most of the time, there would be one or more meetings to discuss 
issues of major importance or those aspects on which there were major 
differences of opinion. With the exception of the MFA, other agencies seldom 
challenged the military’s views regarding national security policy options or 
courses of action. Potential conflicts between the views of the TGS and the 
Secretariat – which was considered part of the in-house business – were almost 
always avoided through the use of informal channels, personally involving top 
decision-makers such as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the 
Secretary General himself. The Office of the Prime Minister and the Parliament 
as a whole were simply absent from this entire process of ‘national’ policy 
formulation and, perhaps more remarkably, in its implementation.  
At each stage, the agencies involved would compile their institutional 
views through a similar process of internal correspondence, coordination and/or 
meetings and forward them to the Secretariat, which would prepare the final 
draft. The final draft was normally briefed to the National Security Council and, 
once endorsed, was signed by the Prime Minister and became effective. It was 
                                                                                                                       
Security Council shall be regulated by law. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. 
Law Number 2709, dated 7 November 1982. First adopted by the Founding Assembly 
(Kurucu Meclis) on 18 October 1982 for referandum, published in Official Gazette No 
17844, on 20 October 1982. Following referandum, republished on 9 November 1982, 
Official Gazette No 17863. http://www.byegm.gov.tr/content.aspx?s=tcotrot. Accessed 
on 8 December 2012. 
2
 This was mainly due to the job specifications of those posts rather than an arbitrary 
selection favouring retired military just because of their military background.  
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distributed to the military and civilian agencies that had primary responsibility for 
implementing it. For the Special Policy Papers – intended for special regions or 
special purposes – a similar process was followed; however, the agency office 
that had primary responsibility for the process could change, depending on the 
subject of the paper. 
Although a similar process was employed for the formulation of defence 
policy, it was more or less an in-house exercise that tended to be restricted to 
the military agencies. Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the so-
called National Military Strategy of Turkey (Türkiye’nin Milli Askeri Stratejisi, 
TÜMAS), that is, Turkey’s defence policy, was presented to the Prime Minister, 
distributed and became effective. In any case, it was a closed process with little, 
if any, participation and pluralism, which excluded the Parliament – the National 
Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the General Assembly 
– completely.  
Since the whole process was absolutely exclusionary in nature, no 




Transformation of Civil-Military Relations 
The reform of the Turkish security sector was initiated as early as 2001, 
immediately after the adoption of the Accession Partnership for Turkey by the 
Council of the European Union in March of that year. These reforms were 
aimed at the composition, structure, roles and functions of the MGK and the 
legislative framework relating to the MGK and its General Secretariat. The 
reporting chain for the Chief of the Turkish General Staff – directly to the Prime 
Minister, as elucidated in the Constitution – and the General Staff’s position as 
a stand-alone ‘MoD’ had always been contentious subjects in internal political 
debate. However, these issues had been avoided by successive governments.  
The ‘reform’ of the MGK occurred in stages. The first changes, as a first 
step, came in 2001, when Article 118 of the Constitution – on the MGK – was 
amended. In May 2001, the Ecevit government forwarded a constitutional 
amendment package of 38 articles to the Speaker’s Office as a draft law signed 
by all three leaders of the coalition parties (the leading Democratic Leftist Party 
(DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)). 
The general rationale3 behind submitting this package read, ‘newly emerging 
needs, expectations of the public, new political openings, EU membership 
process and related economic and political criteria’. The fact that the package 
had been prepared by an ad hoc Parliamentary Interparty Conciliation 
Committee was also clearly stated. Civil society also gave manifest support to 
                                                 
3
 Draft law on Amending the Constitution, by Istanbul Deputy Bulent Ecevit and 290 
other deputies. 6 May 2001. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem21/yil01/ss737m.htm. 
Accessed on 9 December 2012. 
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this initiative by the government. Nine civil society organisations and platforms, 
including the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD; the 
most influential organisation) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB; the largest such organisation) circulated a paid 
advertisement.4 Published in major national dailies on 24 September 2001 – 20 
days before the draft law came to the General Assembly – it openly supported a 
‘Yes’ campaign. 
The package was passed by Parliament in October 2001, only six 
months after the Accession Partnership. It introduced minor but symbolically 
important changes. These changes reflected the Government’s determination to 
pursue the EU accession goal, and also constituted a test of the Army’s 
potential reaction to further ‘reforms’. The amendments to Article 118 decreed 
that the number of civilian members was to be increased, as membership of the 
MGK was to be expanded to include the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Justice. The ‘advisory’ nature of the MGK was underscored. From now on, 
the Council of Ministers would ‘evaluate’ the decisions of MGK, rather than 
‘giving priority in consideration’. Besides, ‘the Cabinet heeds MGK decisions’ 
was altered to ‘takes into consideration’, basically treating MGK decisions as 
‘advice’.  
Later, in December 2001, the 57th Ecevit/coalition government prepared 
a bill5 for amending Law no. 29456 in line with the constitutional changes in 
Article 118 that had already been passed by the Parliament. However, the bill 
never made it to the Plenary, and when the legislative term suddenly ended in 
the midst of an economic and political crisis in autumn 2002 and the country 
went into early general elections in November, it became null.7 
Civil society, at that time, did not consider these changes to be 
satisfactory, but major changes would follow in 2003. The Turkish Economic 
and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), for example, argued that these 
changes ‘did not represent a radical change in the status of the Council’. While 
referring to previous publications by TÜSİAD suggesting ‘ending the 
constitutional status of the National Security Council’,8  TESEV nevertheless 
admitted that ‘in reality, current political conjuncture was not fit for more 
fundamental changes in the status of the Council’. This was because, it argued, 
                                                 
4
 Sabah 2010.  
5
 Government Bill on amending the Law on the National Security Council and the NSC 
General Secretariat; dated 28 December 2001, based on the Cabinet decision dated 27 
December 2001. 
6
 Law no. 2945, Law on the National Security Council and the General Secretariat for the 
National Security Council, adopted on 9 November 1983. Official Gazette, 11 November 
1983, No. 18218. 
7
 This was due to the Rules of Procedure of the TGNA, Art. 77: ‘Those government bills 
and draft laws, which are not finalized and not become law before the end of a legislative 
year, become null. […].’ 
8
 Tanör 1997, 83-85; Tanör 1999, 100-109. 
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the ‘Armed forces playing a more effective political role in Turkey, in comparison 
to other Western democracies, [had] too fundamental historical, sociological 
and political reasons to be changed by a simple amendment in laws or in the 
constitution’. It reiterated the need for ‘a more restricted and concrete 
redefinition of the notion of national security’.9 
Upon assuming office, the new, 58th Gül Government of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) resubmitted a number of government bills10 that had 
become null, including two proposals on the MGK that had previously been 
prepared by the Ecevit coalition government. They were referred to the 
Committee on the Constitution on 19 December 2002 and debated on 9 
January 2003. They were clearly given priority, supported unanimously and 
adopted by the Plenary on 15 January 2003, eventually reflecting the 
constitutional changes on Law no. 2945.11  
In July 2003, the 59th AKP Government submitted a comprehensive 
‘democratisation’ package of 37 articles to Parliament, the so-called Seventh 
EU Harmonization Package.12 It was prepared as a government bill, amending 
various laws, including legislation related to the MGK and its General 
Secretariat, among others. The general rationale – in a clear reference to the 
Accession Partnership Document of 200313 – referred to the ‘EU membership 
process’, ‘legal, political and economic reforms, undergone by all candidate 
countries’, the ‘National Programme [of Turkey]’ of March 2001 and 
‘constitutional amendments of November 2001’. It was referred to the 
Parliamentary Justice Committee – as the primary committee – on 24 July 2003. 
It was then debated in the EU Harmonization Committee on 24 July, submitted 
to the Speaker’s Office on the following day, then debated in the Justice 
                                                 
9
 Özbudun 2002, 8 
10
 Government letter to the Speaker’s Office dated 11 December 2002, resubmitting 
some government bills which became null. 1/404: Government Bill, Adding Two Articles 
and One Temporary Article to the Law on the National Security Council and NSC 
Secretariat General, and Amending the Art. 36 of the State Personnel Law.  
1/941: Government Bill, on Amending the Law on the National Security Council and NSC 
Secretariat General. 
11
 See Law no. 4789, dated 15 January 2003, Official Gazette No 24997, 18 January 
2003. Law on Amending the Law on National Security Council and the General 
Secretariat for the National Security Council, http://www.izafet.com/hukuk/368633-mgk-
yasasinda-degisiklik.html#ixzz1vPCgCEr1. Accessed on 9 December 2012. 
12
 The Government Bill for a ‘democratisation’ package of 37 articles amending various 
laws; dated 23 July 2003, based on the Cabinet decision dated 23 July 2003. 
13
 Partnership Document of 2003 aimed to curb the vast operational tasks and authority 
of the NSC in line with its redefined constitutional role of a ‘consultative’ body. Official 
Journal of the European Union. L 145/40, 12 June 2003. Council decision of 19 May 
2003 on […] the Accession Partnership with Turkey. 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/turkey_apd_2003.pdf. 
Accessed on 9 December 2012. 
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Committee on 29 July, and adopted in the Plenary on 30 July 2003.14 The whole 
process, for the full package, was completed in a single week. 
This Seventh Package – Articles 9, 24-28 and 35 – introduced further 
and important changes to the structure, composition and responsibilities of the 
MGK, particularly its General Secretariat. As civilians were permitted to be 
appointed to the post of Secretary General, this position was no longer 
‘reserved’ for a general or admiral from the Turkish Armed Forces. ‘If he/she 
was a member of the Turkish Armed Forces [only then] endorsement by the 
Chief of the General Staff would be sought’. With the new description of its 
responsibilities, now stated in two simple sentences – amending Article 13, 
Duties and Responsibilities – the Secretariat was stripped of its traditional role 
as an ‘executor’ and became what was essentially a secretarial unit, with no 
real job. In practice, the functions of the institution have been downgraded and 
restricted to ‘mobilisation inspections’ and ‘crisis management’ through the 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Department (AFAD). The authority to 
‘supervise’ the execution, based on the MGK decisions, was transferred to the 
Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, the regular MGK meetings were to be 
scheduled to take place bi-monthly, instead of each month.  
The Government used the amendments to Law no. 2945 and the Bylaw 
for the General Secretariat of the MGK as instruments to enact political 
decisions. In December 2003, the formerly ‘secret’ Bylaw for the Secretariat 
was abrogated and replaced by a new ‘unclassified’ one.15 As the Secretariat 
had been fundamentally reorganised, several offices with critical tasks and 
responsibilities were closed. In August 2004, a civilian, an ambassador, was 
appointed Secretary General of the MGK for the first time. The overall 
manpower composition of the Secretariat also rapidly changed as the contracts 
of retired military personnel were not renewed and an influx of ‘civilians’ – 
mainly from the MFA – replaced them, occupying key positions. Even the style 
of ‘writing’ and jargon used in correspondence and communication was 
transformed from ‘military’ to ‘diplomatic’.16  
Meanwhile, security sector reform, under the general heading of 
‘civilianisation’, took an interesting turn, and in April 2003, the main functions of 
                                                 
14
 See Law no. 4963, dated 30 July 2003. Official Gazette No 25192, 7 August 2003. 
Law Concerning the Amendment of Various Laws. 
15
 Bylaw for the General Secretariat for the National Security Council. Cabinet Decision 
dated 29 December 2003, no. 2003/6688, based on the Law no. 2945, adopted on 9 
November 1983. Official Gazette: 8 January 2004, no. 25340. 
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/yonetmelik.html. Accessed on 9 December 2012. 
16
 Since then, as of December 2012, four ‘civilian’ secretary-generals have taken office, 
all but one with a diplomatic background. It can be argued that this was based on a 
conscious political choice to replace the military with the diplomatic corps, the only other 
state institution – apart from the army – which has been involved in formulation of the 
national security policy and with some capacity to maintain the effectiveness without 
serious disruption. The current incumbent is a former governer and a recent office holder 
within the Office of the Prime Minister.  
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the Societal Relations Department (Toplumla İlişkiler Başkanlığı) of the 
Secretariat were transferred to the Ministry of Interior. This department had 
been primarily responsible for the much debated and contentious ‘information 
operations’, but now the very same functions – which had been so severely 
criticised on the grounds of democratic rule – would continue to be carried out, 
only not by the ‘army’, but by the ‘police’. Not only were the functions – 
psychological operations being prominent – maintained; beyond a simple 
transfer of one ‘office’, the department also expanded and enlarged its 
organisation throughout the country in the form of Societal Relations Bureaus in 
81 governorships. 
The reorganisation of the General Secretariat of the MGK was 
completed towards the end of 2006. All changes were initiated solely by the 
political authority, and the EU process had a major impact on the overall 
transformation in terms of compliance with the political criteria.  
 
 
Defence Policy-making in Turkey after MGK ‘Reform’ 
As of mid-2006, the process of security sector reform, as far as the MGK and 
the Secretariat were concerned, seemed complete. However, a number of 
parallel developments were also taking place. In May 2006, the Security Affairs 
Department of the Prime Minister’s Office was upgraded and completely 
reorganised as the Directorate General of Security Affairs. Its terms of 
reference17 included authority for ‘managing communication and coordination 
between the Office of the Prime Minister and other state institutions with 
responsibility for internal security, external security and counter- terrorism’.  
The next step was the establishment of the Undersecretariat for Public 
Order and Security at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new Undersecretariat 
– which did not have ‘operational’ responsibility – came into being in 2010, 
tasked with carrying out functions similar to those previously performed by the 
MGK. 18  As this new bureaucratic animal also assumed responsibility for 
‘informing the public about its activities and conducting public relations’, 
practically all functions had now been transferred to a civilian-dominated, 
centrally controlled organisation, and these functions had actually been 
                                                 
 
17
 See Art. 12, Law no. 3056, Law Concerning the Organization of the Office of the Prime 
Minister, dated 10 October 1984, amended by Law no. 5508, dated 24 May 2006. 
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/687.html. Accessed on 15 November 2012. 
18
 ‘Develop counter-terrorism policies and strategies; support security institutions and 
other relevant bodies; coordinate between them; provide strategic information; track and 
analyse international developments in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and other relevant bodies; carry out or commission analyses and oversight’. See Law no. 
5952, Law Concerning the Organization and Missions of the Undersecretariat for Public 
Order and Security, adopted on 17 February 2010. Official Gazette: 4 March 2010, no. 
27511; Bylaw dated 25 March 2011. http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/30975.html. 
Accessed on 15 November 2012.  
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expanded. However, in terms of transparency, public accountability, 
communication and public information, there had been very little, if any, 
change.19 Finally, with the parallel and quite similar ‘de-militarisation’ process 
that also took place within the MİT, as of mid-2012, the security sector reform 
process seemed to have reached its politically optimal extent. This latest move 
– considered along with other accompanying political steps already taken – 
actually marked the completion of the ‘change of hands’ in the security 
bureaucracy.  
These reforms notwithstanding, in terms of the formulation of national 
security and defence policy, little has changed since the beginning of the 2000s. 
The General Secretariat of the MGK, as before, is nominally responsible for the 
overall coordination and compilation of national security policy, with the same 
agencies involved. However, now the TGS – as the once-dominant actor – has 
reportedly been replaced by a small ad hoc group working for the Office of the 
Prime Minister as need arises. The National Security Policy Document is now a 
purely ‘political’ document, that is, it reflects priorities more in line with the 
political priorities of the Government and the governing party. Concerns related 
to domestic politics have also gained higher importance. Other than that, the 
whole process is still closed to Parliament, civil society and the public. There is 
very little debate, or even reporting, in the media regarding these issues. As for 
defence policy, it still remains within the sole purview of the TGS.  
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
With the failure to adopt a holistic approach, the interconnections between the 
various dimensions of the democratic ‘reform’ process in seemingly separate 
areas have been overlooked in Turkey. The reform process naturally advocated 
that the security sector was to be under civilian political control, understood as 
‘executive’ control. However, democratisation also requires direct oversight (by 
Parliament), and indirect oversight (by civil society), through legal measures, 
transparency and accountability and openness to media. This naturally involves, 
among other things, the making of security and defence policies. In Turkey, so-
called reform measures have led to neither of these democratic aims.  
                                                 
19
 The Underecretariat website includes response(s) to only one single ‘FAQ’ – its postal 
address. Its ‘press releases’ are all single-sentence denials of stories which appeared in 
the press, six in total in 2012. Its ‘public information’ activities, in 2010, included ‘briefings 
to delegations from Sudan and Pakistan, four briefings to Police Academy students and 
media analyses’. In 2011, there is nothing that can be considered ‘information’, other 
than a vague statement of ‘exchange of views’ with unspecified ‘individuals and think-
tanks’. This brings into question the public aspect of its mission statement and gives the 
impression that business is conducted as usual. 
http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/index.snet?wapp=B6570736-B892-48CF-8770-6A2352301560. 
Accessed on 10 December 2012.  
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The whole ‘reform’ process was primarily aimed at eliminating the 
military’s dominant role in the MGK and the MGK Secretariat. But the result was 
only to cripple this institution as the main national security policy-making body, 
without replacing it with or transferring its policy-making functions to another 
institution. Besides, while the TGS exerted influence on the formulation of 
national security policy through the MGK and its Secretariat, it also had sole 
authority and autonomy for the making of defence policy. Not only has this 
remained unchanged, but the intention to change it has not even been spelled 
out as a political aim yet. When this does happen, it will take more than a simple 
change in the state protocol list – such as moving the Chief of General Staff 
from the right to the left side of the Minister of Defence. It will require a complete 
integration of the General Staff with the Ministry and a clear delineation of 
authority and responsibilities. Then the latter, not the former, would assume full 
responsibility for the formulation of defence policy. More importantly, not only 
would this allow for a more efficient and effective formulation, implementation 
and review of policy in complete harmony with other aspects of national security 
policy, and in real cooperation with other ministries and state institutions, but 
above all, only then, could political supremacy actually be exercised.  
The fact that neither has been realised by means of the reform process 
is puzzling and deserves an explanation, especially as it has happened despite 
the political opposition’s unusually unconditional support and the military’s less 
than enthusiastic but ‘docile’ attitude vis-a-vis the historic changes taking place. 
One possible explanation is the lack of political will, which is, at first instance, 
surprising. For example, the often-mentioned Article 35 of the Turkish Armed 
Forces’ Internal Service Law, it has been argued, has to be changed as the 
most significant step towards keeping the Army within its natural area of 
jurisdiction. A political move, with great symbolic value in this sense – testing 
the sincerity of the Government’s will for reform – came from the political 
opposition. A draft law to amend this article,20 prepared by a main opposition 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy, was submitted to the Speaker’s Office 
in September 2011. Another draft law to amend the very same article,21 this 
time prepared by a deputy from another opposition party, the Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP), was submitted to the Speaker’s Office in October 2011. 
But, after more than a year, both are still waiting at the National Defence 
Committee for an action to be taken. And this is happening in a Parliament 
where both the parliamentary committees and the General Assembly are firmly 
controlled by the majority represented by the governing party.22  
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 Draft Law by Deputy Muharrem İnce (CHP), 12 September 2011. 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-0064.pdf. Accessed on 10 December 2012. 
21
 Draft Law by Deputy Hasip Kaplan (BDP), 7 October 2011. 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-0108.pdf. Accessed on 10 December 2012. 
22
 Actually, TESEV’s Security Sector Policy Report’s one prominent observation in 2010, 
based on the 2008 National Programme was that, ‘the pledges made in civil-military 
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Now that, at the end of 2012, most of the foreseen changes, particularly 
those related to the MGK, have already been implemented and the priority has 
shifted to other areas of reform, the attitude and the role of the European Union 
is also worth reviewing. By mid-2009, some fundamental changes, not only with 
respect to ‘understanding’ and ‘perception’, but also regarding the nature of 
civil-military relations in Turkey, had already taken place. Nevertheless, the 
European Commission’s Turkey 2009 Progress Report, which was published in 
October 2009, included a long list of criticisms.23 Surprisingly, it even stated that 
‘No change (had) been made […] to the Law on the National Security Council’, 
despite the fact that radical changes had already taken place and been fully 
implemented. The 2010 Progress Report, which was adopted in November 
2010, immediately after the September 2010 constitutional referendum, adopted 
a rather cautious tone; but the 2011 Report24 appeared fully satisfied with the 
progress achieved, even though no further changes had taken place since 2006. 
However, less than five months after the delivery of the 2011 Report, ‘optimism’ 
within the EU about civil-military relations in Turkey had evaporated and – as far 
as the military aspect of security sector reform was concerned – had been 
replaced by a rather deep ‘concern’. In March 2012, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the European Parliament (EP), 25  while welcoming ‘the continued 
efforts to improve civilian oversight of the military’, emphasised ‘the need to 
ensure the continued secular integrity of the armed forces and their operational 
capability’. This was an unprecedented official statement by any European 
institute as far as the military of any country was concerned. The EP Resolution 
on 29 March 2012 adopted a slightly amended version of this motion and 
stressed ‘the need to ensure the continued operational capability of the [Turkish] 
                                                                                                                       
relations [were] limited in scope’; moreover, the Programme did ‘not envision [sic] a 
fundamental shift in the structure of law enforcement units’, and it did not ‘promise a real 
change in the security model in Turkey’ which was ‘a sign of the lack of political will in 
this area’. Akay 2010, 30-31. 
23
 ‘The armed forces have continued to exercise undue political influence via formal and 
informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed on a large 
number of occasions their views on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond 
their remit […] On a number of occasions, the General Staff reacted publicly to politicians 
and media reports. […] No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal 
Service Law or to the Law on the National Security Council. […] No progress has been 
made on strengthening legislative oversight of the military budget and expenditure. […] 
Parliament has no mandate to develop security and defence policies. […] The alleged 
involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed by the 
investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns.’ EC 2009, 10-11. 
24
 ‘In October 2010, the National Security Council approved a revised National Security 
Policy. This document is not public. It was reportedly prepared mainly by the civilian 
authorities. […] Overall, good progress has been made on consolidating the principle of 
civilian oversight of security forces. The Supreme Military Council of August 2011 was a 
step towards greater civilian oversight of the Armed Forces. Civilian oversight of military 
expenditure was tightened and a revised National Security Plan [sic] adopted.’ EC 2011, 
14. 
25
 European Parliament 2011, Article 10. 
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armed forces’.26 However, there has been no discernable concern regarding the 
‘way’ national security policy and defence policy was formulated, neither from 
the perspective of democratic oversight nor technical efficiency.  
The hard fact is that the key issue – achieving an integrated MoD and 
General Staff – has never been properly discussed, and is still missing from the 
political agenda and related debate in Turkey. The Turkish security and defence 
policy-making system is transforming but not reforming. What is absent is the 
political will – as evidenced by the experience of the last ten years – to make 
the Turkish political decision-making system more effective and more 
democratic.27  The potential risk awaiting Turkey is that a symbolic move is 
made to ‘subordinate’ the military ‘to the political authority, but that the decision-
making system is left as it has always been: inefficient, taking place in a ‘black 
box’ that is centrally controlled and closed to any input, military or otherwise.  
There are simply too few civilians working in the making and execution 
of security and defence policy, and even fewer of them are well prepared for 
such work. However, this is not only about the lack of civilian capacity; it is 
about promoting ‘good governance’, that is, advancing the principles of 
transparency and accountability. Future efforts for real ‘reform’ should focus on 
three interconnected, equally daunting tasks: integrating the Turkish General 
Staff with the MoD, taking into consideration and making optimal use of best 
practice examples as adapted to specific needs of the country; reorganising the 
Turkish military from top to bottom, that is, at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels, in line with the current and drastically changed requirements of 
the battlefield; and educating, training and preparing the military and civilians to 
work together, in areas related to security and defence policies, professionally 
and psychologically. The ‘civilians’, above all, consist of those in Parliament: 
MPs, advisors and staffers. 
All those involved in policy formulation have to understand the need for 
collaboration amongst various government agencies, between uniformed and 
civilian officials, between the executive, civil society and the legislative, and the 
importance being generally open to media. These aims not only require firm 
commitment on the part of the Government, but also Parliament’s willingness to 
take on responsibility for oversight. Above all, the Turkish military, as the 
traditional architect of security and defence policy, which has now completely 
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 European Parliament 2011, 11. 
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 The question of ‘why political will is absent’ is valid and legitimate. However, this paper 
is not intended to answer this complex question – which would require a stand-alone 
study – but to point to this crucial and missing aspect of the democratic reform process in 
Turkey. Nevertheless, decision-making models and leadership styles that continue to 
dominate the Turkish political scene can be offered as one possible explanation. Political 
deinstitutionalisation has led to the downgrading of the whole decision-making system to 
one based on idiosyncratic and ideological considerations. All policy-making processes, 
for all practical purposes, have been limited to dynamics taking place in a closed and 
small circle of decision-makers and/or advisors.  
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left the political scene – albeit reluctantly – should actively and willingly lead the 
way toward good (better) governance in the security sector, particularly in 
designing a new defence policy-making system, this time as a mentor, if 
necessary. The question is, who or which institution is better prepared for this 
vital function than the military, with so many decades of practical experience, in 
and out of Turkey? The Turkish army has a moral responsibility and obligation 
to assume this role for the ‘civilianisation’ of the Turkish security and defence 
policy-making system. If anything, it has been clearly shown that the 
achievement of civilianisation is too important and too difficult to be left in the 
hands of civilians, particularly politicians, alone. It takes common effort, honest 
cooperation and unity of effort.  
Finally, it is fair to say that both the Turkish military and the political elite 
have not been tested sufficiently in all these respects. Ironically, while real 
reforms are far from being complete, to make things worse, the Turkish 
Government has now firmly – and curiously – adopted the military’s traditionally 
sceptical attitude towards Europe and the EU. It has turned out to be reluctant 
to make further reforms and, as evidenced by the recent statements by the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution and the Minister 
for European Union Affairs28 on the EU Commission’s Turkey 2012 Progress 
Report, has become aggressive in the face of substantiated criticism.  
It appears that third party involvement – an honest broker, in some 
sense – could help a lot. The fact that the Government is no longer forthcoming 
on the issue makes such involvement even more important, a prerequisite for 
sustaining the reform process. This third party would naturally be composed of 
third sector organisations (global civil society): think tanks and other 
international non-governmental organisations working with local partners and 
media within Turkey. Such an effort would ideally be supported by the 
international community, particularly the EU and respective member states, this 
time adopting a holistic approach to democratisation in Turkey rather than a 
selective and – evidently – counter-productive one. This time it would engage 
Parliament and the political opposition along with the Government. This does 
not necessarily mean that the third party would do the work that should and can 
only be done by Turks themselves, but it would act as a facilitator, by providing 
insights, sharing best examples, giving training, and encouraging open 
discussion toward sustainable solutions.  
Global society has already done a lot to contribute to democratisation in 
Turkey, perhaps not always in the most suitable way, as perceived by some 
inside the country. But, as exemplified above, it is actually high time now, since 
the environment, despite some setbacks and overwhelming odds, is more open 
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 For the statement by the Chairman of the Committee on the Constitution, Burhan Kuzu 
and the response by Head of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey Jean-Maurice Ripert, 
see “360 Derece” 2012. For the statement by Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis, see 
“Ankara’nin Nabzi” 2012. Both accessed on 17 December 2012.  
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than ever for such a contribution, and is even demanding it; and as it is both 
desirable and certainly needed. 
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Part E - Policy Papers 
 
IX. The State Secrets System and its Impact on Parliamentary 







The deficiencies and obscurity of the existing legal framework in Turkey allow 
the executive to exclusively classify information and documents related to 
defence and security issues, and thus to block Parliament from having access 
to the information needed for effective parliamentary oversight. Therefore, there 
is a need for legal regulation of not only the objective and definition of state 
secrets, in terms of their scope and content, but also of the principles, 
conditions and limits governing Parliament’s right, or that of its committees, to 
access state secrets. The new legislation should aim to find a balance between 
the confidentiality that is necessary for the security services to perform 
effectively and the accountability and transparency that are essential for the 




Current legislation contains a number of provisions concerning the definition of 
state secrets and penalties for their unauthorised disclosure. Unfortunately, the 
legislation does not clearly specify the process by which documents or 
information should be identified as secret and exempt from public access: by 
whom, how, when and for how long.  
Article 26 of the Constitution states that freedom of expression should 
be restricted so as ‘not to disclose information duly qualified as a state secret’. 
Moreover, under Article 76 of the Constitution, individuals who have been 
convicted of disclosing state secrets cannot be elected as parliamentarians. 
Article 48 of the Law on Civil Servants stipulates that being convicted of the 
disclosure of state secrets constitutes an impediment to being a public servant.  
The Rules of Procedure (RoP) of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) clearly excludes state secrets from the scope of parliamentary inquiry 
(Article 105). Moreover, Article 70 of the RoP states that the content of plenary 
debates held in camera should not be disclosed and should be treated as 
classified information. 
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What is a state secret? Like in many other countries, the concept is 
directly related to concepts such as national security, defence and the national 
interest. Generally speaking, information and documents are classified and 
exempt from public access when their disclosure may endanger national 
security or national interests. Below are some definitions of ‘state secrets’ 
according to different laws: 
The Law on Criminal Procedure (2004) defines a state secret as 
‘information, the disclosure of which may impair the foreign affairs of the state, 
national defence and national security, and may prejudice the constitutional 
order and foreign affairs’ (Art. 47). 
The Law on the Right to Information (2003) defines state secrets as 
‘information or documents that would clearly impair the foreign affairs of the 
state, national defence and national security on disclosure and that are 
classified as State Secrets in terms of their content’, and excludes such 
information from the scope of the right to information (Art. 16).  
Another definition of classified information is provided by Criminal Law 
(2004): ‘the information required to be kept confidential due to its qualification in 
terms of the state's security or internal or foreign political interests’ (Art. 326/1). 
Pursuant to this Law, any person who discloses the above-mentioned 
information can be punished with five to ten years of imprisonment (Art. 329/1). 
As we can see, existing legislation provides a general, rather obscure 
definition of the concept that lacks clear limits, and which does not contain any 
specific principles regarding the classification of information as secret. The 
legislation leaves the most important questions unanswered. By whom, when, 
how and for how long should information to be classified and remain 
inaccessible? These legislative shortcomings and the vagueness of these 
definitions allow the executive and public authorities to refuse to share 
information needed by Parliament by simply stating that its disclosure would 
harm ‘national security, foreign and national interests or the constitutional order’. 
Assessment of the threat or danger posed by disclosure tends to be purely 
political and subjective. 
An Ombudsman's Office has been established with the task of 
examining and holding inquiries into the various activities of public bodies. The 
office is affiliated to the TGNA, in accordance with Law no. 6328 of 14 June 
2012. The Ombudsman is appointed by Parliament. Article 18 of the Law 
provides that the Office of the Ombudsman can request public authorities to 
provide any document that is needed for an inquiry. However, the authorised 
bodies have the power to refuse to share any classified information or 
documents with the Office, provided that they specify the grounds for doing so 
when required. The Chief Ombudsman is allowed to examine classified 
information, but it is not at his or her discretion to decide whether such 
information merits being classified. Besides, the said information cannot be 
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used for any reports prepared by the Office, due to the current legislation 
mentioned above, and cannot be disclosed to public. 
During the last parliamentary term, the AKP Government presented the 
Bill on State Secrets to the TGNA. The committee debates on the Bill are 
complete, but the plenary debates have not yet been held. The general 
justification of the Bill states that:  
Inadequate legislation relating to state secrets and confidentiality 
means that it is necessary to regulate the issue with a specific law. 
Moreover, the necessity of harmonising with EU legislation, maintaining 
a transparent, accountable and democratic government, achieving a 
compromise between the interests of the state and citizens, and 
ensuring the right to information, makes it inevitable that the concepts of 
state secrets and confidentiality should be clarified.  
The Bill defines a ‘state secret’ as ‘confidential information, documents and 
records that may impair the international relations of the state or the state’s 
security upon disclosure to unauthorised persons’ (Article 3/1). Like the current 
legislation mentioned above, this article is also undermined by an obscure 
definition and vague wording.  
The Bill envisages a State Secret Assessment Board comprised of the 
Ministers of Justice, National Defence and Internal and Foreign Affairs, presided 
over by the Prime Minister. The TGNA, with its legislative and oversight 
functions, is totally excluded from the Board. The Board, which resembles a 
small cabinet, has exclusive power to decide on proposals from the Prime 
Ministry and other ministries to qualify information as state secret. The Board is 
also authorised to exclude the said information from being classified as secret. 
Furthermore, the Board is empowered to refuse to submit any classified 
information to the Courts, provided that it justifies its refusal. Consequently, the 
Government, through the Board, is granted the power to prohibit parliamentary 
access to information on the grounds that it has been classified. The main point 
of criticism is that the Bill disproportionally strengthens the executive, making it 
almost the sole decision-making actor on issues relating to state secrets 
through the State Secrets Assessment Board. It is striking that Parliament has 
no direct or indirect power and has not been granted an initiative in such 
problematic areas, and that no provision has been inserted into the Bill that 
would allow Parliament to access classified information, provided that the 
principle of confidentiality is observed.  
 
 
Parliamentary Oversight: Current Problems  
One of the primary functions of the TGNA is to review and monitor the activities 
of the Government and public agencies. The Assembly carries out its oversight 
function in a variety of ways. Of these, the most frequently used method of 
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obtaining information are the ‘parliamentary questions’, by which deputies may 
simply request information from the Government. 
The Assembly may also set up committees of inquiry to examine 
different aspects of a particular matter. These committees have the power to 
request the necessary information from ministries, public institutions, local 
government, and so forth. However, the committees do not have the formal 
power to gain access to any information (sometimes classified) when public 
organs refuse to share information. Finally, the RoP state that it is not possible 
to initiate or conduct a parliamentary inquiry on state secrets (Article 105/5).  
The internal rules, together with the current legislation mentioned 
above, leave Parliament dependent upon the goodwill of the Government and 
other public organs to share information. It is clear that the effectiveness of 
parliamentary oversight depends on having accurate information, obtained in a 
timely manner. Due to the obscure and subjective nature of the wording of 
current legislation, the administration uses its discretionary power in the 
broadest sense and it is frequently the case that the information or documents 
requested by parliamentary standing committees or committees of inquiry are 
not supplied by the executive on the grounds of confidentiality or state secrets.  
The problem and its impact on parliamentary oversight have been 
clearly stated in several reports by committees of inquiry. First, one of the 
committees of inquiry highlighted the fact that the concept of a ‘state secret’ 
allowed some public officials to engage in illegal activities, including human 
rights violations, and to sweep any disturbing facts related to illegal activities or 
human rights violations under the carpet.1  
Another committee of inquiry emphasised that the concept, scope, 
contents, and limits of state secrets are not clearly regulated, meaning that 
during the committee’s inquiry, public institutions (the National Intelligence 
Service, the General Staff and the ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs) 
have refused to share requested information on the grounds that it is classified.2 
This committee clearly defined the problem:  
Although there is not a clear limitation concerning state secrets, 
exclusion of state secrets from the scope of parliamentary inquiry will 
result in the considerably decreased effectiveness of political inquiry. 
When an inquiry on the activities of the Government is requested, the 
Government may block Parliament’s initiative by stating that the issue is 
a state secret. In other words, with this provision in the RoP, the 
performance of a power assigned to Parliament is subject to the 
permission of the Government that is supposed to be supervised by 
Parliament. This is incompatible with the nature and goals of a political 
inquiry.3  
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Despite the fact that the problems arising from legislation relating to ‘state 
secrets’ were pointed out expressly in the reports by committees of inquiry, the 
TGNA has not adopted systematic and comprehensive legislation relating to 
‘state secrets’ and has not amended the RoP as recommended by the 
committee reports.  
To summarise, current legislation relating to state secrets has created 
an area that lies completely outside the scope of parliamentary inquiry and 
constitutes a serious obstacle to effectively monitoring the activities of Turkey’s 




As we have seen, the main problem is the legislation relating to classified 
information and its negative impact on parliamentary oversight. The formal 
capacity of Parliament to perform parliamentary oversight is limited by the 
factors outlined above. The lack of systematic and comprehensive legislation on 
classified information and the exclusion of state secrets from the scope of 
parliamentary inquiry are the main reasons for Parliament’s limited capacity. 
The problem could be addressed by adopting a new law on state 
secrets, as recommended by several reports by parliamentary committees of 
inquiry. The Committee of Inquiry on the Susurluk Incident (1997) 
recommended that, ‘It is a necessity for the proper functioning of the rule of law 
to define the limits of the concept of a state secret and to allow Parliament 
access to state secrets’. 4  Recently, the Committee on Coups and Military 
Memorandums (2012) also recommended that the concept of a state secret 
should be legally regulated so as to remove the obscurity surrounding its 
definition, and that Parliament be strengthened in terms of its means of 
oversight. 5  
As explained above, the protection of state secrets forms an exception 
from freedom of expression as per Article 26 of the Constitution and freedom of 
information as per Article 16 of the Law on the Right to Information. Thus, when 
reforming legislation relating to state secrets, it is necessary to observe the 
principles of confidentiality and accountability, service requirements and 
freedom of information (at least of Parliament on behalf of the public). In view of 
this, what type of legislation is needed?  
First, the concept of a state secret needs to be regulated by law: 
specifically, what type of information can be labelled as a ‘state secret’, by 
whom, who can get access to such information, and how? The law should 
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clearly define the concepts of ‘defence’, ‘security’ and ‘the national interest’ 
(similar to the Official Secrets Act in the United Kingdom). This would provide 
anyone with a reasonable explanation as to what information might have a 
damaging effect on national defence, security or the national interest. Naturally, 
the legislation should cover the principles, criteria, authority and procedures for 
classifying and disclosing state secrets, penalties for unauthorised disclosure, 
the rights of individuals or Parliament to access information, and, finally, right of 
appeal if access is denied.  
Information and documents which might lead to the disclosure of a 
particular operation that has or is being undertaken, or is being proposed by the 
security services, or identification of a person who has been, is being or is 
supposed to take part in such an operation, can be sensitive and should not be 
disclosed to the public. However, authorised committees or selected deputies 
must have access to such information, provided that they observe the 
confidentiality of the issue. 
Second, the legislation should limit the discretionary power of the 
executive by integrating parliamentary bodies into the process. Any authority 
that is responsible for dealing with state secrets should contain members of the 
Assembly or persons appointed by the Assembly, such as the Ombudsman.  
Third, the main purpose of parliamentary oversight, particularly 
parliamentary questions and inquiry, is to draw public attention to the 
problematic activities of the executive. For this reason, Parliament (committees 
or selected deputies) should have access to state secrets in order to ensure the 
proper functioning of parliamentary oversight. The provisions of the RoP relating 
to the powers of committees of inquiry should be amended so as to force the 
executive to share any information or document requested by the parliamentary 
committees. It should be stipulated that persons and institutions are obliged to 
share all information with the parliamentary committees. Liability must be 
subject to sanction. In addition, the committees must be able to decide to share 
the information obtained with the public, regardless of whether it is classified, 
either through a qualified majority or unanimously. 
Finally, the provisions of the RoP excluding state secrets from the scope 
of parliamentary inquiry have created an area that is protected from 
parliamentary inquiry. To exclude such a vague area from the scope of the 
parliamentary inquiry means for Parliament to relinquish its power to control the 
executive, something that it is duty-bound to do. Thus, it is necessary to repeal 
this provision of the RoP (Article 105/5) in order to ensure effective 
parliamentary oversight of the security sector. 
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X. Civil-Military Cooperation on Foreign Policy-Making: The 







Civil-military relations are often understood from a confrontational perspective in 
Turkey, something that is directly related to the security pillar of foreign policy. 
This paper suggests that a consultation mechanism should be developed to 
deal with the process of foreign policy decision-making. The security concept is 
highlighted as a way of linking the civil and military authorities when making 
foreign policy decisions. The consultation mechanism could be an instrument to 
exercise democratic oversight of the security pillar in foreign policy, in which the 




Since 2002, within the context of rebuilding democratic institutions and 
reforming civil-military relations in Turkey, the Turkish Government has been 
trying to establish a Western pattern of civil-military relations with reduced 
political influence for the military. The institutional reform process of the 2000s, 
which led up to the start of Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU, 
introduced changes in the core areas of civilian control over the military, 
budgeting and planning methods.1 However, this process of ensuring a clear 
division of authority between the Government and the armed forces, 
Government oversight of the General Staff and military commanders through 
civilian institutions, and the restoration of military prestige and trustworthiness, 
is marked by a conflictual paradigm. This paradigm is characterised by 
institutional cooperation between the Government and the armed forces. While 
this cooperation should address the security pillar of foreign policy-making, 
there has been a failure to distinguish between civil and military cooperation 
within the context of security policy. Governmental primacy in all areas of 
security policy, including the formation and implementation of national security 
policy, means that nowadays, the military is largely separate from civilian 
institutions. This lack of institutional cooperation has led the military to turn to 
non-institutional mechanisms, such as press conferences, briefings and cultural 
channels, to influence security policy. If efficient institutional cooperation can be 
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ensured between the civil and military authorities, the latter will be able to 
abstain from confronting the Government on security matters. 
 
 
Turkish Foreign Policy-making: Background and Current Practice 
The mainstream approach to civil-military relations in Turkey is generally based 
on a dual and conflictual paradigm of power relations, which distinguishes the 
secular, patriotic, rational and modern soldier from the elected, inefficient, anti-
secularist and interest-based politician. Analysts who are critical of the military’s 
influence on politics in Turkey underline the conflict-ridden aspects of the 
relationship between the military and civilians.2 They regard civil-military issues 
as ‘power relations that involve constant confrontation and tension.’3 Therefore, 
‘civil-military relations are power relations because they refer to a conflict about 
who will have the upper hand when it comes to contentious issues.’ 4  The 
problem ‘is not just the implementation of the democratic control of the armed 
forces, but the larger one of civilian empowerment, that is, enabling civilian 
governments to take control over not only the military universe but also the life 
of the country, the economy, political process, institutional make-up.’5  
The historical and constitutional task of the Turkish Armed Forces is to 
protect the territorial and political existence of the state, along with its republican 
and secularist principles, against internal and external threats. Article 35 of the 
Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law states that the duty of the Turkish 
Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish 
Republic, as defined in the Constitution.6  Turkish foreign policy-making has 
traditionally revolved around a main systemic factor, namely the achievement of 
security. In addition to this, Turkish foreign policy has worked ‘to expand the 
sphere of peace and prosperity in its region, generate stability and security, and 
help establish an order that paves the way for prosperity, human development 
and lasting stability’.7 These tasks demand that the military play a primary role 
in domestic and international political issues, parallel to diplomatic ones.  
In the 1990s in particular, the military began to act as an autonomous 
force in a number of policy fields with the support of the Government, in 
response to terror and security problems in Turkey. This revealed the 
inadequacy of collaboration between the military and civilian powers.8 Although 
constitutionally, the supremacy of civilian power is absolute in Turkey, existing 
institutional decision-making mechanisms caused the military to use non-
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institutional mechanisms in the 1990s. The military exercised particular 
influence on politics through the National Security Council (MGK), an advisory 
body to the Government.9 The existence of the MGK as a military-dominated 
body with a significant degree of executive power in a number of areas (the 
economy, financial markets, banks, privatisation and foreign policy) created a 
political system with a dual executive: the civilian authority and the military 
authority.10  
The current members of the MGK are the President (the chairman), the 
Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the 
Ministers of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Justice, and 
the Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie. As a 
governmental website puts it,  
The MGK submits its advisory decisions about the formulation, 
determination and implementation of the national security policy of the 
State and its opinions about the maintenance of the necessary 
coordination, to the Council of Ministers. This council evaluates decisions 
of the MGK concerning the measures it deems necessary for the 
preservation of the existence and independence of the State, integrity of 
the country and peace and security of the society.11  
Although the MGK has provided a partial mechanism for civilian and military 
leaders to cooperate on foreign policy matters and the formulation and 
implementation of national security policy, this does not mean that the MGK 
avoided being based on a dual executive in the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
MGK did not unite the military with functional and institutional civil mechanisms. 
Under normal conditions, these mechanisms are designed to facilitate military 
and civilian institutional cooperation. Furthermore, they allow for making 
professional and strategic security decisions with reference to institutional 
cooperation based on civil and military dialogue.  
The lack of institutional cooperation on decision-making in security 
matters does not mean that the military refrains from voicing its opinion on 
related issues. The civilian authorities suggest that this exercise of voice, in the 
form of recommendations on defence and security matters, should be under the 
control of the civilian government. 12  It is thus clear that an institutional 
mechanism is needed to achieve such control and facilitate the division of 
labour between civilians and the military. The Chief of the General Staff has a 
direct relationship with the President and the Prime Minister through regular 
meetings and MGK meetings. Over the years, however, the MGK has become a 
key decision-maker in Turkey, and it has failed to achieve cooperation between 
civilians and the military. Because the MGK has functioned as a high-level 
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platform that includes civil and military leaders, it has turned into an arena of 
political competition for civil and military leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats. 
Foreign policy decision-making that involves multiple high-level autonomous 
actors has proved to be a policy challenge. Decision-making processes with 
multiple actors often fail to end in compromise agreements and well-structured 
policies.13 
To avoid such failure, an integrated, low-level cooperation mechanism 
is needed that could supervise the two sides. A Joint Committee, which has an 
inter-institutional character, could be responsible for the formulation and 
conduct of security policies at a lower level. Such a low-level cooperation 
mechanism would give civilians an opportunity to enter a new area to influence 
security and military matters. Potentially, this could promote the principles of 
transparency and accountability, which are inherent in good administrative 
practices. In addition, low-level cooperation mechanisms could provide a 
platform for civilian control, democratic oversight and mutual confidence 
between civilians and the military in the security sector. The MGK has the 
potential to be a platform where civilian and military leaders cooperate. It does 
not have the potential to promote democratic oversight, however, due to its 
high-level character and the fact that it positions the military in a place where it 
can avoid having to share responsibility with civilians.  
In any state that has norms, values and principles based on the rule of 
law, democracy and human rights, the civil authorities need the armed forces 
for the defence of the state and its territorial integrity. At the same time, the 
armed forces need the civil authorities for the recognition of their own 
legitimacy. At this point, it is important to acknowledge that the main issue is not 
to establish the primacy of the elected civilian government over the armed 
forces, but ‘how to maintain a strong and effective military that poses no threat 
to the civilian elite.’14 This challenge can be managed effectively by building a 
cooperative and functional relationship between civilian and military actors. As 
mentioned above, this does not necessitate cooperation at a high leadership 
level. Rather, it depends on the existence of low-level cooperation and related 
institutional mechanisms. In addition, control of the military depends on the 
degree to which the officer corps cooperates with the civilian government, and 
vice versa. Both function within the same state structure and are dependent 
upon one other.15 
In response to approaches that regard the armed forces simply as an 
instrument of the civilian government, without considering the nature and 
capabilities of that instrument, we should stress the significance of dialogue 
between politicians and soldiers and the harmonisation of the two actors. The 
necessary principle is civil-military integration, founded on the notions of 
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equality in counsel and of the harmonisation of effects. This reformed system of 
civil-military relations would reintegrate the armed forces and the government 
within the state structure and render parliamentary control of both civilian and 
military agents of the executive more effective.16 In the contemporary world, the 
political and military spheres are penetrating each other more than ever. The 
civil-military relationship should not be seen as conflict-ridden. Political and 
military leaders are expected to collaborate in reaching a constructive 
consensus, not only on defence and security policies, but also on how to 
manage their relationship within the state and society.17  
 
 
Recommendations on Civil-Military Cooperation 
In Turkey, civilian governments have either tried to relegate the military to the 
sidelines or they have granted it too much autonomy. Consequently, military 
confidence in the competence of civilian governments has tended to be low. In 
the process, a delicate relationship has been established between civilian 
governments and the military, whereby politicians and officers have turned into 
adversaries, rather than allies. 18  This delicate relationship is based on the 
separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of civilians over the 
military to prevent military intervention. At this point, the ‘theory of 
concordance’ 19  should be considered as a reference for dialogue, 
accommodation and shared values or objectives between civilians and the 
military. Society, as another agent, should also be added to the civilian and 
military authorities. The main proposition of this theory is that if the military, 
civilian elites and society achieve concordance on related issues, then domestic 
military intervention becomes less likely. In addition, in contrast to prevailing 
approaches, which are based on the separation of civil and military institutions, 
concordance theory promotes cooperation and involvement among the military, 
political institutions and the society. It does not separate the civil and military 
spheres so as to prevent the latter exercising influence. If the military has 
established dialogue and cooperation with civilian elites and society, military 
intervention can be prevented.20  
The active and enduring agreement between the military, political elites 
and society can explain why domestic military intervention has not occurred in 
the EU countries. In order to explain a country’s civil-military relations, we need 
to look at cultural and institutional factors, focusing on the composition of the 
officer corps, political decision-making processes and recruitment methods.21 
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Politicians have not shown interest in the technicalities of security and defence 
policy in Turkey. However, it is a significant component of the active and 
enduring agreement between the military and political elites. Politicians have 
usually taken office without knowledge of military strategy and weapon 
procurement problems, meaning that the General Staff has played a 
determining advisory role. The improvement of their interest in and knowledge 
of security and defence matters means that they can play more efficient role in 
security policy.22 
In the foreign and security policy-making process in Turkey, the civilian 
authorities are represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defence, and the armed forces are represented by the General Staff. 
Institutionally, the Prime Minister, as the head of the Government, is the 
supreme decision-maker in foreign policy-making. As suggested above, 
however, a Joint Committee should be the primary institution responsible for the 
formulation and conduct of security policies, which could flow from other 
mechanisms, including lower-level cooperation between civilians and the 
military. This Joint Committee should be responsible for preparatory work on 
security issues and should be established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
Consultation Unit. It should consist of expert representatives from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. This committee 
should be administered by ambassadors from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
low-rank civilian and military professionals from the Ministry of Defence and 
General Staff. The committee should occupy a distinguished position in the 
security pillar of the foreign policy decision-making system, in which it should 
function as a platform for dialogue, suggestions and guidance and to supervise 
the work of experts. The underlying competition and conflict between civilian 
and military institutions in Turkey needs to be removed. This would be achieved 
by combining political leaders' potential for strategic assessment on security 
matters with military leaders’ potential for assessing these matters 
diplomatically, within the framework of a Joint Committee working programme. 
The improvements suggested above and the Joint Committee working 
programme would involve information-sharing between political and military 
leaders and staff regarding military capabilities, plans, strategies, principals, 
coordination, costs and benefits. The Joint Committee would devise 
psychological operation plans, work on national security policy, and plan 
mobilisations and war preparations. Such a committee would potentially be able 
to counter the institutional weaknesses of the MGK, including its lack of 
oversight. One aspect of democratic or political oversight relates to the extent to 
which the military is involved in making foreign policy. The Joint Committee 
would be an instrument for democratic oversight on security matters in which 
the military would be an effective actor. Furthermore, the committee would 
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support parliamentary oversight on security matters, allowing politicians to 
intervene in the Joint Committee’s practices. In this way, it would be possible to 
create an institutionalised cooperation and consultation mechanism involving 
the civilian and military authorities, whereby a strong and effective military 





XI. Analysing the Restructuring of the Turkish Security Sector 







There is a need for effective inter-institutional coordination and cooperation 
between the military, police and intelligence units on counter-terrorism issues in 
Turkey, just like in other countries. Cooperation plays a critical role in ensuring 
Turkey’s security in the face of ever-changing global threats, regardless of the 
frequency of terrorist incidents. Only through proper coordination can a multi-
faceted threat such as terrorism be effectively addressed. In this policy paper, 
the current status of inter-institutional cooperation on counter-terrorism in 
Turkey and the political and social impact of revised legal arrangements are 
analysed. To transform inter-institutional coordination into effective and 
sustainable cooperation, such coordination has to emerge via a democratic and 





Inter-institutional cooperation on counter-terrorism is an issue that relates both 
to the security and the democratic structure of the state. In view of Turkey's 
recent history, it may be observed that neither counter-terrorism nor inter-
institutional cooperation is a new issue. However, since the arrangements with 
regard to either issue have been unsettled and given the inadequacy of the 
existing counter-terrorism mechanisms, the issue of inter-institutional 
cooperation has maintained its importance and caused the debates to continue 
on various platforms. Democratisation and the oversight of counter-terrorism 
institutions constitute another important dimension of these debates. 
In 2010, the debate gained new momentum when the Public Order and 
Security Undersecretariat was formed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
Undersecretariat was intended to ensure the coordination between the 
institutions involved in counter-terrorism. To understand this situation, we need 
to evaluate the recent developments in the light of legislation and expert 
opinions. I will start by briefly reviewing the history of coordination between 
Turkish security institutions. Then, I will assess recent practice with regard to 
the secure and democratic management of counter-terrorism. In the conclusion 
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to this chapter, I will suggest a number of policy recommendations for making 





In Turkey today, the most important institution for determining security policy 
and coordination is the National Security Council (MGK). According to the law 
regulating the foundation and duties of the MGK:  
National Security means to watch and protect the constitutional order, 
national existence, integrity and all interests in international platforms 
including political, social, cultural and economic as well as contractual 
jurisdiction against all kinds of internal and external threats. National 
Security Policy of the State means the policy encompassing all 
principles of internal, external and defensive actions within the 
conditions specified by the National Security Council in order to ensure 
national security and to attain national objectives.1 
The MGK's method of outlining security policy for Turkey is closely related to 
the formation of the Council. The MGK is presided over by the President and is 
comprised of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs, and the Commanders of Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie 
Forces (amended: 15/1/2003-4789/1 Art.). The Council is also important in 
terms of institutional coordination at the high levels of state, because it brings 
together all of the top civilian and military command personnel. Furthermore, the 
presence of commanders, ministers and directors among the Council’s 
members, such as the Gendarmerie Forces Command and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs tasked directly for counter-terrorism, reveals that the MGK is the 
supreme coordination centre for counter-terrorism. This situation is also 
expressed in the law regulating the duties of the MGK: the MGK makes 
recommendations related to specifying, determining and implementing the 
state’s national security policy and provides opinions on ensuring the necessary 
coordination, submitting these to the Council of Ministers (amended: 7/8/2003-
4963/24 Art.). Although in legal terms, the Council’s decisions are only 
recommendations, considering the formation of the Council and recent practice, 
it can be observed that the Government has put the decisions of the MGK right 
at the heart of its security policy. 
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To effectively combat terrorism in the 1990s and for coordination 
purposes, [EMASYA] was signed between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Turkish General Staff on July 17, 1997. The amendment made in the Provincial 
Administration Law required the arrangement for intervention of the military 
forces to the public unrest events where police forces are inadequate. The 
EMASYA Protocol, the abbreviated form of Security, Public Order and Support 
(Emniyet, Asayiş, Yardımlaşma), emerged due to this legal requirement. Its 
content was not fully disclosed officially.2 The fact that EMASYA was signed 
with a confidential protocol has hindered the disclosure of many articles. This 
was pointed out at the time by Prof. Niyazi Öktem, an expert in administrative 
law, who noted that ‘EMASYA is a protocol that was not fully disclosed to public. 
Such non-transparent arrangements should not be made in a normal 
democratic order’.3 The protocol, which was criticised on the grounds that it 
threatened to undermine democratic surveillance and accountability in counter-
terrorism, was abolished on 4 February 2010.4 However, the abolition of the 
protocol did not eliminate the need for effective inter-institutional coordination 
and cooperation on Turkish counter-terrorism between the military, police and 
intelligence forces. The importance of this need is evident: Turkey’s security 
needs to be ensured in view of the ever-changing global threat, regardless of 
the frequency of terrorist incidents. 
 
 
Assessment of Recent Practice 
The need for effective inter-institutional coordination on counter-terrorism and to 
ensure this coordination within the framework of democratic principles recently 
led to the emergence of new legal arrangements. In view of this, we need to 
evaluate the extent to which the Public Order and Security Undersecretariat 
formed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs will satisfy Turkey’s security-related 
and democratic priorities. According to the law regulating the foundation and 
duties of the Public Order and Security Undersecretariat, ‘The Public Order and 
Security Undersecretariat was founded in affiliation with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to develop the policy and strategies related to counter-terrorism and to 
ensure coordination between the relevant institutions and organizations’.4 
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To ensure a sufficient level of coordination and cooperation in the area 
of counter-terrorism, the Undersecretariat has a number of units available, as 
indicated in Table 1.  
ORGANISATION OF THE UNDERSECRETARIAT OF PUBLIC ORDER AND 
SECURITY 








































Undersecretariat   





    
Table 1: Organisation of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security.5 
 
Its main role emerges within the framework of the ‘Board of Coordination on 
Counter-Terrorism’. According to the relevant law, this Board was founded to 
ensure the necessary coordination on counter-terrorism between the security 
institutions and other relevant institutions, and to assess policy and practice in 
this area. The Board is presided over by the Minister of Internal Affairs and 
comprises the Deputy Chief of General Staff, the Undersecretary of the National 
Intelligence Organisation, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, the 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Undersecretary of Public Order and Security, the 
                                                                                                                       
 mustesarl%C4%B1g%C4%B1n%C4%B1n-teskilat-ve-gorevleri-hakk%C4%B1nda-
kanun/158343 [accessed 22 October 2010]. 
5
 “Organisation of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security,” no date. 
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Director General of the Police and the Commander of the Coast Guard. 
Whenever necessary, representatives of other relevant institutions and 
organisations may be invited. 
The Board meets upon the invitation of the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
The agenda of the meeting is determined by the Minister of Internal Affairs, in 
consultation with the board members. The secretarial work of the board is 
undertaken by the Undersecretariat. The board focuses on establishing 
comprehensive coordination, as required by counter-terrorism. Apart from 
gathering together high-level government officials at the MGK to determine 
strategy, the Board of Coordination in Counter Terrorism provides facilities for 
more effective cooperation, such as sharing of intelligence directly with the 
relevant directors of institutions participating in counter-terrorism. The duties of 
the Undersecretariat with respect to counter-terrorism, as defined in the relevant 
law, are as follows: 
1. To conduct activities for specifying policy and strategies, and to monitor 
the implementation of these policies and strategies.  
2. To evaluate the strategic intelligence from the security institutions and 
intelligence units, and to share this with the relevant units.  
3. To conduct the necessary research, analysis and evaluation activities.  
4. To provide strategic information support to the security institutions and 
relevant organisations and to ensure proper coordination among them.  
5. To inform the public and carry out public relations activities.  
6. To monitor and assess the international developments in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant institutions.  
To conduct inspections and surveillance. 
Almost all of the duties of the Undersecretariat in the area of counter-terrorism 
are focused on ensuring inter-institutional coordination and cooperation. It 
should be noted here that the cooperation is not only with respect to counter-
terrorism. According to the law, the Undersecretariat has no operational duties 
related to the direct provision of security. The main duty of the Undersecretariat 
is to enable the sharing of information and experiences of the institutions that 
have operational units, such as the military and police forces and other 
institutions that have important counter-terrorism functions, and also developing 
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies.  
According to the relevant laws, the role of the Undersecretariat in inter-
institutional cooperation is organised in the following ways. The 
Undersecretariat works in cooperation with ministries, institutions and 
organisations to perform the duties specified in the relevant laws. These 
ministries, institutions and organisations are to respond immediately to the 
Undersecretariat’s requests for information and documents. In this regard, the 
relevant law grants power to the Undersecretariat to make requests from the 
relevant institutions in carrying out its duties. Furthermore, the Undersecretariat 
acts as a common contact and coordination point for intelligence-sharing, and 
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brings together institutions working on counter-terrorism. The Undersecretariat 
fulfils this function through the Intelligence Assessment Centre. According to the 
relevant law, this Centre is directly affiliated to the Undersecretary so as to be 
able to receive and assess the strategic intelligence from the relevant 
institutions; that is, so as to function as a base for the policies and strategies to 
be proposed, as well as counter-terrorism measures. The Centre assesses the 
strategic information and intelligence obtained by security institutions, 
intelligence units and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within this framework. The 
intelligence needed to determine the strategy on counter-terrorism is provided 
to the Undersecretariat by the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Undersecretariat of the National Intelligence Organisation, the 
Gendarmerie Command, the General Directorate of Security and the Coast 
Guard Command. The analyses and assessments that are made in line with 
this information are shared with the relevant units. 
The budget of the Undersecretariat is arranged in line with the relevant 
law. Accordingly, the Undersecretariat has a general budget subject to the 
Public Finance Management and Auditing Law no. 5018, dated 10 December 
2003. An allowance is made for the budget of the Undersecretariat in relation to 
the work conducted in the extent of this law and is subject to confidentiality 
according to the provisions of Article 24 of Law no. 5018. A discretionary fund 
facility is allocated to the Undersecretariat. According to the relevant law of the 
Undersecretariat, the Council of Ministers shall execute the provisions of this 
law. In this respect, the Undersecretariat is under the auditing of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and is subject to auditing to the extent that the Ministry as a 
whole is subject to auditing. 
 
 
Proposals and Conclusions 
The debates relating to the Draft of the Undersecretariat at the General Council 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, formed upon the recommendation of 
the Government, have drawn serious criticism from opposition parties. For 
instance, İsa Gök, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Member of Parliament 
for Mersin, pointed out that ‘the Undersecretariat shall supervise or ensure 
supervision’ was stated in the draft. However, he continues, ‘which institute will 
hold it accountable? This is not clear in the draft. There is an ongoing effort to 
form something like a second MGK’ and alleged strongly that the 
Undersecretariat had operational powers, despite claims to the contrary. 
İsa Gök further accused the Government of ‘creating a giant [and not 
knowing] where it will stop’. 6  Opposition parties saw the ‘Public Security 
Undersecretariat’ as ‘the shadow government’ of the executive. The use of the 
discretionary budget allocated to the Undersecretariat was questioned, and 
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concerns were expressed that the Undersecretariat would perpetuate the 
dreadful atmosphere created by wiretapping. 7  Hasan Özdemir, Member of 
Parliament for Gaziantep from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), criticised the 
use of funds from the discretionary budget by the Undersecretariat, which has 
no operational powers, and asked, ‘Are the institutions related to the security 
not enough for coordination?’ He added, ‘Does the Government not trust the 
intelligence units?’ 8  Criticism focused on the scope and allocation of the 
discretionary budget to the Undersecretariat. These problems led to questions 
about the Government’s position and about democratic oversight of counter-
terrorism coordination. In particular, the obscurity of the law has heightened 
concerns about the Undersecretariat. For instance, ‘It is not clearly specified 
whether the Undersecretariat would perform wiretapping’. As this activity is 
described as ‘collecting data, information and documents’, the operational limits 
of the Undersecretariat remain not clearly defined.9 
Considering all these criticisms, it can hardly be said that inter-
institutional coordination in Turkey's approach to counter-terrorism has found a 
satisfactory solution with this new legal arrangement. A more democratic, more 
accountable inter-institutional coordination mechanism would allow for more 
effective and sustainable counter-terrorism efforts in the long run. Moreover, 
having officials who have been duly elected via democratic procedures manage 
such a mechanism ought to contribute to the democratisation of the cooperation 
between security institutions. However, it would also be necessary for these 
elected persons to establish mechanisms for being accountable to the 
Parliament (i.e. political accountability) and the judiciary (i.e. judicial 
accountability). In the absence of such mechanisms, it should not be overlooked 
that any non-supervised authority would be susceptible to corruption and abuse, 
even if elected by the public. In particular, coordination between state 
institutions on issues directly related to the security of the state and the nation, 
such as counter-terrorism, is critical in terms of improving both the security of 
the state and the cooperation of the public with the state. Only through proper 
coordination can a multi-dimensional threat such as terrorism be dealt with 
effectively. To transform inter-institutional coordination into effective and 
sustainable cooperation, such coordination has to emerge via a democratic and 
participatory process, and multi-dimensional accountability mechanisms brought 
into force. 
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This paper concerns universal human rights and their observance and 
protection in the Turkish Republic. To this end, the history of human rights will 
be outlined and their universal understanding will be analysed. Finally, Turkey’s 
contribution on human rights will be examined, and a number of 
recommendations will be made in the conclusion. 
 
 
The History of Human Rights 
Human rights are a particular branch of international law and they apply equally 
to every person. They are unique because they are universal, inalienable and 
indivisible. They are not simply a religious doctrine or a cultural understanding; 
they are upheld in numerous international treaties and political agreements. 
According to these agreements, all of the diverse cultures of the world should 
understand human rights in the same way. Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as principles for their fulfilment, are global. Although people around 
the world live in many different environments and act according to their cultures 
and political and social structures, they have similar ideas regarding human life. 
Life, liberty, property, equality, freedom of expression and religious freedom, the 
ability to resist oppression, dignity, and so forth, are universal fundamental 
rights for every human being and therefore undisputed. Individual nation-states, 
subordinate to supranational guidelines, are responsible for observing and 
protecting human rights.1 
Since the 19th century, a progressive extension of human rights has 
taken place in the social field, which is reflected in the right to work, education 
and social security. However, these first steps were not reinforced or enshrined 
in international treaties. Until 1945, the protection of human rights was the sole 
responsibility of nation states and their constitutional bases. In the wake of 
totalitarianism in Europe and the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) 
made the protection of universal human rights one of its main goals. On 10 
December 1948, despite abstention by Communist countries, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted as an international, non-binding 
recommendation, with a catalogue of civil, political and social rights. On 16 
December 1966 this Declaration was followed by two international covenants: 
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one on Civil and Political Rights and one on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Together they form the so-called Bill of Human Rights. The contents of 
the Bill of Human Rights are reflected in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) of 4 November 1950 (entered into force on 3 September 1953) 
and the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961 (or the revised version of 
3 May 1996). Particularly the ECHR has a binding effect on State parties. The 
protective organs are the European Court of Human Rights (which hears 
individual and State complaints after domestic remedies have been exhausted), 
whose decisions are binding for the State parties, and the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, to guarantee the execution of the Courts’ 
decisions.2 
Complaints against violations can be filed at the UN Human Rights 
Council. In addition, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a specialised 
agency of the UN, has been commissioned to promote social justice and human 
and labour rights. The UN thus aims to guarantee the collective protection of 
human rights and international judicial control. Unfortunately, the UN Human 
Rights Council’s decisions are merely recommendations. 
 
 
Universal Human Rights in the Republic of Turkey 
Turkey ratified the ECHR in May 1953 without any reservations. While one 
might think that Turkey has been a profound respecter of human rights since 
then, the reality is quite different. Regarding faith and freedom of expression, 
press freedom, equality and other fundamental freedoms, there have been 
significant shortcomings. Also in matters of minority rights, Turkey has faced 
difficulties. One of the most famous examples of this is the Kurdish issue, which 
has taken the form of fighting with terrorist Kurdish rebels and military 
operations in the eastern regions. This has led to the regional disparity between 
East and West. The Kurdish minority has long been prohibited from practising 
its traditions. Religious communities, such as the Christians, Jews and Alevis, 
have also complained about not being respected at both the governmental and 
societal levels. These are just some of many examples of Turkey’s violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Efforts by human rights activists to 
address or improve minority rights, freedom of press, speech and religion, equal 
rights, equal opportunities and many other basic freedoms, have failed for 
cultural and political reasons. One of the main problems has been the military's 
influence in politics. For years, the Turkish military saw itself as the guardian of 
the secular state and representative democracy in Turkey, and this is precisely 
why many failed to see the defects of Turkish democracy. Soldiers intervened in 
both political and civil affairs, and formed an authoritarian power structure that 
found its legitimacy in the cultural framework of society. To separate the military 
                                                 
2
 ECHR, Article 46. 
 133 
from civilian life was thus not only a political task, but also a sociological one, 
because the military was seen as an indivisible part of society. In other words, 
people’s awareness needed to be changed.  
 
 
The AKP Government 
Upon taking office in 2003, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
stated that one of the main goals of the new government was the gradual 
demilitarisation of state and civil institutions. With this, Erdogan aimed to clarify 
that military intervention could not offer an escape from unwanted political 
systems, but represented a derogation of human rights and democratic 
principles, and that by intervening, the military only strengthened its repressive 
and authoritarian role in civilian life and in politics. Erdogan's charismatic 
leadership and mentoring role towards a transforming society brought results 
that human rights activists had long aspired to. Modern Turkish citizens 
questioned the military’s hierarchy and its position as the guardian of the people. 
They tried to understand the socio-economic background to the coups and the 
nature of the military mind. Institutionally and politically, this transformation was 
strengthened by important events. In 2010, coup attempts by the Turkish 
military and their weaknesses in the fight against Kurdish terrorism were 
challenged, leading to investigations 3  These investigations revealed long-
standing plans for a military coup. As a consequence, several soldiers were put 
into custody. Parliament proposed new legislation to address the special status 
of soldiers in Turkish society. After the referendum of 12 September 2010, goals 
such as restricting the military legal system and establishing the supremacy of 
civil law over soldiers were achieved. The result was strict civilian control over 
the Turkish military.  
These were not the only gains of the Turkish transformation, however. 
In terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a series of changes took 
place, in which minorities were recognised, inequalities were addressed, and 
the civilian legal system was improved. For example, on 23 February 2011, the 
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted. 4  There has also been 
progress in the areas of equal opportunities and women's rights. On 24 
November 2011, a law was passed to prevent and combat violence against 
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Legislative Progress 
The annual report of the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social 
Research identifies the following points with regard to improvements in the area 
of human rights in 2011:5 
• Civilian control of the security sector; 
• Compliance with international human rights; 
• Institutionalisation in the field of human rights: in the General 
Directorate of International Law and Foreign Affairs of the Ministry 
of Justice Department, the Ministry of Human Rights was 
established; 
• Training of officers: since November 2011, an EU programme has 
been in place to train military judges and prosecutors on human 
rights; 
• Prisons: the Prison Reform Programme 2011; 
• Freedom of expression: topics long considered taboo are now freely 
debated, especially in the media (such as Ergenekon, İnönü, etc.); 
• Freedom of religion: the doctrine of Alevism can be learned at 
schools now, and the worship of the Orthodox Christians can be 
practised in some politically closed churches; 
• Freedom of association and assembly: efforts by the ILO to adapt 
the restrictive provisions of the existing legal framework for trade 
unions; 
• Women's rights: rules to prevent and combat violence against 
women and domestic violence; 
• Children's Rights: various projects for the education of children, 
child labour and gender inequality in primary schools; 
• Disabled persons: the government improved the household budget 




Progress in Practice 
In addition to the progress described in the SETA Foundation’s annual report, 
other developments have taken place with regard to human rights. Despite 
these remarkable developments, Turkey is still criticised in relation to free 
speech and religious freedom, political violence, judicial proceedings, arrested 
journalists and academics, competence in holding inquiries, minorities, people 
with disabilities, press freedom and freedom of association and assembly and 
other issues. The process of democratisation is a difficult and slow one. The 
intention is there, for the most part, though the implementation is not always 
self-evident. 
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The extent to which an authoritarian and repressive military system is 
undergoing a lingering transformation into an authoritarian civilian system 
should be examined. The current government has been in power for almost ten 
years. In this decade, much has happened in the economic, political and social 
spheres. However, in these, the classic tools of an authoritarian system are still 
at work. While in some popular cases, such as demilitarisation and the creation 
of ‘democratic openings’, there appears to have been improvement, we often 
encounter dramatic cases that are almost indistinguishable from those under 
totalitarian systems. The press is largely controlled by the Government and far 
removed from any objectivity. The public expression of critical and objective 
opinions is still dangerous. According to the Istanbul media portal Bianet (2012), 
100 journalists and 35 editors are currently in custody.6 
According to the Istanbul-based journalist Necati Abay, spokesman for 
the Solidarity Platform of Imprisoned Journalists (Tutuklu Gazetecilerle 
Dayanışma Platformu – TGDP), there are currently between 4,000 and 6,000 
investigations running against journalists. 7  Most of them are accused of 
supporting the terrorist organisation the PKK, or its allied organisations. The 
German Journalists’ Union (DJU) has warned that people who make use of the 
right to freedom of expression are simultaneously being declared supporters of 
terrorist groups and may be fined.8 The investigation into the secret organisation 
Ergenekon has been used for the same intentions. In the world ranking of press 
freedom compiled by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Turkey has fallen from 
148th to 179th place. The author Nadire Mater describes press freedom in 
Turkey as being very unpredictable: ‘while the government promises reform and 
relaxation the one day, accusations follow the next day’. A gloomy atmosphere 
in Turkey prevails in terms of press freedom, says the author. The number of 
imprisoned journalists, students and politicians is a cry for help in this important 
region, to which the European Court of Human Rights should respond. Also, the 
number of police violations in Turkey has increased. One of many recent events 
in this regard took place on 29 March 2012, when the Turkish police fought with 
tear gas and water cannons against a large demonstration in Ankara aimed 
against the new education reforms.9 The city centre resembled the scenes of 
the Arab spring. 
Equally, in prisons, having a uniform is the best weapon because it 
denotes hierarchy and authority.10 Human rights activists describe the situation 
in prisons as one of excessive use of force by police officers. The number of 
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violent incidents is increasing, says Spiegel Online.11 About 5,000 complaints of 
ill-treatment have been filed at the Ministry of Justice since 2006. The 
processes usually end in acquittal. Kenneth Roth, executive director of the 
human rights organisation Human Rights Watch, says that there has been a 
‘significant increase’ in the abuse of police power, and that cases of severe 
torture and incidents with fatal consequences are increasing. This development 
is grounded in the corresponding judicial change of 2007, which served to give 
the police greater discretion. Human Rights Watch has produced an 80-page 
report detailing allegations of torture and disappearance of evidence. At the 
same time, this is at odds with the improvements promised by an EU candidate 
country. The so-called ‘zero tolerance’ attitude on torture, as announced by 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, has not been realised. To conclude with respect to 
human rights in Turkey, we can look at the US State Department’s Annual 
Report on Human Rights. The report on the Republic of Turkey describes the 
deficiencies in access to justice, government intervention in the freedom of 
expression and press freedom, and the insufficient protection of vulnerable 
groups and human rights activists in Turkey.12 The European Court of Human 
Rights has also criticised lengthy pre-trial detention in Turkey. The duration of 
post-trial detention overstepped the limits and is not acceptable either. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
As has been argued in the reports by the United States State Department and 
the European Court of Human Rights, respect for democracy and human rights 
in Turkey remains inadequate. The Government has described its democratic 
aspirations, for which religious and emotional sacrifices have to be made. One 
should also consider the other side of the coin. To recognise demilitarisation is 
one step on the way to democratisation. However, the actual ‘democratisation’ 
of Turkey still has to take place. 
Above all, the question arises as to how to continue with the very 
moderate process of democratisation with respect to human rights in Turkey at 
present. This is not going to be an easy task, because the members of the 
Government were given their undisputed position of power by the Turkish 
people, who are themselves ultimately responsible for this situation. A collective 
transformation of Turkish awareness with respect to human rights thus has to 
take place. First of all, human rights must be recognised by the people. At this 
point, one could ask the famous question: who are ‘the Turkish people’ anyway? 
I would like to refine this question in the light of the evolution of the people since 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded Turkey. After all, since then, all inhabitants of 
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Turkey have had an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the main 
theoretical features of freedom and democracy. So, it is not the theory that is 
lacking, but the fact that the theory has not yet been completely transferred into 
practice. 
Turkey always presents and defends itself as a democratic country 
where freedom and democracy are written in capital letters. But now is the time 
to give people a proper education on these issues. People must be taught what 
integrity, acceptance and tolerance stand for. Additionally, they must learn to 
question decisions and to discuss differences and diversities. International and 
Turkish organisations can heighten awareness of human rights among people 
of any age. The raising of awareness and the internalisation of democracy can 
only be achieved through education. These training programmes and seminars 
should not be restricted to Ankara and Istanbul, but widely spread over the 
country. A people that is well educated in politics and that can observe and 
understand decision procedures can also respond to the self-awareness (if not 
arrogance) of the Government.  
Government officials should not represent their own interests, but those 
of the people. It is important not to classify the society in terms of Kemalists and 
Conservatives and to exclude others (as is the case in present-day Turkey), but 
to approach every citizen as an integral part of the people. On the institutional 
level, Turkey needs an office of internationally well-respected organisations for 
human rights, where people can attend educational activities on these matters. 
An annex of the European Court of Human Rights would be ideal, but is 
probably not feasible. Either way, there should be an Ombudsman to whom 
citizens can go to get unbiased information on human rights. Finally, the various 
European Committees (of the EU and/or Council of Europe) should take 




Part F - Conclusion 
 







In the last three years, CESS and its Turkish partners have organised seminars 
and workshops in Ankara and Istanbul on good governance in the security 
sector. At these meetings, Turkish, European and US experts discussed the 
challenge of managing the security sector in ways that are both effective and 
accountable. Some of them have contributed chapters to this book. In this final 
chapter, we will pick up some of their points and review them in the context of a 
broader discussion of good governance, what this means, and how it can be 
applied to the security sector. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary,1 ‘governance’ means ‘the 
action or manner of governing a state, organization.’2 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
politicians, development agencies and scholars took a growing interest in the 
way government departments and private sector organisations are managed. 
Corporate governance falls outside the scope of this book, but the development 




Good Governance in the Development Industry 
These days, scholars and practitioners in the field of development believe that 
poverty and underdevelopment are not mainly due to a lack of capital or 
education, poor infrastructure, insufficient access to technology, a skewed 
division of wealth or inequality in international trade. According to the current 
paradigm, these all contribute to underdevelopment, but the most fundamental 
problem is the poor performance of state institutions and services; that is, bad 
governance. There is wide agreement in the development industry that 
improving governance is the key to achieving the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) is the most prominent architect and advocate of this approach. 
In 1997, UNDP’s chief executive, James Gustavo Speth, wrote the 
preface to a seminal report called Governance for Sustainable Development. 
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He wrote: ‘Wherever change is for the better, wherever the human condition is 
improving, people point to good governance as the key.’3 
The report explained that so far, good governance had mostly been 
measured in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. While affirming that these 
were essential, the report focused its attention on societal characteristics. It 
defined good governance as follows: 
Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels … 
Good governance is, amongst other things, participatory, transparent 
and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the 
rule of law. Good governance ensures that the political, social and 
economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that 
the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in decision-
making over the allocation of development resources.4 
In the 15 years that followed, UNDP and others elaborated the notion of good 
governance, increasingly replacing it with the term ‘democratic governance.’ 
Scholars may frown at the interchangeable use of these terms, but the fact is 
that practitioners and policymakers rarely distinguish between them. A 2010 
report called A Guide to UNDP Democratic Government Practice asked: 
What does it mean to promote ‘good governance’ for human 
development? There is no single or simple answer. But much 
discussion about the definition of good governance has centred on what 
makes institutions and rules more effective and efficient, in order to 
achieve equity, transparency, participation, responsiveness, 
accountability and the rule of law.5 
This is a tall order, not only in Central Africa or the Sahel, but also in the 
Caribbean, the Middle East and South and Central Asia. Merilee S. Grindle of 
Harvard University describes the development industry’s good governance 
agenda as unrealistically long and growing longer. The changes required to 
deliver good governance are staggering, but expectations are high nonetheless. 
Grindle recommends aiming for ‘good enough governance.’6 She points out that 
it is particularly problematic to require rapid progress towards good government 
from states that need massive amounts of foreign aid to fight poverty and 
underdevelopment. Almost inevitably, their state institutions are weak, 
ineffective, inefficient and of dubious integrity. Even if rulers wanted to push 
through such reforms quickly to clear the way for international assistance, they 
would fail. 
                                                 
3
 UNDP 1997, 1. 
4
 Ibid., 4. 
5
 UNDP 2010, 15. 
6
 Grindle 2004, 199. 
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Security Sector Reform and Governance 
Now let us consider the security sector. Here, the obstacles to governance 
reform are even greater. Military, intelligence and police forces are likely to 
resist efforts to make them more accountable and transparent more strongly 
and more successfully than civilian government agencies. Governments may 
flatly refuse to carry out such reforms for fear of losing the support of their 
security forces. 
Yet the donor countries’ doctrine for security sector reform (SSR), 
written by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in collaboration with Western and Northern European governments and 
experts, is just as adamant as UNDP about the need for good governance. 
Their approach, codified in the 2007 Handbook on Security System Reform, 
was produced by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the 
body that co-ordinates the overseas development policies of all Western donor 
states.7 
It is remarkable that the industrialised countries allowed – in fact invited 
– a development organisation to formulate a common donor policy for 
international security assistance. Of course, security experts were closely 
involved in the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 
which produced the SSR handbook. But the OECD DAC made no secret of the 
fact that this new doctrine for security assistance was a development approach. 
The predominant notions in current development policy were enshrined in the 
new policy for supporting reform of the security sector.8 The EU policies9 on 
SSR are very similar. 
The OECD policy for supporting SSR is built on four guiding principles, 
which fall into two pairs. The first are effectiveness and accountability. SSR is 
supposed to improve the delivery of security and justice services in such a way 
that citizens are safer and feel safer. The Western SSR doctrine by no means 
plays down the importance of national security, maintaining law and order, or 
upholding the constitutional foundations of the state. But, in line with current 
Western thinking on development, it maintains that the ultimate test of the 
security and justice system is whether it provides for the safety of every woman, 
man and child. Human security is key in this area, just as human development 
is the shibboleth of the development community. 
There are sound reasons for this heavy emphasis. In reality, national 
security forces are often a threat to the safety and the peace of mind of the 
people they are supposedly protecting. Indeed, people often fear the police and 
                                                 
7
 OECD 2007. 
8
 OECD DAC prefers the term ‘security system’, which encompasses all people and 
organisations involved in providing and overseeing security and justice services. 
9
 There are three policy documents: one for the Council, one for the Commission and a 
third to harmonise the first two. 
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the military more than they fear criminals and terrorists. Therefore, there is a 
need to ensure that the security forces are using their power in the right way. 
Unless they are tightly controlled by the government, overseen by parliament, 
accountable to the courts and closely monitored by civil society and 
independent media, they are unlikely to provide human security. Human 
security can only be protected if the power of the security sector is balanced by 
full accountability. Thus the first two guiding principles of SSR are locked to 
each other in a dialectic relationship. 
The next two are sustainability and local ownership. Ten years ago, the 
security community was completely unfamiliar with these two notions. 
Sustainability can mean various things. It often refers to the careful use of 
natural resources, but here we can simply take it to mean effectiveness today 
and tomorrow. In development co-operation, sustainability often serves as 
shorthand for the ability to keep going when foreign aid has come to an end. Of 
course, foreign aid means more than foreign money. It is equally important for 
the security system to be sustainable in terms of the continued availability of the 
right people in the required numbers, continued political support and the 
continued confidence of the public. 
The requirement of local ownership means that SSR should be driven 
and led by relevant groups in the country concerned. In development jargon, 
these are called stakeholders. The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR argues that 
unless the programme to improve the security sector is based on domestic 
needs, priorities and ideas, and led by local people, it will not be appropriate, 
much less sustainable. If SSR is determined by the aims, concerns, ways of 
working and schedules of the donors, it may achieve some useful results, but it 
will correspond poorly to local needs and will most likely break down when 
foreign aid comes to an end. 
This makes sense. Nevertheless, local ownership is rightfully 
considered the biggest challenge, if not the Achilles’ heel of SSR. The first 
problem here is that the interests and goals of host country governments are 
not the same as donors’. The former usually want to use foreign aid to 
modernise their security forces, while the latter push for the security forces to be 
reduced in size, trained to respect human rights, overseen by a strong 
parliament and scrutinised by free media and society. Even if donor 
governments do want to make the recipient country’s security forces stronger, 
their parliaments will often require them to demand improved transparency, 
accountability, the rule of law and the empowerment of vulnerable groups as a 
condition for foreign aid. 
To be sure, there may be groups in the recipient country, not 
associated with the government, who agree with the demands of the donors. 
The wishes and concerns of these ‘stakeholders’ may lend legitimacy to the 
donors’ efforts to push through SSR programmes that the national government 
is reluctant to accept. This is the second problem of local ownership. As the 
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OECD DAC readily admits, SSR is highly political. It enhances the power of 
oversight bodies, empowers marginalised groups and qualifies the power of the 
executive. No wonder that host country governments have mixed feelings about 
such efforts, which spring from a strategy devised in the North for use in the 
South. 
This, then, is the third problem of local ownership. Here too, the OECD 
DAC is candid. It frankly presents its SSR doctrine as a donor strategy, arguing 
that industrialised countries cannot and should not prescribe how developing 
countries should organise their security systems. They can merely devise a 
common policy for helping developing countries to do this. 
This is true and proper, as far as it goes. However, if the recipient 
countries are heavily dependent on foreign aid, they will have little choice but to 
comply with the conditions under which assistance is offered. And if the donors 
are all following the same strategy, in this case the OECD DAC doctrine for 
SSR assistance, then the recipients will be unable to play the donors off against 
each other. In such a situation, donor conditionality becomes a diktat, and local 
ownership a pretence. The OECD DAC concedes that local ownership often 
leaves much to be desired at the beginning of a programme, and encourages 
donors to make enhancement of local ownership one of the goals of SSR 
assistance programmes.10 
Despite the many difficulties it faces and evokes, however, good 
governance is essential to the success of the security sector. Drawing on some 
of the preceding chapters, let us consider some of the challenges facing the 
security sector in Turkey. Turkey is, of course, no longer considered a 
developing country. It is reforming its security system, partly under the influence 
of the requirements of accession to the EU. It receives some foreign aid for 
such purposes. But, as I have argued elsewhere, its reforms are determined 
more by its government’s policies and interests than by foreign requirements 
such as the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire.11 The donor 
strategy for SSR is not a foreign requirement, as Turkey is a founding member 
of the OECD. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will not be able to mention all the 
excellent contributions in this book. I have selected those that seem most 
directly relevant to my focus on good governance.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 Edward Joseph argues that local ownership is overrated (Joseph 2007). Laurie Nathan 
firmly argues in favour of local ownership, but admits that it faces many problems, both in 
host and in donor countries. The former often lack the capacity or the political will to 
seriously reform the security sector, whereas in the latter, local ownership is often no 
more than a rhetorical device (Nathan 2008). 
11
 Faltas 2012. 
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Political Accountability 
Van Eekelen (chapter I) stresses the need for ‘the clearly defined authority of 
the president, prime minister, minister of defence, chief of the general staff and 
parliament’. This might seem self-evident, but it deserves to be emphasised. 
Effective governance starts with clear mandates and a coherent division of 
powers, founded on law. 
According to our authors, in Turkey, there is a lack of clarity 
surrounding the roles of the TGS, the MGK, the Prime Minister’s Office, the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the TGNA in the 
making of defence and security policy. In NATO countries, as well as EU 
member states, the Ministry of Defence is the principal organisation engaged in 
developing and implementing defence policy. In Turkey, as Solmaztürk explains 
in chapter VIII, this job falls to the TGS, which acts like a second ministry of 
defence. The TGS is, of course, a military organisation. This raises the question 
as to which civilian government authority provides political guidance to the TGS 
and is accountable to Parliament in matters of defence. 
Clearly, the Minister of National Defence in Turkey does not perform 
this role. In 2011, there were reports that the Turkish Government intended to 
create an integrated MoD as the main locus of defence-policy-making, under 
the political leadership of the minister. Solmaztürk warmly recommends this; 
and indeed, many Turkish and foreign experts share this opinion. However, it 
has not happened so far. 
While the MGK ‘is nominally responsible for the overall co-ordination 
and compilation of national security policy,’ writes Solmaztürk, the MGK is not in 
charge of the armed forces and not accountable to the TGNA. Prior to the 
reforms of 2003 and 2004, the MGK was dominated by the military and served 
to obtain the co-operation of other departments with the policies designed by 
the TGS. Its role and authority are now much reduced. 
Increasingly, the Prime Ministry and, more particularly, its Directorate 
General for Security Affairs, are now co-ordinating national security policy, at 
least formally.12 According to the Constitution, the chief of the TGS reports to 
the Prime Minister in times of peace. This means that normally, the Prime 
Minister is the political boss of the military. Despite his formidable qualities, 
however, the Turkish Prime Minister does not provide daily political guidance to 
the military. He lacks the time, the staff, the expertise and perhaps also the 
desire. 
In 2012, General İlker Başbuğ was arrested and accused of being a 
member of a terrorist organisation and plotting against the government while he 
was Chief of the TGS. If these charges prove to be true, which I find hard to 
imagine, they would mean that Prime Minister Erdoğan is politically responsible 
                                                 
12
 In times of war, he performs the duties of the Commander in Chief on behalf of the 
President of the Republic. 
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for these crimes, because they were committed by an official who reported 
directly to him. As far as I can tell, this point has hardly been raised in Turkey. 
The conclusion must be that there is no government authority that 
provides detailed civil direction and political guidance to the military in Turkey. 
 
 
Coherent Policy Guidance 
The lack of clarity about the political leadership of the Turkish defence 
establishment is not only an issue of accountability. It also affects the quality of 
policy formation and implementation. A few years ago, when I was teaching 
during a CESS programme in Ukraine, I asked the participants what Ukraine’s 
policy on accession to the NATO was. They said the answer depended on 
whether you listen to the president or the prime minister. At the time, the two 
were bitter rivals. Of course, if a country has two contradictory official policies 
on an issue, it actually has none. Voters will not know what the government’s 
goals are, nor will the officials at various government agencies. Depending on 
the political affiliations of their bosses, they will support one policy or the other, 
and end up working at cross purposes. The result is bad governance. 
There is less confusion in Turkey. Everyone knows who Number One is; 
if Recep Tayyip Erdoğan makes a policy statement, it is usually safe to assume 
that that this is the policy the government will pursue. These days, we can also 
expect the military to fall into line. But the Prime Minister does not pronounce on 
all defence and security matters. One can only imagine the complicated process 
of consultation that preceded the recent government decision to ask NATO 
allies for help in defending Turkey’s southern border against hostile aircraft and 
missiles. 
Mercan (chapter X) points out that the Turkish military is nowadays 
largely separate from civilian institutions, and this lack of institutional co-
operation leads the military to use informal mechanisms such as press 
conferences and briefings to make their views known. Better institutional co-
operation would make such public statements (which may be regarded as 
improper meddling by the military in politics) and confrontations with the 
government unnecessary. 
Mercan is not in favour of establishing the primacy of the elected 
government as a civilian power over the armed forces. This leaves open the 
question of the political accountability of the military. Instead, he advocates 
close collaboration between the two pillars of the defence and security 
establishment of the Republic. He points to the need for ‘equality in council and 
harmonisation of effects,’ and stresses the need for shared valued between 
civilians and soldiers. 
Sadık (chapter XI) also calls for closer and better institutional co-
operation in the development and execution of security policy, drawing his 
examples from the field of anti-terrorism. He stresses the need for such 
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mechanisms to be more democratic and more accountable. This, he asserts, 
will make counter-terrorism more effective and sustainable in the long run. 
 
 
The Purse and the Sword  
In chapter III, Van Driel describes the incident that decided the democratic 
nature of the Dutch political system once and for all. It was not a civil war, a 
revolution or a new constitution. It was a struggle in 1868 between Parliament 
and the King, initially about the budget of the foreign ministry. The outcome was 
that the elected representatives of the people became the ultimate state 
authority, whose mightiest weapon is the power of the purse. The Dutch 
Government cannot spend a single euro without the specific approval of 
Parliament, laid down in a budget law. If the Dutch Parliament wants to express 
its dissatisfaction with a minister, it sometimes reduces the minister’s budget by 
one euro. The financial effect is nil, but as a political signal, this measure is 
highly effective. If Parliament is not happy, the minister has a problem. 
Parliament may be the highest authority in a democratic system, but it 
cannot match the power of the executive, which has more money, information, 
staff and media access, plus the advantage of being more united. In most areas, 
parliaments can only oversee the actions of the executive in broad outlines, ask 
questions and pass resolutions. Inquiries are more intrusive. Nothing matches 
budgetary control, however, as a parliamentary instrument for influencing 
government policy. 
In chapter IV, Şatana discusses the control of defence-related 
expenditure in Turkey in some detail, drawing partly on unpublished research 
funded by the CESS. She flags the existence of defence-related funds that are 
not allocated by Parliament and not subject to parliamentary control. Parliament 
has much less influence over activities funded via such extra-budgetary 
revenues, hence democratic control is weaker. Şatana also laments the fact 
that the budget for some parts of the armed forces, specifically the Gendarmerie 
and the Coast Guard, is not available. This makes budgetary control impossible, 
unless Parliament decides to reject the defence budget as a whole. 
Parliaments control government spending before the fact, by allocating 
funds or withholding them. They also control expenditure after the fact, by 
checking to see how government has used the money granted by parliament. 
For this purpose, there are specialised, independent audit organisations, which 
are among the least known, but most powerful, state bodies. Sayiştay, the 
Turkish Court of Accounts, has been struggling for years to acquire the right to 
audit all military spending, and for the access that will allow them to perform this 
duty. Both have proved difficult to obtain. 
In late 2010, the powers of Sayiştay to audit military expenditure were 
significantly enlarged, paving the way for audits of extra-budgetary resources 
earmarked for the defence sector. However, one and a half years later, a law 
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was passed that turned back the clock, curtailing the auditing powers of the 
Court of Accounts and introducing a secrecy clause that limited the information 
available to the public on military assets and expenditures. It comes as no 
surprise that Şatana considers the auditing of defence expenditures one of the 
most problematic issues of civil-military relations in Turkey. 
 
 
The Rule of Law 
In the section on SSR and governance, I mentioned the fact that while the 
armed officers of the state are supposed to protect the population, citizens 
sometimes see them as a threat. The law is the only protection that citizens 
have against abuse of power by security forces. If such abuse is prosecuted 
and punished by independent judicial authorities, this will serve as a deterrent. It 
will also signal to the population that the law is there for their protection and not 
merely for the rich and powerful. The fair, equitable and independent application 
of the law is one of the strongest pillars of good governance in the security 
sector. 
Toprak (chapter XII) discusses the state of human rights in Turkey. He 
sees potential progress: conventions have been ratified, laws have been 
passed and improved, watchdogs have been established, and training 
programmes have been put in place. But when it comes to really pushing back 
the violation of human rights, the picture is much less encouraging. Complaints 
to the European Court of Human Rights abound. The freedom of the press 
seems to be going from bad to worse, and this is affecting the reporting of 
human rights violations. Pre-trial detention is widely criticised at home and 
abroad. Despite government promises, torture has not been eradicated. 
Turkish officers, up to former chiefs of staff, are now among the victims 
of political meddling in the judiciary, long pre-trial detention and other violations 
of the rule of law. Snoep (chapter V) reminds us that soldiers are citizens, 
whose human rights and civil liberties deserve protection. Their rights are no 
less valid than those of civilians. Besides, soldiers are more likely to respect 
citizens’ rights if their own rights are safeguarded and they receive the respect 
they are due. 
 
 
The Triangle of Good Governance  
Good governance is not easy to achieve, and the security sector is perhaps one 
of the areas in which it is most elusive. But it is essential, most particularly in the 
domain of security, for all the reasons discussed above. 
There are three sides to good governance: we can call them 
effectiveness, affordability/efficiency and legitimacy. They go together. If we 
were to try to separate them, we would no longer have good governance, just 
as a triangle without three sides would cease to be a triangle. If the security 
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sector is not effective – in other words, if it is not performing its purpose – it will 
begin to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the people and their representatives. 
Without public support, it will receive fewer resources and less political backing. 
This will further undermine its performance. 
The three sides go together, but each side needs special attention. In 
the last two decades, the Dutch military has become a more effective force, 
increasingly focusing on its new mission: the maintenance of international 
peace, security and the rule of law. It has gained public respect and support in 
the process. It has learned to use its resources more efficiently, too. However, 
the willingness to provide the armed forces with the resources they need, at a 
lower level of ambition, has not grown accordingly. Politicians have failed to 
explain to the voters why we cannot afford to go on cutting the defence budget. 
This side of the triangle needs more attention. 
In Turkey, it seems to me that the defence establishment needs to work 
on legitimacy and effectiveness. Improved political accountability and 
transparency will inspire confidence amongst the citizens and Turkey’s friends 
abroad. Improved coherence and collaboration will make Turkish defence policy 
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